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Abstract	  
 
Sustainability reporting (SR) is the practice of communicating environmental, 
social, and economic information and initiatives of a company (largely non-financial) to 
their stakeholders. This practice has been inspired by a variety of factors, including the 
recent threat of climate change, the financial crisis, and evolving governance models. 
There are many different policies being used around the world to implement SR. Some of 
these policies are voluntary, allowing the company to choose whether they report and 
what content to include. Others are more mandatory and government-regulated with 
specific requirements and various compliance mechanisms.  
Minimal research has been done on the governance of SR and the extent to which 
reports are achieving their policy goals. Through the creation of a sustainability 
scorecard, and a policy analysis of case countries, this study assesses if mandatory or 
voluntary standards are more effective for sustainability disclosures. Reports governed by 
mandatory legislation and reports under a voluntary standard are evaluated according to 
sustainability reporting criteria developed from semi-structured interview and literature 
themes. The countries studied are illuminated through a mapping analysis of SR policies, 
where the most mandatory-driven policy countries and the most voluntary-driven policy 
countries are used for the final assessment of effectiveness. This study provides structure 
to the complex policy mix, not only on the degree to which a policy is legally binding and 
mandatory, but also to its relative effectiveness to the developed criteria. The results of 
this study suggest that although the implementation method of mandatory or voluntary 
may not significantly impact reporting effectiveness at this time, mandatory countries 
score higher on most qualities on the sustainability reporting scorecard.  
 
Keywords: Sustainability reporting · mandatory regulation · voluntary standards · 
sustainable development · policy    
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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  
 
1.1	  Problem	  Statement	  	  
In sustainability reporting (SR), there is a mix of both mandatory and voluntary 
standards for reports (GRI et al., 2013). The reasons why some jurisdictions have SR 
policies mandated by the government while others are using voluntary ones does not 
appear to be studied in great detail (Perrini, 2005). There is an international debate on 
what the best policy structure is for SR, if any at all. Mandatory policies, often called 
hard law, aim at overcoming societal critiques of the private sector, and enhancing the 
comparability of corporate performance (Sulkowski & Waddock, 2014). Voluntary 
standards create incentives for companies to report, as a way to establish competitive 
advantage (Buhr, 2010). Moreover, despite reporting rates of 93% among the G250, the 
rate of SR increase is beginning to slow (KPMG, 2013; Morrow and Yow, 2014). This 
plateau suggests that voluntary reporting may have reached its peak, and other policy 
alternatives need to be explored. An assessment of achieving reporting objectives 
suggests if one model should be preferred over others, adding clarity to the unclear nature 
of SR policies at the present moment.  
 This study has a professional significance and contribution. It can fill a current 
gap in policy whereby the plethora of standards available makes comparability and 
usefulness of reports difficult to achieve. Current sustainability reports provide a wide 
scope of information, at varying levels of quality (Hess and Dunfee, 2007). Few studies 
have reviewed the quality of disclosures in sustainability reports (Hess and Dunfee, 
2007). Investors have voiced these concerns, as reporting standards vary across different 
regions and countries, making comparability difficult (CDSB, 2012). The lack of an audit 
standard adds more complexity to the debate, as it becomes quite easy for companies to 
be selective on what they disclose. This selectiveness exists even within mandatory 
regulation, with exemption clauses (Hohnen, 2012; GRI, 2013c). Mandatory regulation of 
sustainability reporting does not initially present itself to be a strong alternative to 
voluntary practices, as companies may be ignoring compliance requirements. The extent 
to which this neglect is occurring has not been studied in great detail (CDSB, 2012). 
The current environmental challenge of climate change, the overconsumption of 
natural resources, and social concerns around income inequality and worker health and 
safety are some sustainability concerns faced by businesses globally (Brockett and 
Rezaee, 2012a; KPMG, 2013). The effectiveness of SR governance structures is crucial, 
given the past financial crisis and its resultant call for corporate accountability to alleviate 
the erosion of public trust and repeated government bailouts (Brockett and Rezaee, 
2012a; 2012b). Addressing the aforementioned issues cannot occur with a mere “coping 
strategy”, as Mitchell (2011) argues on voluntary standards generally, that “both the 
large-scale ‘neoliberal privileging of market-based solutions’ and the more direct 
influence of those who will be required to disclose may lead to a particular form of 
disclosure that ‘largely exempts corporate actors from stringent disclosure’ ” (p.1883). 
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Although this research may not resolve the debate, it contributes to the larger debate 
around which governance structures firms should aspire to in private sector exchanges. 
 
1.1.1	  Significance	  of	  the	  Problem	  	  
The effectiveness of sustainability reporting policy is important, due the impact 
that sustainability disclosures have on companies and society. SR is therefore important 
for a number of reasons. First, it helps management gain a better internal understanding 
of their corporate operations and impacts (Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a). Second, it 
provides enhanced external information to other stakeholders, which can have a financial 
impact and broader social impacts with respect to maintaining social license from the 
public through fulfilling stakeholder’s “right to know” (Fung et al., 2007). This can be 
referred to as “the principle of legitimacy” which holds that a company must gain societal 
acceptance, as they owe a responsibility to the society that gives them their higher power 
in the first place (Hahn & Lulfs, 2013). Third, SR needs to fulfill the objectives it was 
meant to serve. It can offer many benefits, such as creating shared value for society, 
management, and employees (Eccles and Krzus, 2010; Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a). 
However, these benefits can become difficult to articulate when the definition of 
sustainability is still widely debated, and when the formats of reports are heterogeneous 
(Moneva et al., 2006; Hahn & Lulfs, 2013; Herzig & Schaltegger, 2011). Should SR 
maintain its notoriety for being a public relations scheme, the deeper goals of mitigating 
climate change, protecting employee rights, and operating ethical supply chains will not 
be achieved (Gray & Milne, 2007; Hahn & Lulfs, 2013). SR has great potential, due to its 
internal and external benefit for the organization. However, if driven down an inefficient 
policy path, such as through unproductive regulation or diluted private requirements, the 
practice should be re-assessed and modified.  
 
1.2	  Contribution	  
Recent reports on SR touch upon different global policies, and the quality of 
reports (GRI et al. 2013; KPMG, 2013). However, there is no approach that evaluates the 
normativity of these policies; their degree of mandatory and voluntary regulation has not 
been addressed nor tested for effectiveness, and has been identified as a gap in the 
literature (Scholtz et al., 2014; Van der Esch & Steurer, 2014). The mandatory-voluntary 
debate exists in environmental governance more broadly, and the outcomes of these 
policies are still uncertain (Gupta, 2008). Meanwhile, other disciplines are just beginning 
to recognize the implications of governance structures on sustainability outcomes. Eccles 
and Krzus (2010) make a parallel to financial reporting stating, “…if no framework for 
nonfinancial reporting has risen to the level of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) or U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Standards (GAAP), an 
increasing number of companies have been experimenting…” (p.116). This 
“experimenting” has lead to a lack of a succinct objective for SR, and has created a 
myriad of policies that need to be revealed and understood. This study can respond to this 
void.   
This study offers three contributions. Each contribution is associated with a sub-
study in the Methods chapters. In sub study 1, this study offers a new set of generalized 
criteria for assessing sustainability reports. The quality-based criteria outlines what is 
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important in SR through considering best practices in the literature and common themes 
from interviews with experts in sustainability reporting. Existing models that use qualities 
for evaluating reports, such as the UNEP/SustainAbility evaluation framework and the 
Reporting Criteria developed by KPMG (Figure 20 and 21 in the Appendix) will also be 
considered as guidance. The developed criteria can offer a preliminary integrative model 
of scattered conceptions of what SR should include.  
Secondly, through sub study 2, this study analyzes and plots countries’ sustainability 
reporting policies on a scale that measures policy prescription. Mapping the international 
policy mix of SR will offer a structure to this wide-ranging practice (GRI et al., 2013). 
Adams and Whelan (2009) identify this gap, calling for a “scanning of the environment” 
of corporate social disclosure (CSD), noting that for managers to change their corporate 
strategy, they must identify role models and evaluate governance models for 
organizational change: 
 
“…Some actors will be inclined to see legislation or, alternatively, soft 
government regulation, as the answer to all ills that exist in regard to existing 
patterns of CSD [corporate social disclosure]; while other actors will be likely to 
see governments as being of no help as a result of them being slow to move and 
excessively constrained by political pressures. These differing viewpoints will 
have a major influence on the strategies employed by various actors as they try to 
achieve their desired ends” (Adams & Whelan, 2009, p.136). 
 
Policy mapping, and the following review of reports in sub study 3, creates a basis for 
management and governments to benchmark sustainability performance. 
Lastly, in sub study 3, this study uses the developed criteria, which will be in a 
scorecard format, to assess the effectiveness of the mandatory versus voluntary 
sustainability reporting, the goal of this study. This part of the study assesses if 
mandatory or voluntary standards make a difference in the adherence of the reports to 
sustainability criteria; this is the goal of the study.  
1.3	  Research	  Question	  and	  Objectives	  
 
In considering the recent trend in voluntary and mandatory SR, the research question is: 
 
“How effective1 are mandatory sustainability reporting standards in comparison to 
voluntary sustainability reporting standards?” 
 
There may be a null hypothesis present, which would be:  
NH: There is no ideal or optimal policy for SR, specifically between 
mandatory and voluntary policies.  
 
There is an independent variable (IV) and dependent variable (DV): 
IV: Adherence of SR to Effectiveness/Best Practices Criteria 
DV: SR Implementation Method (voluntary v. mandatory) 
                                                
1 I explain what I mean by this word “effectiveness” below in the limitations section, as well as in the 
literature review. The concept of effectiveness used for this study relates to the IV and DV.  
  
4 
 
The difference between mandatory and voluntary sustainability policies may appear to be 
too contextual with no optimum policy. Yet, this null hypothesis reveals a gap that needs 
to be tested. In researching the effectiveness of policies, this thesis can address if there is 
a better policy to adopt, and assess if this intuition is true. 
 
In order to answer this question on policy form (Sub Study 3 in Chapter 5), it is necessary 
to conduct two sub-studies: 
- Sub study 1. Sustainability Reporting Criteria Development, in the form of a scorecard 
(Chapter 3) 
- Sub study 2. Policy Mapping (Chapter 4) 
 
The structure of the thesis identifies each sub-study’s method and the findings, which are 
then incorporated into the main inquiry in sub study 3, to assess the effectiveness of 
mandatory versus voluntary reporting standards.  
 
Objectives 
I. Discover the key features of both mandatory and voluntary SR policies, and 
the ways information is used in these reports 
II. Define criteria that emerge from the discourse on sustainability reporting best 
practices  
III. Assess the influence governance structures of SR have on the form and 
content of the report  
IV. Inquire if one of these reporting types creates higher quality reports 
 
1.4	  Hypothesis	  of	  the	  Researcher	  
Current literature consistently discusses the European Union as a collection of 
states that place more attention on regulating environmental and social disclosures in 
comparison to other areas, such as North America (Perrini, 2005; GRI et al., 2013; Gray, 
Owen & Adams, 1996; KPMG, 2013). Moreover, companies from countries with a 
stakeholder approach (i.e. Scandinavia) tend to have higher quality reporting than those 
countries with a shareholder approach (i.e. North America)  (Kolk and Perego, 2010). 
Recent research on stock exchange requirements – particularly around sustainability 
disclosures (i.e. South Africa) – finds that policies that are mandatory, prescriptive, and 
broad, have the strongest correlation to sustainability disclosure excellence (Morrow et 
al., 2013, p.4). This initial data suggests that the mandated reporting may lead to higher 
quality reporting.  
North America is often characterized as a more apprehensive regulatory 
environment, as they tend to focus on voluntary disclosure of community initiatives, as 
opposed to sustainability (Kolk, 2008; Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996). European countries 
appear to be the most consistent sustainability reporters, with the highest quality 
sustainability reports on average (Kolk, 2010; KPMG, 2013). A historical review of 
sustainability reporting further suggests that social reporting and employee reporting have 
been common practices in European countries, such as the UK, Denmark, Germany, and 
Finland, for quite some time (Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a; Gray et al., 1988). In 
considering these trends, it is predicted that mandatory reporting countries will have more 
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effective reports than those in voluntary reporting countries, due to their legislative 
history and predicted higher quality. 
1.5	  Methods	  Summary	  
Despite existing research on voluntary versus mandatory standards, and a current 
divergence in how sustainability reporting is governed, these two debates have not yet 
aligned. However, the practice of sustainability reporting suggests that companies are in a 
period of experimentation where research on reporting governance and quality could be 
useful. The absence of an approach that evaluates these policies and their respective 
outcomes, coupled with the imminent sustainability issues facing the companies and 
society, suggest that this gap in research is relevant for recommending future policy 
strategies for reporting. Moreover, corporate communications have the power to 
influence investors, communities, governments, and civilians in a way that has great 
potential for societal change and positive contributions to sustainable development (R. 
Gray, pers.comm., Jan. 14, 2015).  
The methods will exist in three parts. The first part will be the creation of SR 
criteria, through the literature, and through six interviews conducted with sustainability 
professionals from professional service firms, academia, and NGOs. Through open-ended 
questions, professionals provided their perspective on what best practices in sustainability 
reporting are, enhancing the credibility of the established criteria. The criteria aim to 
balance the level of prescription, so as to be generic enough for international application, 
but with enough specificity to avoid being interpreted. By using a range of sources to 
inform the criteria, the prediction is that there will be recurring qualities of reports. The 
data will be analyzed inductively, being built from particular attributes of reports 
(discovered through existing policies, models, and theories) to general themes (Creswell, 
2014).  
The second part will be mapping the policy mix on a spectrum that assesses the 
extent to which the policy is mandatory compared to the extent to which the policy is 
voluntary.2 This mapping exercise will reveal two countries primarily driven by 
mandatory policies, and two countries driven by voluntary ones. Only OECD countries 
will be included, with the exception of South Africa due to their advances in integrated 
reporting. Seven countries are mapped on the governance spectrum, being judged by their 
sustainability disclosure and reporting policies currently in existence. The coding 
protocol will be based on the degree of prescription of the policies in place (if 
applicable), and the range of topics disclosed. Two countries at the mandatory end of the 
spectrum and two countries at the voluntary end will be evaluated. The legal structures 
and strength of the institutions in a country may need to be considered (Ioannou & 
Serafeim, 2011; Adams & Whelan, 2009). 
Thirdly, the reports from companies in the four countries will be measured for 
effectiveness. Because larger companies tend to be impacted by mandatory standards and 
voluntary ones, the largest publically traded companies in each case country will be 
reviewed (GRI et al., 2013; KPMG, 2013). 10 reports per country (40 reports total) are 
assessed according to the extent to which these companies are aware of compliance, and 
                                                
2 Similar qualitative mapping has been performed in the new governance literature, specifically based on 
the attributes of obligation, delegation, and precision, through a coding criteria on a three-part scale of 
strong, moderate, and low (Abbott & Snidal, 2000, p.424).  
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the extent to which their reports follow the sustainability reporting scorecard. Through 
the results of sub-study 1 and 2, the research question is addressed.  
1.5.1	  Paradigm	  	  
The paradigm of thesis is the constructivist paradigm, whereby meanings are 
constructed through interactions with others and the world (Creswell, 2014). Because this 
study is highly contextual due to its global scope and variety of policies assessed, the 
constructivist paradigm allows one to recognize national differences and governance 
trends. Constructivist paradigms are generally inductive and require data collection from 
the field, which the mapping activity and report assessment require. Because each 
country has its own regulations, multiple participant meanings are inevitable, a feature of 
constructivist paradigm. This thesis will touch upon empirical, analytical, and normative 
inquiry. It is empirical through its literature review and interviews. It is analytical in the 
creation of criteria, the mapping exercise, and the review of reports. It is normative in that 
the results can make claims on how SR should be governed, and what reports should 
include. The final assessment of four countries may have predictive value for countries 
with similar attributes and for the case countries (Gibbert et al., 2008).  
 
1.6	  Conceptual	  Framework	  	  
The conceptual framework of this study reveals the theoretical underpinnings of 
this research, explains the methodological path of the study, and shows the connection of 
each step to the research question. It is primarily useful for depicting the multi-method 
process of this study. 
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This conceptual framework will be primarily relied upon in the Methods chapters, 
chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
1.7	  Limitations	  of	  Study	  
There is the possibility that the policy mix may be difficult to fit into a mandatory-
driven and voluntary-driven scheme. Choosing countries will create boundaries around 
the data. The study will also be limited based on the structure of the mapping process. 
Results will not be generalized, as only a small sample in the final assessment of reports. 
However, this appears reasonable given the three-part nature of the methods. Choosing to 
focus at the country-level may overlook regional differences in reporting, but can allow 
results with international implications, and is a common method of evaluation (Abbott & 
Snidal, 2000; KPMG, 2013). 
The term “effectiveness” has been tentatively chosen to refer to the assessment of the 
reports to the sustainability reporting scorecard, and will be discussed further section 2.3. 
Issues such as low targets or exemptions may meet compliance requirements, but do not 
address the broader issues of a policy objective, such as long-term sustainability goals. 
This study will not be analyzing the actual performance of companies, but will focus on 
the form and content of the reports. Hess (2007) notes that companies can conduct 
sustainability reporting, appear accountable, without changing firm behaviour. The 
appearance of disclosures may hide the reality of a company’s true performance; this 
study will not consider the above in detail, but there is an awareness of it.   
1.#Sustainability#
Repor3ng#Criteria#
2.#Mapping#Policy#Mix#for#
Sustainability#Repor3ng#
Stakeholder+Theory+
New+Governance,+
+Mand/VolDebate+
SR+Literature+
Hybrid+++Mandatory+++ Voluntary+++
3.#Assessment#Against#SR#Criteria#
Disclosure+Theory++
SR+Report+Sample+++
Variables+
IV:+Adherence+of+SR+to+EﬀecHveness/
Best+PracHces+Criteria+
DV:+SR+ImplementaHon+Method+
(Mand.+v.+Vol.)+
Interview++
Themes++
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Chapter	  2:	  Literature	  Review 
 
2.1	  Background	  and	  Context	  	  
2.1.1	  Sustainability	  and	  Corporate	  Behaviour	  	  
Financial crises in North America, Europe, and Asia, the increasing threat of 
climate change, and the heightened activity of civil society movements are motivating 
companies to become more transparent about their financial and nonfinancial impacts and 
performance (Kolk, 2003, 2008; Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a; 2012b; KPMG, 2013). 
Stakeholders and the media expose corporate violations of environmental regulations, 
labour laws, and human rights, threatening the continued existence of companies. Public 
companies, in particular, have wide reaching impacts due to their connectivity not only to 
their employees and surrounding communities, but also to their shareholders who have a 
direct financial relationship with the company. The shifting relations between a company 
and its stakeholders, as well an increasing awareness of a company’s interaction with the 
natural environment, have called into question the sufficiency and accuracy of the annual 
report in providing a snapshot of a firm’s performance and impacts.  
The outcome document of the Rio+20 Conference of 2012 specifically mentioned 
sustainability reporting under Principle 47, and this principle is currently being 
implemented into the working draft of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, 
specifically as Goal 12.6 (UN, 2012; 2014). This goal aims to “encourage companies, 
especially large and trans-national companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to 
integrate sustainability information into their reporting cycle” (UN, 2014). The recent 
international partnership between Brazil, Denmark, France and South Africa at the 
Rio+20 demonstrates the pervasiveness of sustainability reporting governance. This 
partnership, the Group of Friends of Paragraph 47, was inspired during the Rio+20 
Conference in 2012 (GoF47, 2012; Eccles and Krzus, 2014).  
The recognition of the limits of the planet and its resources through international 
reports, such as the Brundtland Report of 1987, creates a need for companies to 
internalize sustainability into current reporting mechanisms, and move from externalizing 
sustainability issues to simple community initiatives (Gladwin et. al, 1995). Internally, 
companies see the potential for value creation that creates long-term relationships with 
employees, suppliers, the planet and its resources. Companies are now being encouraged 
to take on transparent initiatives with the potential of gaining competitive advantage in 
the future (Moon, 2007; Desjardins and Willis, 2009). Externally, there is a demand not 
only for information, but also for continual performance improvements in economic, 
social, and environmental dimensions. It is also useful to stakeholders, who may change 
their patterns of behaviour, such as purchasing patterns or investment decisions, 
depending on their interpretation of the information provided (Mitchell, 2011). 
Sustainability reporting can serve as a tool to bridge this gap. 
2.1.2	  What	  is	  Sustainability	  Reporting?	  	  
Sustainability reporting can be broadly defined as “the process of identifying, 
classifying, measuring, recognizing, and reporting performance in all areas of EGSEE 
(economic, governance, social, ethics, and environmental)” (Brockett and Rezaee, 
2012b). This definition is quite all encompassing, as it mentions the range of steps 
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involved in creating a sustainability report. Sustainability reporting is defined in many 
ways in the literature, but generally addresses the triple bottom line, whereby economic 
growth, environmental protection and social welfare are weighted equally (Elkington, 
1997). The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) presents a triple bottom line inspired 
definition, presenting sustainability reporting as a practice “about the economic, 
environmental and social impacts caused by its everyday activities…[and] also presents 
the organization's values and governance model, and demonstrates the link between its 
strategy and its commitment to a sustainable global economy” (GRI, 2014).  
Sustainability reporting is often synonymous with other titles, including, but not 
limited to: corporate social responsibility reporting, corporate reporting, responsibility 
reporting, corporate environmental reporting, citizenship reporting, triple bottom line 
reporting, environmental, health and safety reporting, and environmental, societal and 
governance (ESG) reporting.3 These terms are used interchangeably, and will collectively 
be referred to as sustainability reporting (Eccles and Krzus, 2010; Brockett and Rezaee, 
2012a; KPMG, 2013). The term “sustainability reporting” is seen as the predominant 
label for disclosing nonfinancial information, and includes reporting on all three aspects 
of the triple bottom line – economic, social, and environmental (Gray & Herremans, 
2011, p.406).  
Sustainability reporting can be regarded as encompassing material typically not 
included in the annual report. Lozano (2013) defines it as, “a voluntary activity with two 
general purposes: (1) to assess the current state of an organisation’s economic, 
environmental and social dimensions, and (2) to communicate a company’s efforts and 
sustainability progress to their stakeholders” (p.58). Because sustainability reporting is a 
relatively new practice, some reports place emphasis on one aspect of the triple bottom 
line (i.e. environmental reporting), while others will include all three dimensions of the 
triple bottom line. Sustainability reports typically include nonfinancial information, or 
“all information reported to shareholders and other stakeholders that is not defined by an 
accounting standard or a calculation of a measure based on an accounting standard” 
(Eccles and Krzus, 2010, p.83). Ioannou & Serafeim (2011), in their discussion of 
mandatory sustainability reporting, find that sustainability reporting aims for a wide 
audience, defining it as: 
 
A firm-issued general purpose non-financial report that provides information to 
investors, stakeholders (e.g., employees, customers and NGOs), and the general 
public about the firm‘s practices involving environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) issues, either as a stand-alone report or as part of an integrated report (p.2). 
 
Thus, the form of a report may vary, but it is meant for a wider audience than financial 
reporting. In defining sustainability reporting as the reporting of nonfinancial 
information, a polarization is created between the sustainability report and the financial 
report. Sustainability reporting typically discloses information not included in financial 
reporting, which is usually governed by its own separate accounting standard and/or 
legislative requirement.  
                                                
3 See Sulkowski & Waddock, 2014; Gray & Herremans, 2011; Lydenberg et al., 2010; Hahn and Lulfs, 
2013 
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Sustainability reporting at the national level, however, may not be refining the 
content and form of reports. Rather, national reporting laws have made the sustainability 
reporting landscape increasingly complicated, with a variety of standards, report formats, 
and compliance mechanisms being utilized. Despite the increase in standardized 
sustainability reporting, the definition of sustainability is still very fluid among 
companies (Langer, 2006; Jensen & Berg, 2012).  
Because sustainability reporting on nonfinancial performance is mainly a 
voluntary practice, companies are able to use a variety of terms to refer to nonfinancial 
information, and the information reported varies from firm to firm (Kolk, 2008; 
Sulkowski & Waddock, 2014). Some countries now include sustainability disclosure 
requirements within legislation, and financial and securities regulation (GRI, 2013; Van 
der Esch & Steurer, 2014; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011, 2014). Some countries call for 
sustainability disclosures in the annual report, while others demand particular sectors to 
report (GRI et al., 2013). Sustainability reporting is thus being redefined and shaped 
through respective national governments. 
2.1.3	  The	  History	  of	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  and	  Current	  Trends	  
The term “sustainability report” became popularized in the 1990’s, after terms 
like “social responsibility” were predominantly used (Gray & Herremans, 2011). The 
term sustainability report is now the most popular coined term for nonfinancial reporting, 
followed by Corporate Social Responsibility Report, and Environmental Report (Lozano, 
2008).  
2.1.3.1	  History	  
Early CSR reports of the 1970’s were heavily focused on social issues, 
particularly labour (Gray et al., 1987; Buhr, 2010). Prior to the 1970’s, there was some 
employee reporting in the UK and the US (Buhr, 2010). The idea of a corporate role 
beyond profit maximization became recognized in Europe in the 1960’s and the 1970’s, 
followed by similar beliefs in the USA. The social accounting movement and high profile 
public issues drove these reports. The social accounting movement was initially led by 
ethical businesses, and spread to become a common practice in large companies (Gray & 
Bebbington, 2002). Consumer associations and social audit companies, particularly in the 
United States and the United Kingdom would publish data on how companies interacted 
with employees, customers, the community, and the environment in order to discharge 
accountability and provide a balanced representation of a company’s social performance 
(Gray & Bebbington, 2002). Environmental reporting experienced a wave of activity in 
the 1980’s, after the surge of social reporting in the 1970’s had subsided due to the lack 
of legislation to keep the practice going (Gray & Bebbington, 2002). Informational 
regulation, also known as regulation by disclosure, was created around this time, too, 
with countries like the United States passing the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act in 1986, creating the Toxics Release Inventory (Sulkowski & 
Waddock, 2014).  
In the 1990’s, separate reports, known as stand alone reports, became increasingly 
popular among large companies, and reporting saw a resurgence of social issues (Gray 
and Milne, 2013). Since then, reporting has moved beyond the social realm, with some 
companies publishing integrated reports, whereby the social and environmental indicators 
are explicitly connected to financial ones (Eccles and Krzus, 2010; Crowther, 2012).   
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Sustainability reporting has become an increasing practice among the world’s 
largest companies. In 2013, approximately 93% of the G250 companies issued a 
sustainability report in some form (KPMG, 2013). In 2001, 45% of the G250 companies 
had sustainability reports (Kolk, 2003). It is important to note that the G250 companies 
are the largest in the world by revenue, and tend to be early reporters. These reports are 
typically voluntary and have two main purposes: to provide an assessment of the current 
state of a firm’s triple bottom line performance, and to communicate efforts and progress 
to a firm’s stakeholders (Lozano & Huisingh, 2011). 
2.1.3.2	  Rise	  of	  Voluntary	  Reporting	  
Voluntary sustainability reports gained prominence in the late 1980’s to early 
1990’s, due to increasing demands from socially responsible investors, and management 
focus on building brand and reputation (Gray and Milne, 2007; Brockett and Rezaee, 
2012a). Moreover, the rise of neoliberalism and recent industrial disasters of the 1980’s 
contributed to changing societal expectations (Gray and Herremans, 2011). Voluntary 
reports were environmentally focused in the beginning, and by the mid 1990’s, took on a 
triple bottom line/sustainability title. These reports were developed as a way to show 
corporations’ accountability to stakeholders, by engaging with environmental and social 
issues (Gray and Herremans, 2011). Voluntary reporting was seen as an advantageous 
way to be transparent about social, environmental, and economic performance, while 
doing it in a flexible way that worked for the collective interest of the industry (Scholtz et 
al., 2014). Many voluntary standards exist that promote sustainability reporting. These 
include the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) sector standards, the 
Climate Disclosure Standards Board Climate Change Reporting Framework, the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP), and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines. Aside 
from the GRI, these particular voluntary standards are quite centered on meeting the 
demands of financial regulators and investor demands, and have no legal power (Jensen 
and Berg, 2012). There is also debate as to whether the existence of a separate report 
increases corporate accountability or not (Gray and Herremans, 2011).  
2.1.3.3	  Rise	  of	  Mandatory	  Reporting	  and	  a	  Legislative	  Mix	  
In considering the current mix of voluntary and mandatory reporting, legislated 
sustainability reporting is a predicted trend for the future (IRSE, 2012). The first legal 
requirements for sustainability reporting occurred with the 1997 Finnish Accounting Act 
(Brockett and Rezaee, 2012). Between 1995 and 1997, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Sweden drafted legislation for annual disclosure of environmental 
performance (Hess, 2007). A joint study by international organizations concluded that of 
180 national sustainability reporting policies reviewed from 45 countries, 72% of these 
were mandatory to some degree (GRI et al., 2013). There has also been a “smart 
regulations approach” to sustainability reporting, whereby there is a mix of voluntary and 
mandatory reporting, existing on a spectrum of different types of regulation and standards 
(Herzig and Schaltegger, 2011).4 
                                                
4 It is recognized through the work of GRI et al. (2013), Herzig and Schaltegger (2011), and Buhr (2010), 
among others, that sustainability reporting exists on a spectrum of governance systems, not as a simple 
binary of mandatory with strict enforcement and purely voluntary systems. The standards around 
sustainability reporting are much more complicated than a black and white relationship. However, for the 
purposes of explaining the divergence of national sustainability reporting approaches towards both the 
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Sustainability reporting is increasingly being implemented into national and 
international regulations (Kolk, 2003; GRI et al., 2013; Ioannou & Serafeim, 2011). 
These requirements take a variety of formats, and can be legislated disclosures, stock 
exchange requirements, or financial reporting requirements. As seen in Figure 1, the EU 
focuses more heavily on government initiatives, while the Americas have government 
and market recommendations over sustainability reporting in some form. Other countries 
focus on stock exchange disclosures, such as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (IoDSA, 2009a; GRI et al., 2013). Despite these regulations, 
sustainability reporting is still largely voluntary in most jurisdictions (Hahn & Lulfs, 
2013). 
 
 
Figure 1: The International Sustainability Reporting Policy Mix (GRI et al., 2013, p.8). 
Many countries have a combination of both market and government regulation (GRI et 
al., 2013). It has been suggested that future sustainability reporting policy should 
consider that mandatory and voluntary reporting can be mutually reinforcing (Hess, 2007; 
O’Rourke, 2004). Current reporting practices seem to support this trend. 
2.1.3.4	  Different	  Forms	  of	  Reporting	  
 
“How information is presented can have as much influence on people’s behaviour as the 
factual content of the data” – Fung et al., 2007, p. 44. 
                                                                                                                                            
inclusion of government legislation, and the absence of it; and for the purposes of reviewing existing 
governance literature and debates, these terms will be used. It is the understanding of the researcher that the 
policy mix in sustainability reporting is not simply a regulated versus non-regulated relationship. 
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The nonfinancial information of the sustainability report can be presented in 
different formats. The sustainability report typically takes the form of a “stand alone 
report”, or an appended report to an annual report. A new format, integrated reporting, 
includes financial and non-financial information. Kolk (2010) describes the diverse 
practices of sustainability reporting as including “considerable diversity in types 
(environmental, social and sustainability reports), formats (stand-alone of part of the 
financial report)…means (electronic or paper)…and external involvement (from 
stakeholders, verification of data, and if so, by which party/parties).” (p.373). For the 
purposes of this study, a sustainability report will be a publically accessible corporate 
report that includes sustainability disclosures and matches one of the following three 
forms: a stand alone report, annual report disclosures, and an integrated report. Excluding 
reports that do not come in the stand-alone report format would be excluding valuable 
forms of reporting, and thus a holistic definition has been pursued (Daub, 2007). 
1.	  The	  Stand	  Alone	  Report	  
Stand alone reporting is the most common form of sustainability reporting, and 
comprises a document published as its own independent report, apart from a company’s 
annual report. Stand alone reports were initially driven by the conception that 
sustainability issues were different than financial ones and therefore needed their own 
medium of communication (Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a). Stand alone sustainability 
reports are usually voluntary. The first stand alone reports were social reports in the 
1970’s, followed by environmental reports in the 1980’s, and sustainability reports in the 
mid-1990’s (Herzig & Schaltegger, 2011). There became a need to “increas[e] the 
positive impacts and reduc[e] negative effects of operations on sustainable economic, 
social and environmental performance”, and the stand alone report responded to this 
concern (Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a, xiii).  
2.	  Annual	  Report	  Disclosures	  	  
An annual report typically includes the financial statements for a company, the 
notes to the financial statement, and a management discussion and analysis (MD&A) of 
the company’s finances; this is a mandatory requirement under accounting standards 
(Kieso et al., 2010). Annual reports are primarily made for publicly traded companies. 
Currently, Canada and most of the world follows the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) for their annual report, whereas the generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) are used in the US5 (Eccles and Krzus, 2010). Professional 
associations are the main drivers of accounting standards, as opposed to actual legislation 
(Hohnen, 2012). These reports are audited and assured by a recognized accounting firm, 
and are written for investors and financial analysts primarily (Eccles and Krzus, 2010).  
Sustainability disclosures are often found in sections of the annual report (Jensen 
and Berg, 2012). Approximately 51% of global companies include corporate 
responsibility information of some form in their annual reports (KPMG, 2013). Typically, 
these disclosures focus more on the financial performance of the company, as opposed to 
                                                
5 The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) governs financial reporting under the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) governs 
reporting under the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). IFRS is used in most countries 
globally, while GAAP is still used in the United States. 
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the social and environmental aspects (Langer, 2006). Different strategies are suggested 
for including sustainability topics in annual reports, from incorporating certain key 
performance indicators (KPIs) into the MD&A, to focus on material issues and 
recommended metrics in securities filings (Dir. 2013/34/EU; Eccles and Krzus, 2014).  
Critics argue that annual report disclosures do not embed sustainability data into 
the corporation, nor does it focus on historical or future business insights that can 
improve long-term strategy (Eccles and Krzus, 2010; Jensen and Berg, 2012). It 
continues the disconnection between the economic aspects of a firm, and ESG challenges 
that stand alone reports perpetuate. In this way, separate reporting struggles to meet the 
requirements of the triple bottom line (Azapagic, 2004; Gray and Milne, 2013). Mere 
disclosure without any consideration of what the data means for a business and its 
stakeholders does not integrate environmental and social considerations (Eccles and 
Krzus, 2014). This concern, of both stand alone and annual report disclosures, has 
motivated a new form of reporting. 
3.	  The	  Integrated	  Report	  	  
 An integrated report is “a concise communication about how an organization’s 
strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external 
environment, lead to the creation of value over the short, medium and long term” (IIRC, 
2013). The intent of the integrated report is to proactively identify both financial and non-
financial risks and rewards in operations, as well as differentiate companies from 
competitors in the creation of sustained value (Lydenberg et al., 2010; Eccles and Krzus, 
2010; EY, 2014). The form of the integrated report is not necessarily a document, but can 
also be an online portal of financial and non-financial information (M. Krzus, pers. 
comm., Jan. 16, 2015). The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) released 
their principle-led framework for developing an integrated report in December 2013 
(IIRC, 2013). South Africa currently has adopted mandatory integrated reporting for all 
listed companies on the JSE. Approximately half of all self-declared integrated reports in 
the world are coming from the EU, while only 3% are currently coming from North 
America, showing a divergent uptake of the practice across the globe (Eccles and Krzus, 
2014). 
 The most common notion of integrated reporting is its blending of material 
sustainability topics with material financial topics, focusing on multi-dimensional value 
creation of a company through strategy, governance, and performance disclosures 
(Sulkowski & Waddock, 2014; Eccles & Krzus, 2010). Jensen and Berg (2012) highlight 
that the integrated report was supposed to serve as a rejection of pure shareholder theory, 
and overcome some of the shortcomings of the stand alone report. According to some, the 
integrated report does not necessarily replace the stand-alone report, but provides 
complimentary information, as each is directed to different audiences (Eccles and Krzus, 
2014). The integrated report is primarily for providers of financial capital, by combining 
financial and narrative information on environmental, social and governance issues 
(Eccles and Krzus, 2010; 2014; IIRC, 2013). However, the South African body on 
integrated reporting identified all stakeholders as the primary audience of the integrated 
report (IoDSA, 2009a). The IIRC framework stresses the multi-dimensions of value 
creation through the six types of capital. Financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, 
social/relationship, and natural capital all contribute to an internal business model, and 
create outcomes that positively benefit both the firm and stakeholders for long term value 
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creation (IIRC, 2013). See Figure 2 below, which visually depicts the input and output 
cycle of the six capitals. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Value Creation with the Six Capitals of Integrated Reporting (IIRC, 2013, p.13) 
 
2.1.4	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  and	  Financial	  Reporting	  
Through accounting standards, a social reality is constructed by which companies 
and organizations can be judged to be successful and efficient (Gray & Bebbington, 
2002). This environment is based on inputs of information, funds, and physical resources, 
which then must be captured and presented in a financial report released by a company 
(Gray & Bebbington, 2002). Financial reporting serves as a tool of corporate governance, 
by reducing information asymmetries between management and company shareholders, 
and creating accountability through systems of discipline and enforceability around 
corporate contracts (Weil et al., 2006). According to the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (2014): 
 
Financial reports provide information about the reporting entity's economic 
resources, claims against the reporting entity and the effects of transactions and 
other events and conditions … Some financial reports also include explanatory 
material about management's expectations and strategies… and other types of 
forward-looking information (Section QC2) 
 
Forward-looking information, key to Brundtland’s definition of sustainable development, 
is becoming increasingly relevant. However, forward looking information is difficult for 
companies to assess and audit (Van der Esch & Steurer, 2014). 
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Early corporate reporting was focused on the income statement, and primarily 
written for managers and shareholders (Crowther, 2012). It was not until the mid 1970’s 
that firms began to recognize external stakeholders in their corporate reporting, as future 
prospects for a company became more prominent than past performance. However, this 
led to reports fulfilling a function of self-promotion, as opposed to a communicative one. 
Despite the accusation by authors such as Gray (2010) that financial reporting is, in its 
present form, not well suited for sustainability disclosures, others argue that accounting is 
the means of running a business, and the benefits that occur to the organization should 
translate to a benefit to society as well (Crowther, 2012). Whether financial or 
sustainability reporting, the act of reporting makes organizational life more transparent 
and enhances a democracy through discharging accountability (Gray, Owen & Adams 
1996). The proliferation of voluntary sustainability reporting standards outside of current 
accounting standards perhaps suggests that current accounting frameworks do not 
successfully incorporate sufficient sustainability information (Gray, 2006).  
2.1.4.1	  Pressures	  for	  Integrating	  Sustainability	  Criteria	  into	  Financial	  Reporting	  	  
There is opposition to the view that accounting, as it currently stands, is sufficient to 
include environmental and social concerns. Crowther (2012) argues that the field of 
accounting has focused more attention on the application of standards, as opposed to 
looking at what standards have been excluding. Crowther (2012) explains that, 
“accounting, when used traditionally, considers solely the organisation itself and the 
effects of that organisation’s actions only upon itself, rather than recognising any 
interaction between the organization and its environment” (p.35). Similarly, Willis (2007) 
argues that the standard financial reporting, which was detailed as a regulated practice in 
1933 by the SEC, does not cover content related to meeting societal expectations. 
Questions around serving the public interest as well as private ones, earning fair returns 
for shareholders without infringing others, aiming for equal wealth distribution, and 
focusing on the needs of future generations have become concerns at the corporate level 
(Willis, 2007). Financial and environmental risks can be integrated as environmental, 
social, and economic disclosures into official financial standards, but this requires 
modification to current financial reporting (Hellenier and Thistlethwaite, 2009). Financial 
reporting does not provide the current medium for communication of non-financial data; 
these issues further motivate sustainability reporting. 
The underlying economic model of accountancy has been accused of omitting 
interactions with the biosphere, which can lead to long-term risks to the company and 
deplete stocks of resources necessary for the material well being of the company (Gray & 
Bebbington, 2002). A systems view of accounting articulates a distinction between an 
accountant’s model, and an environmental model more broadly. Sustainability reporting 
aims to fill the gaps between two different worldviews – the accountancy worldview, and 
the environmental worldview. This gap can be seen between the accountant model 
(Figure 3) and the extended environmental model (Figure 4). The extent to which 
sustainability reporting has successfully filled this gap is still debated (Gray and Milne, 
2013). 
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Figure 3: The Accountant's Model: A systems view of conventional accounting (Gray and Bebbington, 2002, 
p.23). 
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Figure 4: The Environmental Model: a systems view of accounting, organizations, and the environment (Gray 
and Bebbington, 2002, p.25). Note: the accountant's model is encapsulated in the upper section of this model. 
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Kieso et al. (2010) argue that the changing circumstances of the “new economy” 
cannot be sufficiently captured in the balance sheet under GAAP or IFRS (p.24). There 
becomes a challenge in deciding how to place value on nature with existing accounting 
standards not developed for such a task (Gray & Bebbington, 2002; R. Gray, pers. 
comm., Jan. 14, 2015). Current balance sheets do not capture many of these intangible 
assets, even though they have the potential to create future value for a company. 
Accountants recognize that “a more all-inclusive model of business reporting…that 
includes not only financial information but other key indicators and measurements that 
help predict value creation” is a present need of many institutional investors (Kieso et al., 
2010). Although financial reporting does include a definition for intangible assets, there 
are other intangible assets that are “not defined by an accounting standard or a calculation 
of a measure based on an accounting standard” (Eccles and Krzus, 2010, p.83).  
2.1.4.2	  Problems	  with	  Financial	  Reporting	  Approaches:	  Materiality	  Assessments	  	  
Materiality is a term used in financial reporting to refer to the impact an item has 
on a firm’s overall financial performance and operations (Kieso et al., 2010). Materiality 
is used in sustainability reporting in a similar way, to determine what sustainability risks 
a particular company reasonably faces and what issues should be reported on. The 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) defines material information as “if 
including it or leaving it out would influence or change the judgment of a reasonable 
person” (Kieso et al., 2010, p.44). The securities regulator in the United States, the SEC, 
defines an item as material “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person 
would consider it important” (SEC, 1999).  
Lydenberg (2012) aptly notes that these conceptions of materiality are relatively 
consistent with the preceding judicial concept of materiality, established in TSC 
Industries v. Northway, Inc. (1976). Marshall, J. used a reasonable shareholder standard 
for the court’s conception of materiality: 
 
… If there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider 
it important in deciding how to vote… there must be a substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made 
available. 
 
In all of these definitions, the parties pertinent to materiality are those that have a 
connection to the firm’s financial performance. However, Eccles & Krzus (2010) argue, 
“no clear consensus definition exists for what is ‘material’ financial information” (p.13).  
Tensions	  in	  Materiality	  
Assessing material issues in sustainability reporting often involves environmental 
and social impacts, and is inclusive of all stakeholders, not merely those with a financial 
interest in the firm (Lydenberg et al., 2010; GRI, 2013a). This creates tension between 
definitions of materiality facing standard setters (Van der Esch & Steurer, 2014; D.Park, 
pers.comm., Jan.20, 2015). Companies may not successfully be able to determine what 
their investors and/or stakeholders want, as materiality is an assumption of what a 
company believes are its material issues (Eccles & Krzus, 2014). Similar to companies 
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creating their own internal definitions of sustainability, defining materiality and 
identifying material issues is adapted at the company level. 
Sustainability reporting faces the same dilemma of determining what issues to 
include in a report, and which stakeholder groups to prioritize. There needs to be 
sufficient sustainability information provided for stakeholders to make informed 
judgments and actions; however, what is material for one company’s stakeholders may 
not be material for another (Lydenberg et al. 2010).  Kolk (2008) posits that dilemmas of 
determining material sustainability issues is not resolved through mere inclusion of 
external stakeholders, but rather “learning how to balance different interests, making 
choices and implementing and explaining them in a transparent manner” (p.12). Trying to 
accommodate for different conceptions of materiality is challenging, given that annual 
reports are written for investors, stand alone reports are written for a larger group of 
stakeholders, and integrated reports are trying to create a balance between the two.  
2.2	  Theoretical	  Drivers	  
2.2.1	  Governance	  Context	  –	  New	  Governance	  Theory	  	  
 
“As both regulators and managers believe sustainable development reporting will be a 
major part of future business operations; the real question is by what means.”  
        - CGA Canada, 2011 
 
There are various guidelines for sustainability reporting, the most popular of which 
is the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines, which prescribes key performance 
indicators (KPIs) for organizations to disclose (Lozano, 2008; Morhardt et al., 2002; Van 
der Esch & Steurer, 2014). Voluntary sustainability reporting is thus the most common 
type of sustainability reporting. Some countries have mandated sustainability reporting 
through financial reporting standards, stock exchange listing requirements, or other 
policy measures. The national governments of Sweden, France, South Africa, Denmark, 
and Brazil, as well as numerous stock exchanges, now require or recommend some form 
of sustainability reporting (Vissier and Tolhurst, 2010; IRI et al., 2014). These 
sustainability reporting guidelines are a more mandatory approach towards reporting, and 
exemplify not only the trend of mandating sustainability disclosures discussed in Chapter 
1, but also reveal a spectrum of policy approaches in sustainability reporting that range in 
their degree of prescription (Buhr, 2010; Herzig and Schaltegger, 2011). New governance 
theory provides context behind these emerging mandatory policies. 
2.2.1.1.	  Theoretical	  Background:	  New	  Governance	  Theory	  	  
 
“Governance as self-organizing networks is a challenge to governability because the 
networks become autonomous and resist central guidance. They are set fair to become 
the prime example of governing without Government.”  
- Rhodes, 1996, p.667 
 
New governance is a contemporary area of study used to classify emerging third-
party governance structures; these structures are prevalent in sustainability reporting 
(Salamon, 2000). This model challenges top-down hierarchal models of state control, and 
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argues for governance through networks (Tollefson et al., 2012). Tollefson et al. (2012) 
explains that, “Tightly controlled, state-centric hierarchies are being superseded by more 
informal, flexible, ‘plurilateral’ arrangements”, leading to a reduced role of the state and 
a heightened domination of business interests (Tollefson et al., 2012). Public-private 
partnerships, privatized governance, and corporate governance are examples of new 
governance in modern society. 
There have been criticisms that the public sector offers vague guidance, 
insufficient authority, and more collaborative, horizontal governance networks need to be 
created that are stronger than voluntary channels, and still somewhat binding (Salamon, 
2000). These new legal systems are also known as “soft law” systems (Abbott and Snidal, 
2000). This emerging theory on new governance underlies current sustainability reporting 
practices, and the debate of voluntary and mandatory standards in two ways. For one, 
new governance suggests that standards do not exist in a binary of mandatory and 
voluntary, but rather exist on a spectrum; this approach is integrated into the policy 
mapping in sub study 2 (Chapter 4). Secondly, this theory suggests that hard law 
standards (i.e. command and control) are in decline in sustainability reporting, and soft 
law systems are more characteristic to existing mandatory sustainability reporting. 
2.2.1.2	  Hard	  Law	  and	  Soft	  Law	  
New governance aligns with “soft law”. Soft law regulation is not rigid, formal 
regulation typical of hard law systems, but focuses on “setting the boundaries that allow 
experimentation to occur” (Hess, 2007). Hard law systems are command and control 
systems of law within a formalized legal system (Case, 2005; Eberlein and Kerwer, 
2004). Hard law involves legally binding obligations, and requires three central criteria of 
precision, delegation and obligation (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). This regulatory form 
requires “direct government investigation and enforcement” of a standard (Case, 2005, 
p.427).  
Soft law systems allow for policy experimentation, which often includes “rolling 
best-practices rulemaking” (Hess, 2007, p.455). Sustainability reporting embodies this 
diffusion of information central to new governance regulation. As Hess (2007) explains, 
“Supporters of [corporate] social reporting consider it a necessary mechanism in enabling 
stakeholder democracy in corporate governance which is consistent with the 
collaborative, participatory, and decentralized approach of New Governance regulation” 
(p.454). Sustainability reporting, even when regulated, is a soft law system, as the 
particular outcomes of the reports are not regulated; only the actual disclosure of 
information is. Mandatory sustainability reporting, as soft law, occupies a middle path 
between hard law and voluntary systems, not supporting command and control 
governance, or self-regulation in entirety (Hess, 2007; Buhr, 2010; Herzig and 
Schaltegger, 2011). Classifying sustainability reporting standards is not as simple as a 
binary relationship, but rather “voluntary and mandatory are a spectrum, not an on-off 
switch” (Buhr, 2010, p.63). Within mandatory systems more broadly, there is also a 
spectrum between hard law and soft law. This spectrum approach will be applied when 
mapping sustainability reporting policies based on their mandatory strength in Chapter 4. 
This spectrum discussed in the literature suggests that sustainability reporting policies are 
more complex then they may initially appear, warranting further inquiry. 
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2.2.1.3	  A	  New	  Governance	  Policy	  Tool: The	  Report	  or	  Explain	  Principle	  
The “report or explain” principle, common in sustainability reporting policies like 
those in Malaysia and Denmark, exemplifies the spectrum approach of sustainability 
reporting policy, and soft law and new governance theory (GRI, 2013c; KPMG, 2013; 
Lydenberg et al., 2010). The report or explain principle holds that companies “need to 
report on their sustainability performance, or explain why if they do not” (GRI et al., 
2013, p.14). This principle can be modified when implemented in different countries (i.e. 
South Africa’s apply or explain principle). The principle assumes that by giving 
companies space to decide their scope and disclosures for their sustainability reporting, 
they can develop competency, and quality reports over time. Projected benefits include 
creating a common minimum level of reporting for companies, promoting transparency 
and public trust, focusing on materiality assessments, improving good governance, and 
giving flexibility to companies, which takes away regulatory burdens like monitoring and 
enforcement costs (GRI et al., 2013).  
The principle reveals one of the misconceptions of mandatory sustainability 
reporting – it is not necessarily binding with state-enforced consequences. Rather, 
enforcement comes from societal forces. The market will be able to monitor non-
compliance (i.e. by impacting financial performance) or will allow a company to justify 
its non-compliance (MacNeil and Li, 2006). Proponents of the ‘comply or explain’ 
approach argue that companies who do not disclose are at risk, and must report or they 
will be at a greater loss than complying (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2012). The 
‘comply or explain’ approach thus adds flexibility to implementation, given that 
companies differ in size, structure and organization (MacNeil and Li, 2006). Regardless 
of whether companies choose to demonstrate compliance or provide an explanation of its 
absence, disclosure is the key component to this new governance inspired reporting.  
2.2.1.4	  Transparency	  and	  Disclosure	  	  
 
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants” – Louis D. Brandeis, 1932 
 
 Sustainability reporting policies, whether voluntary or mandated, are driven by 
the benefits of disclosure. Soft law systems, outlined above, operate under the 
presumption of transparency, whereby laws and standards are the platform used to 
“influence organizational behaviour by promoting internalization of societal norms (Case, 
2005, p. 429). New governance, and the soft law systems it inspires, do not mandate 
particular outcomes but rather require disclosure as a means of discharging accountability 
to a larger group of stakeholders. Fung et al. (2007) define one such government-based 
disclosure strategy as “targeted transparency” whereby “government-mandated disclosure 
by corporations or other private or public organizations of standardized, comparable, 
disaggregated information regarding specific products or practices to a broad audience in 
order to further a defined public purpose” (p.129). Although new governance may not 
directly require a government, transparency policies common to soft law systems use 
information disclosure as a way to change corporate behaviour. By providing information 
to actors outside of an organization, disclosers are empowered to change their behaviour 
and adapt to the actors demands. Williams (1999) explains that the purpose of corporate 
disclosure was to change the attitude of corporate management, by causing them to 
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“exercise their power with a greater sense of fiduciary obligation, both towards 
shareholders and toward the public” (Williams, 1999, pp.1211-1212). 
 Targeted transparency does run on particular assumptions, however. It assumes 
the target actors respond to the information provided (Weiss, 2002). If they do not, the 
normative goals of the policy will not be met. The success of transparency initiatives is 
also very dependent on the norms of the population, the agreement of the population on 
the issue at hand, the accessibility of the information, and the trust a population holds for 
the disclosers. Environmental and social concerns about investments, for example, were 
not considered rational until they became accepted through the environmental movements 
of the 1960’s.  
Even without regulatory involvement, voluntary sustainability reporting also is 
driven by the benefits of disclosure. Voluntary reporting acts as a means for positive 
performers to establish competitive advantage over poor performers who cannot display 
this performance. The provision of information through sustainability reports can avoid 
issues of information asymmetry as companies with positive performance can disclose 
objective measures that poor performing companies cannot mimic (Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Hahn & Lulfs, 2013). Voluntary disclosures can also avoid future liabilities, and detect 
public attitude shifts before regulation (Fung et al., 2007). Therefore, whether reporting is 
mandatory through a soft law system or through a voluntary system, disclosure of 
environmental, social, governance, and economic information is the goal.  
2.2.2	  Rationales	  for	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  	  
 
“…what lies at the heart of all of their requests is a desire to understand how the 
organization’s activities, business model and strategies affect (positive or negatively) or 
are impacted by (positively or negatively) climate change such that investors, consumers, 
the environment, the planet an the next generation may also be positively or negatively 
affected” (CDSB, 2012, p.17). 
 
 Sustainability reporting relies on disclosure-based approaches primarily because 
there are particular benefits for both the company, and external stakeholders, that come 
from disclosing environmental, social, economic, and governance information. In order to 
comment on existing sustainability reporting policies and standards, the rationales for 
sustainability reporting, as well as the risks of reporting, must be understood. 
2.2.2.1	  The	  Benefits	  of	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  
  One of the primary rationales for issuing a sustainability report is that it serves as 
a tool for corporate risk mitigation (Hess, 2007; O’Rourke, 2004). In following the logic 
of targeted transparency, companies can learn what information is important to 
stakeholders through disclosure; meanwhile, they can also learn about how to improve 
internal operations to minimize environmental and social impacts (Fung et al., 2007). 
When companies begin to disclose ESG data beyond their current financial information, 
companies could gain awareness of their behaviour and their impacts, which can lead to 
positive behaviour change (Mitchell, 2011; Van der Esch & Steurer, 2014). The act of 
reporting discharges accountability, and has the potential to improve sustainability 
performance by empowering others with information about the company (Gray, Owen & 
Adams, 1996; Lozano, 2008; Amran et al., 2014).  
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Secondly, there is current investor pressure to disclose sustainability information 
(Serafeim, 2014; Morrow and Yow, 2014). Investors increasingly look for measurements 
of management practices that measure both current and future risks and liabilities 
(O’Rourke, 2004). There is also growing request by socially responsible investment 
funds to disclose environmental, social, and economic information on a company’s 
performance and impacts, in order to make decisions on where to allocate capital, (EY & 
BC, 2014; IIRC, 2013; Serafeim, 2014). Hellenier and Thistlethwaite (2009) elaborate, 
stating that, “…there is growing recognition within the investor community that material 
risks should also include environmental risks such as physical damage from the changing 
environment, regulatory risks from implementing costly environmental regulations or 
fines, or legal liability issues related to a firm’s environmental performance” (p.10).  
Without the sustainability report, investors and the broader public would have to contact 
the companies directly, or search out alternative databases for information. By disclosing 
sustainability information through a report, a company can reduce financial risks, 
increase investment opportunities, dispel distrust in capital markets, reduce excessive 
speculation and short-termism, and potentially avert national emergencies caused by the 
financial crisis or corporate misdeeds (Lydenberg, 2012, p.7). They can also prepare for 
pending regulatory changes (Brockett and Rezaee, 2012b; Van der Esch & Steurer, 
2014). Sustainability reporting operates as the communicative tool for disclosing risks 
and the strategies used to mitigate risk.  
Thirdly, the ability to establish benchmarks is possible through sustainability 
reporting; this can allow companies to achieve a competitive advantage. Mitchell (2011) 
argues that even if a behavioural precedent is not set through disclosure, the mere 
existence of disclosure-based policies, like the voluntary and mandatory standards of 
sustainability reporting, can lead to the creation of a range of bad to good behaviour. This 
allows companies to benchmark each other based on this data. By publically releasing 
reports, companies can see what other companies are including, creating competition and 
an overall positive impact on the quantity and quality of information. 
2.2.2.2	  The	  Drawbacks	  of	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  	  
Reporting standards struggle to ensure the integrity of report data, and face 
challenges in determining the future path of the practice (Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a). 
Despite praise for its international recognition, the GRI still has only 2,000 of 
approximately 60,000 global multinational corporations releasing stand alone voluntary 
reports (Gray and Herremans, 2011). With annual report disclosures, there are potential 
problems to sustainability information being constrained to the functions and audiences 
of financial reporting. For both stand alone and annual report disclosures, auditors may 
not be qualified to audit ESG disclosures, weakening the credibility of reports (N.Morris, 
pers.comm., Dec.9. 2014; Eccles and Krzus, 2014). 
Despite indicator-intensive guidelines like the GRI being widely utilized, the 
large number of indicators makes reporting concise and material information difficult 
(Fonseca et al., 2012). This makes integration of sustainability data into daily operations 
challenging as there may be too much data to interpret (Lozano, 2008). Often, data 
management systems and internal controls of ESG data are not well established (Eccles 
and Krzus, 2011, 2014). Further, voluntary standards like the GRI may allow companies 
to “cherry pick” indicators, which fulfills an image/brand requirement, but not one of 
reliability (Fonseca et al., 2012; Moneva et al., 2006). Lozano & Huisingh (2011) argue 
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that firms need to take a “holistic perspective of sustainability” whereby the triple bottom 
line dimension of sustainability, and the time dimension of sustainability (which includes 
the past, present, and future) are referred to (p.100).   
The absence of a standardized format for nonfinancial reports makes 
comparability and benchmarking between firms and industry partners difficult. Deciding 
what is material is difficult to conclusively state, especially with a large number of 
indicators to report on and changing stakeholder and shareholder demands (Brown and 
Fraser, 2006). The practice of writing a full sustainability report “demands a large pool of 
resources” (Lozano, 2008, p.60). In addition, stakeholder demands may increase as 
reports are continually released; stakeholders may expect positive performance change to 
be evident once reporting becomes regular (Lozano, 2008). Constant improvement should 
be one of the benefits of the practice, but improvement faces its challenges. 
 
2.2.3	  Governance	  Structures	  in	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  	  
 
“Although much of such reporting is voluntary there are some mandatory social 
disclosure requirements and any study measuring the extent of disclosure should 
distinguish between these two types.” –Adams, Coutts and Harte, 1995, p.93. 
2.2.3.1	  Existing	  Voluntary	  Guidelines	  
Many voluntary guidelines exist for sustainability reporting, of which the GRI is 
the most popular (Scholtz et al., 2014). Other standards include the AccountAbility 
AA1000 standard in the UK, SASB in the US, and the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) ISO26000. To avoid public shame and reputational harm, 
companies have a strong motivation to responsibly self-regulate financial and 
nonfinancial information, and provide credible information to concerned stakeholders. 
These guidelines, although fulfilling similar purposes, are structured to collect and 
present information in different ways.  
There are both process, principle, and criteria based standards in voluntary 
sustainability reporting. Guidelines like the AccountAbility 1000 standard in the UK and 
the CDSB Framework are principles-based standards (Adams & Narayanan, 2007; Eccles 
and Krzus, 2010). These guidelines typically offer no commentary on what performance 
criteria should be met more specifically, and often apply to a variety of industries, lack 
specificity and provide loopholes to opt out of certain disclosures (Adams & Narayanan, 
2007; Eccles and Krzus, 2010). Organization process guidelines, alternatively, focus on 
environmental management systems, like EMAS. They often lack the precision required 
to develop a sustainability report and instead focus on putting procedures in place. They 
avoid making normative claims on sustainability practices. Lastly, report content 
standards outline criteria that must be met to reach designated levels of performance. 
These are often indicator-intensive standards, focusing on the measurement and 
comparison of KPIs over time; these indicators may not necessarily integrate with each 
other (Fonseca et al., 2012).  
2.2.3.2	  Current	  Mandatory	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  Guidelines	  
Countries like Denmark, France, Sweden, and South Africa have begun to 
mandate reporting; these mandatory reporting guidelines are thus often issued at a 
national level (GRI et al., 2013; IRI et al., 2014). Recent sustainability factors faced by 
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the global community such as climate change and socially responsible investors have 
inspired the surge in mandatory reporting. These are not entirely hard law systems, as 
previously discussed (Lydenberg et al., 2010). The EU has recently released directives 
explicitly advising member states to implement environmental and social disclosures in 
their annual reports as well. Sustainability reporting legislation often takes the form of 
principle-based legislation, leaving implementation methods to the discretion of the 
company, and classifying current mandatory standards as soft law. The extent to which 
these reporting policies have strict compliance requirements will be investigated in 
Chapter 4. 
	  
2.2.4	  Perspectives	  on	  the	  Mandatory	  Versus	  Voluntary	  Debate	  
The current debate between mandatory and voluntary standards exists in debates 
outside of sustainability reporting, but has also existed within sustainability reporting 
since the 1990’s (Llena et al., 2007). Because legislated sustainability reporting 
requirements are relatively new, broader perspectives in governance and the 
sustainability literature are important, in order to provide context to the current debate. 
This debate has been acknowledged in the literature, but has not been tested for how it 
impacts reporting quality; this is the current research gap this study fills. This study 
contributes to this debate in Chapter 5 though evaluating reports from both mandatory 
and voluntary standards. Understanding different sides of the mandatory and voluntary 
debate is required in order to claim if one is better than the other in sustainability 
reporting.  
2.2.4.1.	  In	  Support	  of	  Mandatory	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  	  
Comparability	  
Regulated reporting can guarantee comparability between companies and avoid 
the proliferation of standards that currently exist in the voluntary realm (Scholtz et al., 
2014). By outlining a particular guideline for companies to follow, there could be an 
“apples to apples” comparison companies in a country (Lydenberg et al., 2010; Jeucken, 
2001). In addition, outlying companies would be forced to communicate their disclosures. 
Sulkowski and Waddock (2014) argue that, “mandating certain ESG disclosures is 
needed to make outliers play by the same rules that the vast majority of mainstream 
companies already see as pragmatic” (p. 1082). Government mandated sustainability 
reporting would put companies on an equal playing field with respect to communicating 
sustainability performance.  
Benchmarking	  
There are benchmarking capabilities that become easier to implement when 
companies are reporting on the same required disclosures. It could have positive market 
effects as well, through the creation of competition over quality information. According 
to Lydenberg et al. (2010), “the ability to benchmark sustainability performance that 
could arise from mandatory minimum reporting requirements could prove to be an 
essential element in facilitating the movement toward competition on sustainability, in 
addition to financials” (Lydenberg et al., 2010). The uniformity of reports would be 
predicted to increase as the enforcement does (Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a). 
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Credibility	  
Mandatory reporting can enhance the credibility of reports, as well as their 
reliability (Patten, 2002). Abbott and Snidal (2000) state that contracts between parties 
gain credibility through the very fact that they can be enforced. There is a societal distrust 
of self-regulated reporting, and mandatory regulations promote socially responsible 
managerial practices in employee welfare, prioritizing environmental and social issues, 
and lessening the frequency of corporate governance corruption by providing a degree of 
legal certainty (CGA, 2011; Scholtz et al., 2014). Enforced audit standards can add 
credibility to reports by ensuring comparable and consistent information (Kolk, 2008; 
Brockett and Rezaee, 2012b).  
Barbu et al. (2014) found that firms in countries with “constraining environmental 
disclosure regulations” report more on environmental issues that those firms that do not. 
Countries in the EU, for example, are seen as less likely to defect from commitments, as 
the EU has more mandatory sustainability reporting; this creates positive reputational 
benefits (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). Scholtz et al. (2014) found a similar result in South 
Africa, whereby sustainability reports of listed companies covered under King III were 
more advanced in content than reports of non-listed companies who voluntarily reported. 
Although these evaluations measure the amount of disclosure, it suggests that national 
regulation can increase the amount of disclosures than would be voluntarily provided.  
Market	  Interests	  and	  Investor	  Protection	  
Sulkowski & Waddock (2014) explain that mandatory reporting prevents investors 
from being misled by failure to report and over-reporting, common issues to voluntary 
sustainability reporting. It also helps investors and regulators foresee circumstances that 
could lead to future crises the company may face (Lydenberg et al., 2010). Despite 
Williams (1999) suggesting that the American SEC does not use its powers to enforce 
existing environmental and social disclosure, Case (2005) outlines that, “the function of a 
mandatory securities disclosure regime is to correct market failures associated with a 
voluntary approach that led to most securities issuers significantly underdisclosing 
critical information” (pp. 440-441). The Danish government uses this rationale, arguing 
regulating non-financial information is like regulating financial information: it prevents 
sub-optimal levels of disclosure and enhance the competitiveness of companies by 
forcing sustainable strategy development (DBA, 2012). Ioannou and Serafeim (2011; 
2014) found that the social responsibility, employee training, board of director 
supervision, implementation of ethical practices, and managerial credibility all increased 
after the adoption of mandatory sustainability reporting. Strong enforcement mechanisms 
and assurance, two characteristics of mandatory reporting, have positive effects on 
companies, and the audiences who read reports. Mandatory reporting can also lead to 
higher rates of voluntary environmental and social disclosures as well (Llena et al., 
2007).  
Potential	  for	  Citizen	  Inclusion	  and	  More	  Rapid	  Change	  	  
Although critics argue that mandatory reporting will interfere with the free 
market, mandatory disclosures can support consumers’ abilities to express their 
intelligent preferences (Williams, 1999). Mandatory reporting can create public databases 
of standardized information, a current shortcoming of voluntary reporting (M.Krzus, 
pers.comm., Jan.16, 2015). Through regulated disclosures, debates on environmental, 
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social, and economic performance can be based on one set of legitimate and robust facts. 
From a stakeholder accountability perspective, some may claim that it is a citizen’s right 
to know information about a company’s sustainability performance (Dye, 1990; Fung et 
al., 2007). Unless reporting is mandatory, companies will continue to hide information 
about their negative performance, as it can reflect negatively on their reputation (Dye, 
1990).  
Beyond meeting a regulatory requirement, sustainability data can be used for 
informing government policy (Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a; Kjaer, 2012). Moreover, 
legal rules carry the power to change the material incentives, understandings, and 
standards of behaviour of companies. Mandatory sustainability reporting can enhance the 
quality of reporting, “by establishing mandatory reporting on sustainability…competition 
on important dimensions of sustainability can be encouraged and entire industry sectors 
channeled towards the creation of a more just and sustainable society (Lydenberg et al., 
2010, p.37). In the UK, sustainability risks that had been regulated for a long period of 
time had strong reporting tendencies over new sustainability issues (GT UK, 2012). 
Legislation can motivate inclusion of more complete sustainability disclosures for both 
external stakeholders and regulators. 
 
2.2.4.2	  Criticisms	  of	  Mandatory	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  	  
Despite benefits of establishing an equal playing field, providing credible 
information, and protecting investors, there are setbacks to regulated sustainability 
reporting. For one, mandatory sustainability reporting often aims at minimal compliance, 
which can have negative impacts on companies and stakeholders (Case, 2005; Williams, 
1999; Larrinaga et al., 2002). Legislated requirements may be seen as a checklist activity 
to merely meet compliance, which may prevent innovative, performance improvements 
companies could invent on their own (ICC, 2005; Llena et al., 2007; Scholtz et al., 2014; 
Larrinaga et al., 2002). Mandatory may not structure and provide information conducive 
to positive public behaviour change either, as information may be difficult to access and 
understand (Case, 2005; Fung et al., 2007). Regulation for sustainability reporting in 
France, the UK, and Spain has faced such criticism (Hess, 2007; Sulkowski & Waddock, 
2014; Larrinaga et al., 2002). Regulating informational disclosure may have less 
influence on substantive performance outcomes, and can raise critiques around the need 
for more radical strategies (Hess, 2008).  
Secondly, enforcement bodies may fail to stringently implement the reporting 
policy. This can create a “compliant boilerplate approach” rather than an engaging 
process between the government and regulated companies (CDSB, 2012, p.17; CGA, 
2011). Enforcement is often weak due to uncertain monitoring costs and logistics around 
mandatory reporting (Lydenberg et al., 2010; CGA, 2011). Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) 
found that strong enforcement for mandatory disclosures is central for an overall positive 
impact on sustainability. Clear, enforced penalties could strengthen existing regulatory 
systems, as mandatory reporting faces issues of misleading information, fraud, and 
ignoring societal norms (Sulkowski & Waddock, 2014). Larrinaga et al. (2002) 
concluded that Spanish reporting legislation did not offer sufficient guidance to 
companies, and transparency was seen as something harmful. Companies may see 
mandated disclosure as harmful to company privacy and the maintaining of competitive 
advantage.  
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Lastly, legislated reporting can have temporal inefficiencies in their historical 
focus on data and long period of implementation. Government regulated reporting is 
often retrospective, with attention on historical data and performance (Jeucken, 2001; 
Case, 2005). There can also be overlap with other standards, creating duplication of data 
(CDSB, 2012). The impacts of mandatory reporting take time to become apparent, as 
“laws and regulations that mandate sustainability reporting are likely to generate effects 
that take a number of years to materialize, making it more difficult for researchers to 
detect these effects” (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011, p.28). This could make it challenging 
for governments to argue the benefits of reporting to companies and citizens who want to 
see short-term benefits of enhanced regulation (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011). 
2.2.4.3.	  In	  Support	  of	  Voluntary	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  	  
Establishing	  a	  Competitive	  Edge	  
Voluntary reporting is often argued as an ideal reporting system as it allows 
superior reporting performers to display their positive performance over other companies 
(Romano, 1998; Sulkowski & Waddock, 2014). In the act of choosing what to report on, 
companies create a race to the top, on the quality of the sustainability performance in the 
report. Companies differentiate themselves from laggards through controlling what and 
how much they disclose. There is an incentive to then follow the leader in voluntary 
reporting, which can improve collective performance of competing companies (Case, 
2005). There may also be a connection between voluntary sustainability reporting and 
improved financial performance (CGA, 2011). Romano (1998) explains “studies have 
found that the quantity and quality of publicly traded firms’ voluntary disclosures…are 
positively correlated with the issuance of securities and with information asymmetry in 
the market for the firm’s stock” (p.2374). Voluntary sustainability reporting can avoid 
issues of minimal compliance, and basic informational disclosure that mandatory 
reporting involves (Case, 2005). Companies can target operational, strategic and 
performance goals specific to their company, should they wish to be industry leaders. 
Mitigating	  the	  Unknowns	  of	  Mandatory	  Reporting	  
Because sustainability reporting is primarily a voluntary practice, the impacts of 
switching to mandatory reporting are unknown. Different companies have material issues 
that are different and changing, making one standard difficult to extend to all companies 
(Langer, 2006). In order to widely implement a regulated reporting requirement, a certain 
level of interpretation would be required. There is also uncertainty around the weak 
compliance rates and slow adoption that mandatory disclosures obtain. Prior government 
led sustainability reporting systems have had slow adoption rates (Gray and Bebbington, 
2002; Freimann and Schwedes, 2011). Voluntary disclosures often include higher quality 
disclosures than the mandatory filings (Coburn et al., 2011; Coburn & Cook, 2014).  
Voluntary disclosures can also display a desire to tell the truth, as opposed to 
making soft claims through weak regulation. Scholtz et al. (2014) found that companies 
who voluntarily reported would integrate environmental information with their business 
strategy and data application systems more often than companies who were mandated to 
report. It can also save costs associated with negotiating government agreements (Lyon 
and Maxwell, 2004). Voluntary reporting can avoid the risk of litigation that comes with 
mandatory reporting, which may lead companies to willingly disclose more information 
to mitigate negative impacts (Esty, 2004).   
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Economic	  Efficiency	  
Voluntary self-regulation can pre-empt government regulation on sustainability 
topics, and leave firms and consumers facing lower costs (Abbott and Snidal, 2000; 
Abbott, 2012). As consumers develop their ability to organize, self-regulation will 
become more stringent in order to prevent legislation. In addition, voluntary reporting can 
be in an industry’s best interest, as they can decipher the material issues for their 
particular industry, and create a voluntary standard in the collective interest of all 
industry members (Scholtz et al., 2014). Governments may not understand these issues, 
and struggle to create industry-specific standards. 
2.2.4.4	  Criticisms	  of	  Voluntary	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  	  
Despite the competitive advantages of voluntary reporting, the popular practice is 
not without its faults. Voluntary reporting can compromise the comparability of reports, 
due to the proliferation of standards (Case, 2005; WBCSD, 2013). Because there are 
multiple ways to measure performance, using a variety of indicators and metrics makes it 
difficult to compare performance (Lydenberg et al., 2010). This proliferation of standards 
and rankings creates a state of ambiguity which can cause under-reporting – which 
negatively impacts investors’ decision making – or over-reporting – which negatively 
impacts broader stakeholders navigating through excessive data (Sulkowski & Waddock, 
2014). Voluntary sustainability reporting may challenge the business case approach and 
the stakeholder-accountability approach due to information disclosure that prevents 
comparison. 
 Upholding a set of objective characteristics for sustainability reporting becomes 
challenging, as many organizations are trying to define what should be in a sustainability 
report (Langer, 2006; Hahn and Lulfs, 2013). The qualitative criteria that are imperative 
to the accounting standards, including comparability, consistency, credibility and 
relevance, are not met with any enforcement mechanism in voluntary sustainability 
reporting (Case, 2005). Despite higher adoption of sustainability reporting among 
companies worldwide, there is less of a compromise of what sustainable development 
means within reports (KPMG, 2013; Moneva et al., 2006). This can create not only 
contradictory definitions of sustainability, but can also create opportunity to re-define 
other terms like materiality; this can open up liability risks to companies and investors 
(D.Park, pers. comm., Jan. 20, 2015).  
Moreover, there is a lack of incentive to provide extensive sustainability 
disclosures. By disclosing too much information, a company may provide a competitive 
advantage to rival firms, creating risk that outweighs the perceived benefit (Case, 2005). 
This can create a “free rider” problem for weaker reporters (Jeucken, 2001; Case, 2005). 
Industries and companies may continue to support voluntary sustainability reporting as a 
mechanism to forestall legislation (Adams & Narayanan, 2007).  
Finally, voluntary reporting is criticized for its subjection to the trends and 
changes of existing political environments, which diminishes the quality of disclosures. 
Voluntary initiatives have been accused of being short-lived, transitory in nature, and 
dependent on current business trends and changes (Gray, Owens & Adams, 1996). 
Accountability in voluntary reporting is not systematic or continuous, and companies can 
opt out at their leisure (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996, p.123; Hess, 2008; Brockett and 
Rezaee, 2012a). Companies can use voluntary reporting as a means of sustaining current 
political and economic arrangements to serve the corporate interest (Guthrie and Parker, 
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1990). By avoiding systemic inclusion of sustainability information in voluntary 
initiatives, ESG issues are often addressed one at a time, avoiding holistic progress of 
sustainability and allowing corporate management to dictate sustainability agendas (Hess, 
2008). Voluntary standards may allow companies to “cherry pick” indicators to report on, 
which fulfills an image/brand requirement, but not one of reliability and comparable data 
(Fonseca et al., 2012; Moneva et al., 2006).  
2.2.4.5	  Other	  Concerns	  	  
At a more systemic level, some argue that neither voluntary reporting nor 
mandatory reporting will change the underlying “corporate concern to maximize 
shareholder wealth so long as the institutional pressures and remunerative 
mechanisms…previously remain intact and/or, legislated reporting requirements are not 
enforced” (Adams and Whelan, 2009, p.130). Criticisms against the entire capitalist 
system may render mandatory and voluntary sustainability reporting as both ineffective 
and useless, and suggest that institutional reform to the free market is required (Brown et 
al., 2009). This debate is beyond the main scope of this thesis. Mandatory and voluntary 
sustainability reporting can both be seen as insufficient, should more radical corporate 
social responsibility and stakeholder democracy initiatives be advocated for (Hess, 2008). 
Thus, some stakeholders may see no substantive value in either type of reporting. 
Secondly, the reaction to sustainability reports may not in fact create positive 
change towards sustainable development. Governments may not see sustainability in their 
interest to regulate, especially given the short nature of electoral cycles (Abbott, 2012). 
Investors and other stakeholders may not respond to sustainability reports as their 
respective voluntary or mandatory policies intend (Weil et al., 2006). Countries with 
strong sustainability reporting regulations may see a trend of capital flight, whereby 
companies will relocate to countries that have minimal or no regulations on sustainability 
reporting, commonly referred to as the “race to the bottom” (Adams and Whelan, 2009). 
These two objections – the corporate corruption in reporting, and the complicated 
objectives of involved parties – create objections to the practice of sustainability 
reporting more broadly.  
	  
2.2.5	  Underlying	  Theories	  	  
Introduction	  
 
There are two broad theoretical approaches that underlie sustainability reporting. 
These two approaches are the stakeholder approach and the shareholder approach; each 
impact the form a sustainability report takes. These approaches are relevant to consider 
for a number of reasons. For one, a stakeholder or shareholder approach impacts the form 
a sustainability report takes, as reports for shareholders are likely to take a different form 
than a report for stakeholders without financial capital invested. Second, each approach 
may impact the type of disclosures provided in a report (and impact the effectiveness 
assessment score in Sub study 1). Lastly, mandatory reporting and voluntary reporting 
may lean more towards one approach than the other. The first of these approaches to be 
considered with be the shareholder approach. 
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2.2.5.1	  The	  Shareholder	  Approach	  
The shareholder approach primarily grounds itself in shareholder theory, agency 
theory, and legitimacy theory. These three theories are founded on the principle that 
companies, ultimately, have a fiduciary duty to their shareholders, given the principal-
agent relationship (Friedman, 1970; Goodpaster, 1991). Agency theory recognizes the 
principal (shareholder) and the agent (company directors) in a contract (Gray et al., 
1988). According to agency theory, it is the role of the board of directors and senior 
management to act on behalf of the principals, and weigh competing stakeholder interests 
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Gray et al. (1988) describes the principal-agent 
relationship in a way that reflects shareholder theory:  
 
 
Figure 5: The Principal Agent Relationship, adapted from (Gray et al., 1988). 
Managing external stakeholders is still important, according to the shareholder approach, 
as understanding stakeholder demand makes good business sense (Goodpaster, 1991; 
Freeman, 1984). There is instrumental value in including stakeholders, as this can help 
mitigate risk and lead to positive financial performance (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). 
Stakeholders arguably should be considered as they can influence providers of financial 
capital if they have sufficient resources that are necessary for the daily operation of the 
firm (Deegan, 2007).  Maintaining control of the sustainability agenda is believed to 
maximize shareholder returns (O’Dwyer, 2003). This objective is for the business to 
continue to exist, and thus turn a profit.  
2.2.5.2	  The	  Stakeholder	  Approach	  
 
"Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against the paramount 
interests of the community... It remains only for the claims of the community to be put 
forward with clarity and force."    -Williams, 1999, p.1220 
 
Sustainability reports are typically written to address groups that extend beyond 
the financial relationship of a company and its shareholder. Stakeholders have a direct 
effect on management decisions on a firm’s activities and disclosures, and because of 
this, they have material concerns that should be included within management decision 
making (Freeman, 1984; O’Donovan 2002). A stakeholder is “any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objective”, and can 
influence the direction of a firm, and/or the implementation of a management strategy 
(Freeman, 2010, p.46). The GRI defines stakeholders as “entities or individuals that can 
reasonably be expected to be significantly affected by the organization’s activities, 
Shareholder	  
• Principal	  
Contract	  	  
• Accountability	  Mechanism	  	  
Management/Directors	  of	  Company	  • Agent	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products, and services; and whose actions can reasonably be expected to affect the ability 
of the organization to successfully implement its strategies and achieve its objectives” 
(GRI, 2013a, p.9). Engaging stakeholders in corporate practices is one of the main goals 
of sustainability reporting (Hess, 2007). Reporting regulation may also demand that 
certain parties are addressed, such as South Africa’s Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act.  
 The stakeholder approach challenges the principal-agent relationship of the 
shareholder approach as “virtually all organisations have stakeholders who although not 
active participants have a direct or indirect equitable interest in the organization” 
(Abeysekara, 2013, p.228). This modified relationship is depicted in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: The Principal Agent Relationship and Stakeholder Theory 
In Figure 6, societal expectations of how a company should act can be said to comprise a 
social contract between the corporation and society (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Deegan, 2007; O’Dwyer, 2003). This expands agency theory’s definition of the principal, 
whereby community ethics and a duty of care apply beyond the shareholder relationship 
(Goodpaster, 1991). Society and the natural environment become the principals, while the 
agent remains the corporation. The accountability mechanisms in the middle of this 
model (Figure 6) include corporate communications like a sustainability report. Providing 
disclosures through sustainability reporting establishes a new contract with stakeholders, 
and can change corporate behaviour through stakeholder engagement (O’Dwyer, 2003; 
Weil et al., 2006). This model, therefore, now includes societal interests and the 
environment beyond the traditional understanding of agency theory (Kolk, 2008). 
There is a moral obligation for companies to both perform in a way that is good 
for society, while having the responsibility to report this back to the society to show they 
have fulfilled this contract (Jensen and Berg, 2012). In order to maintain the relationship 
between shareholders and management, Kenneth Goodpaster (1991) suggests there are 
“morally significant nonfiduciary obligations” to stakeholders (p.67). Through the 
practice of adding environmental, social, and governance data to corporate reports, 
companies will begin to recognize the impacts of their actions on stakeholders that may 
not be directly connected to the company’s return on investment. Stakeholder theory and 
its implications for agency theory underlie sustainability reporting, as financial reporting 
is currently struggling to understand how issues around degrading the planet can become 
integrated into reports primarily written within the principal-agent relationship (Eccles 
and Krzus, 2010).  
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2.2.5.3	  Blending	  Approaches	  
 
“Companies often seem to try to use overly positive, whitewashed sustainability reports 
merely for PR purposes as tool for gaining and improving a company’s reputation and 
legitimacy…”       - Hahn & Lulfs, 2013, p.2. 
 
The last theoretical approach to sustainability reporting uses both a stakeholder 
and shareholder approach. Legitimacy theory “is based on the idea that in order to 
continue operating successfully, corporations must act within the bounds of what society 
identifies as socially acceptable behaviour” (O’Donovan, 2002, p.344). Thus, a firm 
wants there to be congruence between their own value system and the values of society, 
to maintain their right to exist (Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Deegan, 2007). The rationale is 
to portray positive performance in order to maintain a license to operate from the public 
(Gray, Owen & Maunders, 1987; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; O’Dwyer, 2003; Duff, 2014). 
Unlike the stakeholder approach, the motivations are in the company’s interest, as 
opposed to the stakeholders. Yet, according to legitimacy theory, companies use their 
sustainability report to showcase performance to audiences not typically drawn to the 
annual report, to maintain societal acceptance (Hess and Dunfee, 2008). Disclosures are 
necessary as they communicate messages required to keep the audience aware of what 
the firm is doing to maintain acceptance (O’Donovan, 2002).  
This congruence of a firm’s values to society’s values does not necessarily need 
to be one of substance, but rather one of perception. Deegan (2007) and Bebbington 
(2007) argue that companies can display legitimacy through “symbolic management 
techniques”, where there is the appearance of a consistency with social values; however, 
in reality, the company may not be creating sustainable changes in their organization. 
This obligation, however, is established informally, and can possibly forestall formal 
responsibilities that could be established through the law (Gray, 1988). Companies may 
disclose that they adhere to societal expectations with minimal evidence of actual 
community involvement (Toms, 2002).  
The use of mandated disclosures could address this by creating a standard level of 
disclosure. The stakeholder approach and legitimacy theory both assume there is a 
contractual relationship between the firm and society, although it may not be a legal one. 
Legitimacy theory, however, may not include all stakeholders as relevant, if the company 
can maintain public support without inclusivity. Legitimacy theory is limited in its 
contribution to improving the sustainability performance of companies. Irrelevant of 
which way a firm chooses to manage its societal perception, Under this theoretical lens, 
sustainability reporting may not reflect underlying organizational change but may ensure 
that change does not happen (Bebbington, 2007). 
 
2.2.6	  Identifying	  Report	  Purposes	  and	  their	  Audience	  
The effectiveness of a sustainability report is dependent on the audience in which 
it is intended for, and the purpose of the report. Understanding these different report 
approaches is relevant for this study, as different approaches to sustainability reporting 
can create different report outcomes. Because sustainability reporting is being interpreted 
for different audiences and purposes, each of these views will be considered within the 
scorecard creation in sub study 1. Moreover, since many national governments and 
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standard setters are trying to create sustainability reporting standards, both voluntary and 
mandatory, it is important to understand the variety of approaches these groups may 
come from. Defining report effectiveness is context-specific; these views are important to 
understand before reviewing policies. 
This study will define effectiveness based on the section 2.3.2. Sustainability 
reports may aim for particular purposes, and thus, aim for a different readership (Kolk, 
2008). According to Schaltegger and Wagner (2006), and Burritt and Schaltegger (2006), 
there are two approaches to sustainability reporting: the critical theorist approach, which 
categorizes sustainability reporting as a source of corporate sustainability problems, and 
the management oriented approach, which sees sustainability reporting as a tool to help 
managers deal with difficult decisions. Brown and Fraser (2006) outline similar purposes 
for sustainability disclosures, but propose a business case approach, and a stakeholder 
accountability approach. Particular formats of reporting can also aim at particular 
stakeholder groups, such as integrated and annual reports typically aiming for a business 
case purpose.  
2.2.6.1	  The	  Business	  Case	  Approach	  
The business case approach to sustainability reporting emphasizes the economic 
and financial value that can be created through providing the public with environmental 
and social disclosures. This tends to focus on long-term value, risk mitigation and 
awareness, reputational benefits, and maintaining the social license to operate 
(O’Donovan, 2002; Brown and Fraser, 2006). Sustainability reporting is a tool that helps 
management in challenging situations on corporate practices (Lozano, 2013). The 
business case position, as defined by Brown and Fraser (2006) is similar to the “inside-
out” approach of Schaltegger et al. (2006), whereby sustainability reporting is driven by 
the decisions made internally within an organization, threatening the competitive position 
of the company (Lozano, 2013). According to this approach, “based on the strategic 
analysis of which environmental, social and societal issues are of core relevance to the 
economic success of the company, information needs and key performance indicators 
will be deduced” (Schaltegger et al., 2006, p.16). Report data is thus instrumentally 
valuable to investors, management, and audit firms who rely on the report (Brown et al., 
2009). Proponents of this business case approach focus on discussing issues that are 
perceived by society as threatening the legitimacy of the organization in the public sphere 
(Brown and Fraser, 2006). Effective reports from this perspective would include how 
environmental and social issues and impacts were handled to maintain long-term value, 
aligning with the defined purpose of integrated reporting.  
2.2.6.2	  The	  Stakeholder-­‐Accountability	  Approach	  
Accountability theory, more normatively, argues that stakeholders, as principals, 
have a right to information on a firm’s activities (O’Donovan, 2002).  This is commonly 
referred to as the “right to know” or “regulation by disclosure” (Swift, 2001; Fung et al., 
2007; Gupta, 2008). Those who hold the stakeholder-accountability approach hold there 
is both a financial and non-financial responsibility placed on the agent, the company 
(Gray et al., 1988). Accountability mechanisms, like corporate reports, aim to monitor 
compliance with legal, regulatory, and contractual agreements the firm has made (Brown 
and Fraser, 2006). According to this view, stakeholders are the key audience of reporting. 
Schaltegger et al. (2006) refer to this as the “outside-in” approach, whereby “the starting 
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point is external expectations of stakeholders, guidelines and requirements about what 
should be reported and how” (p.16). Therefore, existing sustainability reporting 
guidelines should serve as a representation of stakeholder needs. 
2.2.6.3	  The	  Critical	  Theorist	  Approach	  
 
“Management must shift from the prevailing metaphor of greening, which merely 
"reduces the bads" to that of sustaining or ‘realizing the goods.’” – Gladwin et al., 1995, 
p.900 
 
According to Lozano (2008), critical theorists posit that sustainability reporting is 
a cause and source of corporate sustainability problems. Critical theorists argue that the 
current practice of sustainability reporting creates “non-sustainability sustainability 
reports” (Gray, 2006). Gray and Milne (2007) argue, “that reporting developments, and 
particularly the triple bottom line…are actually proving to be a hopeless distraction from 
substantive sustainability or, worse, the very means to frustrate moves towards the 
changes that sustainability requires” (p. 193). The law is not a way to fix market 
imperfections, to critics, as it is influenced by companies and capital over community and 
environmental needs (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996). Critical theorists thus hold that non-
financial reporting is used as a tool to legitimize the shortcomings of the inefficiencies of 
the market (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996).  
Critical theorists argue that the capitalist structure that underpins all sustainability 
reporting needs to be addressed first, as power imbalances prevent any stakeholder group 
from enacting substantive changes to the environmental and social circumstances 
currently held under corporate control and influence (Brown and Fraser, 2006). 
Sustainability report disclosures, especially within voluntary systems, are often accused 
of creating the appearance of accountability, but are mechanisms of greenwash (Deegan, 
2007; Brown and Fraser, 2006). Marketing techniques deceive the public on a company’s 
actual performance, which typically is negative. Critical theorists argue that the concept 
of sustainable development has been convoluted and lost in the proliferation of human-
centered definitions. Gladwin et al. (1995) suggest pushing for a more integrative 
sustainability paradigm: 
 
Restricting the metaphor to only human elements of the environment and to only 
human-related exchanges across organization-environment boundaries has unduly 
restricted the conceptualization of organizations. Advocates of the sustainability 
paradigm demand a complete notion of the external environment, an 
acknowledgement of the full range of material exchanges with the physiosphere, 
ecological ex-changes with the biosphere, and nonmarket exchanges with the 
broader sociosphere [emphasis added] (p.897). 
 
Sustainability reports, according to critical theorists, are thus “more likely to 
strengthen rather than weaken inequitable power distributions” (Brown and Fraser, 2006, 
p.112). Sustainability reports remain too focused on self-selected indicators, lack 
connection to ecological and social systems, and do not challenge fundamental 
assumptions of financial accounting (Gray and Milne, 2007; Gray, 2010; Gladwin et al., 
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1995). Gray and Herremans (2011) suggest that sustainability reporting serves only 
managerial interests, contrasting the business case approach: 
 
…The stand-alone report does not provide evidence which might enable a reader 
to assess an organization’s environmental impacts let alone its contribution to 
(un)sustainability. The documents are self-evidently valuable from a managerial 
point of view; the evidence is fairly compelling that they may be misleading from 
society’s (and the planet’s) point of view (p.413). 
 
Moreover, companies may try to defend illegal and/or harmful actions to critical 
stakeholders through reports, masking negative performance through rhetoric (Hess and 
Dunfee, 2007). Mandatory information rights are important to critical theorists, but focus 
tends to be centrally on the inherent un-sustainability of large companies in a free market 
system (Gray and Milne, 2013).  
2.3	  Assessing	  Sustainability	  Reports	  
In considering these report purposes and their criticism, defining an effective 
sustainability report is not objective. Defining a  “quality disclosure”, or an “effective” 
sustainability report is difficult to define, due to difficulties in providing accurate non-
financial information and the prominence of management bias in non-financial 
disclosures (Amran et al., 2014; Kolk, 2008; M.Krzus, pers.comm., Jan.16, 2015). This 
presents a challenge for testing the effectiveness of sustainability reporting in both 
mandatory and voluntary countries, and in the three different report formats. As 
previously discussed, there are a variety of underlying theories to sustainability reporting, 
and different audiences that reports are aiming to address. Conceptualizing an effective 
sustainability reporting is thus not objective.  
2.3.1	  The	  Need	  for	  One	  Scorecard	  
Assessing sustainability reports is not a new area of research. Brammer and 
Pavelin (2006), Langer (2006), Daub (2007), Clarkson et al. (2008), and Corporate 
Knights (2014) assessed environmental and/or social disclosure quality at national levels, 
while Barbu et al. (2014) and Amran et al (2014) used a multi-national/continental level. 
Morhardt et al. (2002) used three existing standards to assess sustainability report 
comprehensiveness. There appeared to be a common concern that existing standards 
struggled to measure sustainability performance, instead focusing heavy on one or two 
aspects of the triple bottom line (Morhardt et al., 2002; Langer, 2006; Daub, 2007; Gray, 
2010). One standard for sustainability reporting could possibly alleviate this concern 
(Morhardt et al., 2002; Participant A, pers.comm., Dec.12, 2014). Central to the research 
question, it was also discovered that none of these studies created criteria that could be 
applied to different countries and their respective reporting formats. The model used by 
KPMG (2013) in their international survey appeared to be the closest international 
scorecard, as it used qualities that can be applied globally; however, this only applies to 
voluntary reports. The benefit of creating one set of criteria that include general qualities 
derived from previous studies, existing standards, and international expert opinions, is 
that this includes a wide spectrum of reporting themes that apply beyond one country’s 
borders. Using one set of criteria is required in order to detect international best practices 
in both mandatory and voluntary reporting countries. 
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2.3.2	  Defining	  Effectiveness	  	  
Effectiveness is defined as the adherence to the identified criteria developed in the 
first part of the methods, which is related to the way Daub (2007) presents effectiveness. 
Effectiveness cannot be limited to merely compliance, as: a) voluntary approaches have 
limited compliance measures, and b) compliance does not necessitate that policy 
objectives are achieved, or that reports meet sustainability objectives (Weil et al., 2006; 
Llena et al., 2007). Sustainable development, as a larger, long-term goal, could be 
neglected in approaching “effectiveness” from a compliance-only perspective. For the 
purposes of this study, effectiveness is defined as the adherence to the identified criteria 
for sustainability reporting developed in Sub study 1. Further articulation of this 
definition can be found in Chapter 11. This definition aligns with Morhardt et al. (2002) 
and Brammer and Pavelin (2008).  
Morhardt et al. (2002) evaluated the “comprehensiveness” of reports, defined as 
“the range of items discussed and the intensity of discussion, rather than on the quality of 
environmental performance” (p.229). Comprehensiveness aligns with the definition of 
“effectiveness” used in this study, whereby the report must fulfill the created criteria, 
while also being compliant with existing legislation, should it apply. Low targets or 
exemptions may meet compliance requirements, but do not address the broader issues of 
meeting sustainability objectives through policy. Similarly, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) 
interpret quality environmental disclosures as those that have “both the extent and 
precision of quantification, and the degree of commitment to future actions and/or 
environmental performance” (p.126). Scope, precision, and quantification are thus 
important attributes of quality sustainability disclosures and have been integrated into the 
sustainability scorecard.  
 Sustainability report quality does not necessitate positive performance. 
Environmentally sensitive industries, such as chemicals, utilities, oil and gas, and mining, 
tend to be the first industries to release reports, and tend to have higher quality 
sustainability reports (Lydenberg et al., 2010; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Clarkson et 
al., 2008). Firm’s size and sector positively correlated to high quality disclosures 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). The presence of legitimacy theory in sustainability 
reporting are apparent through this trend (O’Dwyer, 2003; O’Donovan, 2002; Participant 
A, pers.comm., Dec.12, 2015).  Like these previous studies on environmentally sensitive 
industries, this study will not be looking at sustainability performance, but rather, the 
quality of reports.  
2.4	  Summary	  
 
There appear to be three major debates emerging in the literature. Primarily, there 
remains a debate around which governance system is best for sustainability reports, as 
both mandatory and voluntary practices currently exist without an assessment of their 
results. At a secondary level, there appears to be a second debate around the optimal 
reporting format. Currently, there appear to be three different forms of sustainability 
disclosures, aiming at different audiences and with different purposes. This exposes a 
third debate around the intended audience of reporting, of which the shareholder and 
stakeholder approach appear to be contending perspectives. This study can contribute to 
these debates through assessing if mandatory or voluntary is better for reporting 
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effectiveness, and can provide commentary on both reporting format and report 
audiences, as annual reports, stand alone reports, and integrated reports will be reviewed.  
In order to address the research question, this thesis is primarily interested in contributing 
to the first debate. In order to contribute to this debate, this study has a tripartite methods 
structure. Sub study 1 creates a set of general evidence-based qualities central for 
sustainability reporting, through the literature and expert interviews; these qualities will 
apply to both mandatory and voluntary countries, At a secondary level, these criteria 
respond to the general concern around a proliferation of sustainability standards by 
offering one standard that applies in both mandatory and voluntary countries. Through 
the policy analysis and spectrum mapping in Sub study 2, the case countries will be 
chosen. Reports from these countries will then be assessed in the report review of Sub 
study 3. The results of Sub study 3 will respond to the mandatory and voluntary debate. 
The following three chapters will discuss the methods of this thesis. These methods are 
visually depicted in section 1.6. 
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Chapter	  3:	  Sub	  study	  1	  -­‐	  Establishing	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  
Scorecard	  
 
 
  
“Only when most major organizations are required to produce complete, competent, and 
complex statements about their social, environmental, and sustainability performance, 
will society be in a position to judge the extent to which (if at all) organizations are 
performing to the highest standards or social and environmental stewardship and are 
being truthful with their claims to probity and propriety.”  
-Gray and Herremans, 2011, p.420.  
 
Introduction	  
Although criteria have been previously created for sustainability reporting, the 
criteria for this study will be developed using a new theoretical lens.  The GRI guidelines, 
commonly cited as the strongest sustainability standard, have recently faced criticism and 
operate with a high number of indicators, which may not apply to the studied countries, 
and could create issues of comparability when assessing the quality of the reports in Sub 
study 3 (Fonseca et al., 2012, Lozano and Huisingh, 2011). Despite the popularity of the 
GRI guidelines, many reports do not meet their requirements at the present time (Lozano, 
2013). For this study, the literature review and interviews drive the criteria, through the 
discovery and implementation of “best practices” in a sustainability report format and its 
content. The goal of the criteria is not to evaluate the performance of the company, but 
rather to assess the comprehensiveness of the report content, as discussed in 2.3.1. 
There may be opposition to scoring reports based on content, as opposed to 
performance metrics, as scoring based on report content can allow companies to comply 
to the standard simply by adding topics and discussing them, as opposed to integrating 
eco-efficiency or socio-efficiency measures into their actual performance (Morhardt et 
al., 2002; Fonseca et al., 2012). Yet, the mere provision of information in reports still 
creates a degree of transparency that readers of reports are looking for, which leads to a 
positive stakeholder response and thus reputational benefits (Morhardt et al., 2002; Cho 
& Patten, 2007).  
 
3.1	  Methods	  
3.1.1	  Interview	  Rationale	  
The ontological foundation of this thesis operates in the constructivist paradigm. 
This paradigm assumes meaning can be constructed through engagement and interaction 
with external sources, which contain multiple participant meanings. These were the 
researcher’s goals in the interview process – to interact with experts in the field and to 
then find emerging themes on the quality of sustainability reporting and current 
governance trends. The constructivist paradigm assumes that the world is highly 
contextual, as meaning is based on socially and historically derived interpretations. There 
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is recognition that most of the content of the interviews was based on participants’ 
empirical insights.  
After interviews were conducted, there was an assessment of existing literature 
themes, alongside participant transcripts, to triangulate the data on what the literature and 
experts in the field consider to be central themes of quality sustainability reporting 
(Creswell, 2014). The main qualities for sustainability reporting came from the 
interviews, and relevant articles were then associated with these themes. As seen below, 
the sources of each listed quality in the scorecard will be provided in section 3.2.3. 
 Current literature suggested this would be a complicated process, as sustainability 
reporting quality is not defined or objective (Amran et al., 2014; Kolk, 2008). This 
process requires coding the data through the steps of data coding as found in Tesch 
(1990), and can gain a more objective perspective on reporting criteria for Sub study 3. 
Once the scorecard was created, reports were scored to judge the extent to which each 
company complies with the qualities (Larrinaga et al., 2002). These scores were then 
compared to test if the governance structure impacts its effectiveness (or the degree to 
which the reports can meet the generated qualities of strong sustainability reports). 
This study positively contributes to the improvement of sustainability reporting by 
offering insight into expert opinions and best practices in both the field and in literature, 
and by offering a set of developed criteria for sustainability reports. Instead of following 
one existing standard, there is a diversified approach to reviewing reports through the use 
of semi-structured interviews and literature review. Despite the dependence on the 
criteria created by the researcher, and thus a potential bias, it aims to avoid criticism 
currently prevalent in the field of sustainability reporting by recognizing various 
stakeholder voices in the development of criteria (R.Gray, pers. comm., Jan. 14, 2014).  
 
3.1.2	  Interview	  Procedure	  
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 6 sustainability professionals 
between December 2014 and April 2015. These professionals were identified through 
their geographic diversity and their expertise in different areas of reporting. The 
researcher was looking for participants who came from different places, understood 
international sustainability reporting, and worked in different professions (i.e. academia, 
non-profit, advisory services). By diversifying both the geographic origin and area of 
expertise, the scorecard became more objective in its recurring themes. Participants were 
located in Canada, the United States, South Africa and the United Kingdom. Three 
participants worked in advisory services/research, 2 participants worked in professional 
services firms, and 1 participant worked for a sustainability standard setting group. 
Through open-ended questions, professionals provided their perspective on what best 
practices in sustainability reporting are. The semi-structured questions were developed 
with consideration of not only the research question on reporting governance, but also to 
gain an understanding of expert’s insights on the purpose of sustainability reporting, the 
audience of reporting, and the predicted future for sustainability reporting. Given the 
constructivist paradigm for this thesis, as well as the different professional experiences 
and geographical locations of the participants, semi-structured questions were chosen.  
The interviews took between 30 to 90 minutes in length, and gave the opportunity 
for participants to expand on their experiences in sustainability reporting, with the use of 
open-ended questions. A list of 12 questions was generated, with the opportunity for the 
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researcher to add follow-up questions. For one participant, interview questions were 
modified to address only integrated reporting, due to the expertise of the participant. 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed. Participant names, job titles and company 
names were kept anonymous if the participant requested. As a way to increase the 
qualitative validity, transcripts went through member checking, where each participant 
could review and/or modify their transcript (Creswell, 2014). Transcripts were drafted 
shortly after the conversation, and sent to the participant for data verification. The 
researcher then reviewed transcripts for key themes, noting these for each and then 
consolidating all key themes in a chart. The final criteria aim to balance the level of 
prescriptiveness, to be generic enough for international application, and include a quality 
that assesses compliance awareness; these two attributes make these criteria different 
than existing standards, and hopefully more applicable globally. Please see Appendix 1 
for the sample questions, asked, and Appendix 2 for the coding of key themes that 
informed the criteria. 
3.2	  Findings	  
3.2.1	  Data	  Coding	  Procedure	  
 
The data coding procedure used for this project was adapted from the Eight Steps to 
Coding of Tesch (1990), typically used when coding interview data (Creswell, 2014). 
 
1. Read all transcriptions carefully, noting some ideas that come to mind. This step 
was completed in the initial transcription process. 
2. Pick one transcript and ask “What is this about?”, focusing on the underlying 
meaning was opposed to the information presented. 
3. When Step 2 has been completed for all transcripts, cluster similar topics. These 
topics can be arranged as major, unique, and leftover. Topics can alternatively be 
divided into expected data, surprising data, and unusual data (Creswell, 2014). 
4. Take this list of topics and go back to the transcripts, abbreviating each topic as a 
code and writing this code beside its respective sections.  
5. Turn topics into categories by adding descriptive words. Try to reduce number of 
categories.  
6. Abbreviate each category with a new code. 
7. Assemble data that belongs in each category (i.e. take the data from the topics that 
went in to each category). 
8. If necessary, recode existing data.  
 
Please see Appendix 2 for the data coding by theme. 
3.2.2	  Drafting	  the	  Qualities	  for	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  Criteria	  
A list of qualities is created through review of interview and literature themes. 
From existing studies and interviews, one scorecard was created; the rationale for 
creating a new scorecard is explained in section 2.3.1. Recent studies that evaluated 
sustainability reporting quality were reviewed, in order to consider relevant indicators 
and scoring scales. The relevant studies for each quality are listed below, beside the 
respective quality they inform. Qualities that were cited from interviews will include 
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interview citations beside them. It was the intention of the researcher to use both the 
literature and empirical findings to account for the many understandings of sustainability 
reporting within one set of criteria, such as the inclusion of both the shareholder and 
stakeholder approach (as both of these approaches are common internationally).  
In order to make judgments on the current practice of sustainability reporting in 
different countries, particular themes need to be identified with strong sustainability 
reports; the interviews were central in this determination. There was a degree of 
flexibility to the qualities, in order to enhance the applicability of the criteria to different 
countries; this is a current challenge with existing reporting standards in which this study 
hopes to avoid (Moneva et al., 2006; Adams and Frost, 2008).  
3.2.2.1	  Scoring	  
 Reports will be mainly scored based on a 0-3 scale adapted from Daub (2007) and 
his assessment of Swiss companies, and Sutantoputra (2009) use of a 0-3 scale for 
measurement of social indicators in sustainability reports. Upon revisions to the 
scorecard, some qualities were changed to binaries (0-1 scale) or shortened scales (0-2). 
Daub (2007) and Lozano (2013) – who adapted Daub’s scale – explain the 0-3 scale as 
follows: 
 
0 = No meaningful information is provided on the specific criterion. Total lack of 
information on the quality, whereby no information can be found. 
1 = Patchy information is provided. There is some information provided, but it is too 
general, or has little detail or depth.  
2 = The reporting provides good information on the criterion. However, one relevant 
area/indicator is not addressed. The information is of regular or fair performance, data 
covers about half of the issues, or there may be good detail but only in some areas (i.e. 
just meeting the requirements) 
3 = The reporting includes full information to the criterion, and is indicative of good 
performance. Complete and detailed information for the quality is provided. 
 
Determining the difference between a 1 and 2 for a particular quality was a predicted 
challenge. Any clarification required for scoring each quality is included in Appendix 4. 
Below is an initial drafting of what each whole number value would include, with the 
sources and interviews that motivated each quality. These sources were included because 
they explicitly referred to characteristics of a sustainability report that should be present. 
The specific attributes of each whole number value may vary upon the initial application 
of the qualities to reports in sub study 3. 
 
3.2.3	  Scorecard	  Qualities	  	  
 
Concept of Sustainability  
 
Theme: Understanding of Sustainable Development  
 
1. Definition of sustainability, with consideration of sustainable development as defined by Brundtland 
(1987) (Gray, Owen and Adams, 1996; Langer, 2006; Gray and Herremans, 2011; R.Gray., pers.comm., 
2015; Gray and Bebbington, 2002; Lozano, 2013; Gray and Milne, 2013; D.Park., pers.comm., 2015; 
Participant A, pers.comm., 2014; M.Krzus, pers.comm., 2015). 
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0 = no mention of sustainable development 
1 = Sustainability important from a brand management perspective; no detailed definition or connection to 
sustainable development 
2 = Provides clear definition of sustainability but not directly connected to time dimension of sustainable 
development. Sustainability important for long-term financial returns 
3 = Sustainability defined in connection to company operations and sustainable development recognized as 
important for long term value (i.e. carrying capacity, future generations mentioned/time dimension 
included, scale of development discussed) 
 
Management Systems and Governance 
 
Theme: Management Involvement and Engagement  
 
2. Message from leadership with evidence of management involvement (Adams and Frost, 2008; 
Desjardin and Willis, 2009; Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a; Participant A, pers.comm., 2014; Amran et al., 
2014) 
Note: This message can be chairman message, CEO message, CSO message, narrative governance report, 
compliance report, communication report with stakeholders, etc. (Brockett and Rezaee, 2012a).  
 
0 = No evidence of management involvement in the report 
1 = Message from management without supporting information from within the company on their 
involvement and responsibilities 
2 = Message from management with some supporting information of their involvement (i.e. responsibilities 
explained). National Corporate Governance code may be mentioned, but compliance not clear. 
3 = Message from management with evidence of board of directors involvement (board expectations, code 
of conduct, how they help in the strategic management). Compliance with national Corporate Governance 
Code mentioned. 
 
Theme: Corporate Governance Transparency 
 
3. Overview of organization’s activities and governance structure ((Gray and Bebbington, 2002; Milne 
and Gray, 2007; Kolk, 2008; Eccles and Krzus, 2014; KPMG, 2013; Novo Nordisk, 2014; EY, 2014) 
 
0 = No explanation of company operations/activities or governance structure 
1 = Explanation of company activities and governance structure without explaining where sustainability fits  
2 = Explanation of company activities and governance structure, with some connection made between 
corporate governance and sustainability 
3 = Company activities, corporate governance structure explained with clear delineation of sustainability 
responsibilities and structures throughout the organization 
 
Sustainability Strategy and Performance  
 
Theme: Strategic Outlook 
 
4. Company accountable to a corporate sustainability strategy (All interviews 2014-2015; Gray and 
Bebbington, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2003; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Daub, 2007; Moneva et al, 2006; Moneva 
et al., 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008; Sutanoputra, 2009; Lozano and Huisingh, 2011; Lozano, 2013; KPMG, 
2013; WBCSD, 2014; Serafeim, 2014; EY, 2014). 
 
0 = No sustainability strategy present or discussed, may discuss initiatives 
1 = Sustainability vision in place, largely qualitatively described. Some degree of strategic focus (may have 
sustainability policy in place). 
2 = Sustainability vision with targeted quantitative goals, with timelines and assessment of performance 
3 = Sustainability vision with targeted quantitative goals, timelines, assessment of performance, and 
connection to stakeholders. Report sees time as intergenerational, as opposed to a 5-10 year period. 
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Note: 1 “Sustainable Strategy”: “ESG is as much a part of corporate decision making as financial decision 
making...helps a company balance the need to be viable for the long-term, and support the viability of 
society, because a business relies on society to create value” (M.Krzus, pers.comm, 2015). 
 
Theme: Balance of qualitative and quantitative  
 
5a. Qualitative and quantitative content on identified components of sustainability performance (i.e. 
those identified as material) (Buchheim & Beiersdorf, 2005; Daub, 2007; Lydenberg et al., 2010; Brockett 
and Rezaee, 2012a; EY, 2014).  
 
0 = No use of KPIs (financial or non-financial), heavy reliance on story telling. 
1 = Heavy use of narrative in describing sustainability performance, minor use of KPIs and measurement 
(cannot see trends or goal setting) 
2 = Does not measure each component of sustainability performance, but use of both narrative and KPIs 
(may not be able to see trends over time yet) 
3 = Each component of sustainability performance has own KPI (non-financial or financial) supported with 
a narrative, measured quantitatively, consistently implemented 
 
 
5b.  Discussion of both negative and positive performance [Data point only] (Gray and Milne, 2007; 
Hahn and Lulfs, 2013; Scholz et al., 2014, WBCSD, 2014; D.Park, pers.comm., 2015; R.Gray, pers.comm., 
2015). 
 
0 = No discussion on performance being positive or negative  
1 = Positive performance and negative performance discussed 
 
Note: Quality 5b was denoted as a data point because the researcher was unsure of the impacts of negative 
performance disclosure. Moreover, reports typically avoid negative disclosures for reputational purposes. 
However, it would still be interesting to assess if any negative issues or challenges were included in the 
report, for purposes of transparency and honesty with stakeholders.  
 
Theme: Measured sustainability performance  
 
6. Economic, social, and environmental dimensions of performancei are discussed and integrated (Gray, 
Owen and Adams, 1996; Azapagic, 2004; Langer, 2006; Daub, 2007; Lozano and Huisingh, 2008; Eccles 
and Krzus, 2010, 2014; EY, 2014; M.Krzus, pers.comm., 2015, Participant B, pers.comm, 2015) 
 
0 = No discussion of environmental, social, or economic performance 
1 = 1-2 dimensions (environmental, social, economic) of performance discussed qualitatively 
2 = At least 2 dimensions (environmental, social, economic) of performance are discussed both 
qualitatively and quantitatively.  
3 = All dimensions (environmental, social, economic) of performance are discussed both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, with the use of integrated indicators. 
 
Note: May not be balanced coverage of each dimension due to sector specific impacts and the materiality 
assessments done by the company.  
 
Reliability and Credibility 
 
Theme: Assurance of Data 
 
7. Assurance provided on sustainability disclosures (Milne and Gray, 2007; Moneva et al., 2007; Kolk, 
2008; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011; Gray and Herremans, 2011; Brockett and Rezaee, 2012b; N.Morris, 
pers.comm., 2014; Novo Nordisk, 2014; M.Krzus, pers.comm., 2015). 
 
0 = No form of assurance used 
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1 = Self-Assurance: Some or all data or KPIs are assured through a self-regulatory/internal standard (i.e. 
board review). No independent, external party is involved. 
2 = Limited Assurance: Data or KPIs of some material sustainability issues are assured by an independent 
and external assurance provider. 
3 = Full Assurance: Data or KPIs of majority of material sustainability issues are assured by an independent 
and external assurance provider. 
 
Note: The terms “limited” and “reasonable” are similarly used to measure the depth of assurance a third 
party provides. Limited assurance and reasonable assurance on a majority of sustainability issues would 
still be considered a 3/3.  
 
External Credibility and Compliance  
 
Theme: Awareness of Compliance 
 
Note: Quality 8 is not an independent assessment of compliance to existing regulation or to a voluntary 
standard. This quality aims to assess the degree to which companies are aware of their compliance. Quality 
8aa and 8bb are data points for the purposes of discussion, and will not be included in the evaluation of 
quality. Quality 8 addresses the research question directly, and allows for some differentiation between the 
regulated sustainability disclosures in France and South Africa, versus voluntary disclosures in Canada and 
the United States. 
 
8a .Compliance with Standard (if law/policy in place) – France and South Africa (Gray and Milne, 2007; 
Coburn et al., 2011, Brockett and Rezaee, 2012b)  
 
0 = No mention of existing reporting regulation 
1 = Mention of regulation but no attempt to discuss or apply it  
2 = Some explanation of regulation, but unclear if company applies it  
3 = Understanding of regulation and its impacts, with evidence of company awareness of requirements and 
applying them 
 
8aa. Is a voluntary standard applied/mentioned? [Data point only] 
0 = No 
1= Yes 
 
8b. Compliance with Standard (if voluntary Standard in place) – USA, Canada 
 
0 = No voluntary standard used for report 
1 = Internally derived standard or management system used, no external standard referred to 
2 = Use of external standard, but either with no assurance and/or not completely applied 
3 = Use of external standard with either complete application and/or assurance 
 
8bb. Is more than one voluntary standard applied/mentioned? [Data point only] 
0  = No 
1 = Yes 
 
Materiality 
 
Theme: Transparency on Materiality 
 
9. Transparency of materiality concept and assessment of material issues (GRI, 2014; N.Morris, 
pers.comm., 2014; Participant B, pers.comm., 2015; D.Park., pers.comm., 2015; SASB, 2015). 
 
0 = No discussion of materiality 
1 = Material issues identified without disclosure of materiality assessment and key stakeholders 
2 = Material issues identified with materiality assessment and identification of key stakeholders 
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3 = Material issues identified and assessed through direct engagement with stakeholders and are connected 
to the company’s sustainability strategy (i.e. through KPIs)  
 
10. Climate change explained as decision useful information (D.Park, pers.comm., 2015; Coburn et al., 
2011; Desjardins and Willis, 2009). 
 
0 = No mention 
1 = Some mention 
2 = Discussion of climate change (i.e. identified as a risk or material issue) 
 
Note: This was originally supposed to be a 0-1 scale to measure if climate change was a material issue or 
not. An initial reading of reports suggested that materiality was not often used or assessed in reports, and 
the impacts of climate change did change by industry. Judging the usefulness of the climate change 
information provided would be possible to measure. The scale was expanded to a 0-2 scale to become more 
inclusive to the variety of disclosures around climate change. 
 
Stakeholder Engagement 
 
Theme: Stakeholder Involvement 
 
11. Stakeholder identification and involvement in strategy (Azapagic, 2004; Moneva et al., 2006; Moneva 
et al., 2007; GRI, 2013a, 2013b) 
 
0 = No identification of stakeholders 
1 = Identification of key stakeholders  
2 = Identification of key stakeholders and stakeholder engagement processes discussed with concerns listed 
3 = Identification of key stakeholders, stakeholder engagement process discussed, and evidence of key 
stakeholder concerns are integrated into strategic planning 
 
12. Accessibility and comprehensibility of content (Fung et al., 2007; Eccles and Krzus, 2014; M.Krzus, 
pers.comm, 2015). 
 
0 = Report is difficult to access (i.e. may be compartmentalized), is audience specific, and lacks 
engagement (i.e. all textual).  
1 = Report is highly textual, generally appeals to one stakeholder group 
2 = Report uses a balance of text and visuals, user-friendly to more than one stakeholder group 
3 = Report is interactive for the user, and tries to connect to other mediums of corporate reporting the 
company offers. Report shows attempt to operate as a portal of sustainability information, as opposed to a 
PDF format. 
 
Total Maximum Score = 35 points. 
3.2.4	  Limitations	  
The major limitation of Sub study 1 is the use of one scorecard to measure the 
quality of a sustainability report. This leaves the results heavily dependent on the scoring 
system used (which was primarily a 0-3 scale) and on the included qualities. Moreover, 
because this study was assessing the impact of mandatory and voluntary standards on the 
quality of reports, Quality 8 was very much driven towards a specific research objective. 
However, given the nature of using international case countries, one scorecard that can be 
applied to multiple jurisdictions also has its advantages in applicability and 
comparability. Despite the fact that the sustainability reporting criteria will be informed 
through professionals’ empirical ideas and academic literature recommendations, some 
criteria will be excluded. The purpose of this stage is to determine what the general 
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consensus is on reporting and what should be included; these criteria will not aim to be 
overly prescriptive, as this will limit its applicability.  
Another possible limitation is that this scorecard was generated by the one 
primary researcher of this study, and is based on this researcher’s literature review and 
interviews with sustainability professionals. Interviewing a sustainability professional 
from France was not achieved, which would have added more diverse perspectives to the 
creation of the scorecard. However, the diverse resources reviewed to inform the 
scorecard might counter this concern to some degree.  
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Chapter	  4:	  Sub	  study	  2	  -­‐	  Policy	  Analysis	  and	  Mapping	  
4.1	  Methods	  	  
 
Sub study 2 will include a policy analysis of countries with mandatory and 
voluntary reporting. This will be followed by a mapping exercise whereby the policies of 
each country (or lack thereof) will be organized on a spectrum based on the extent to 
which they are enforced or not. This analysis and mapping contributes to the new 
governance literature by assessing the prevalence of soft law, mandatory mechanisms in 
sustainability reporting. The two countries at each end of the spectrum are then included 
in Chapter 5, which encompasses Sub study 3, the report review. 
4.1.1	  Procedure	  for	  Policy	  Analysis	  	  
The policy analysis investigates the sustainability reporting policies in 7 
countries. Countries are mapped on a spectrum based on the degree to which their 
sustainability reporting is driven by mandatory legislation, versus voluntary standards. 
The coding protocol for placing countries on the spectrum is based on the attributes of 
each policy, and their compliance mechanisms. Because countries can have more than 
one reporting requirement, a holistic approach was taken when finding and investigating 
policies. By inductively establishing a list of attributes for the policies in each country 
studied through review of primary documents (i.e. the policies) and secondary studies, 
the researcher will review the mandatory strength of the policy. A secondary topic 
considered during Sub study 2 was to understand the extent to which mandatory policies 
include enforcement mechanisms, as discussed in the new governance literature. The 
legal structures and the strength of the institutions in countries were considered for 
discussion purposes (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2011; Adams & Whelan, 2009; M.Krzus, 
pers.comm., Jan. 16, 2014). To avoid any large discrepancy in institutional strength, the 
majority of countries will be OECD countries, with the exception of South Africa.  
In order to determine which countries to analyze, review of the report, Carrots 
and Sticks: Sustainability reporting policies worldwide – today’s best practice, 
tomorrow’s trends of 2013 was used as a primary guide, alongside other secondary 
analyses of countries commonly referred to in the literature as mandatory and voluntary 
(KPMG, 2013, Vissier and Tolhurst, 2010; Barbu et al., 2014; Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2011, 2014; Eccles and Krzus, 2010; IRI, 2014; IRSE, 2012; Hess, 2007; IRI, 2014). Not 
all countries could be reasonably reviewed for this study, which made the literature 
central to determining case countries. The scope was also restricted, generally, to OECD 
countries. Because mandatory sustainability reporting is less common than voluntary 
reporting, the literature was central in highlighting which countries were beginning the 
trend towards mandatory sustainability reporting.  France, Denmark, and South Africa 
were often cited as countries with mandatory reporting (Larrinaga et al., 2002; Lydenberg 
et al., 2010; Eccles and Krzus, 2010; Barbu et al., 2014;). In addition, these countries had 
high corporate responsibility reporting rates of 98% or higher (KPMG, 2013). 
4.1.2	  Procedure	  for	  Mapping	  Exercise	  
Since this study assesses if mandatory reporting is more effective than voluntary 
reporting, countries and their respective policies in sub study 2 need to be organized by 
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the degree to which they are mandatory or voluntary. This exercise will provide a visual 
map, along a spectrum, to represent the extent to which policies are mandatory and 
voluntary, as illustrated in Figure 7 (Buhr, 2010). It is predicted that countries will be 
dispersed across the spectrum. The use of a spectrum avoids polarization of sustainability 
reporting governance to merely mandatory or voluntary, as it leaves room in between 
these policy extremes, which are predicted in sustainability reporting. Two countries at 
the mandatory end of the spectrum and two countries at the voluntary end will be 
evaluated.  
 
Figure 7: Sample Policy Mapping Format 
The use of a spectrum is beneficial, as it allows for a more holistic interpretation of each 
country’s policy perspective, as opposed to imposing categories onto the different 
national policy perspectives that may not fit on the international scale. The spectrum also 
conforms to the understanding established in the sustainability reporting and new 
governance literature. Much like how regulation can exist on a soft to hard law spectrum, 
sustainability reporting policy includes different degrees of enforcement. The mandatory 
policies mapped in section 4.3, for example, essentially occupy a range of soft law policy. 
It is recognized through the work of Abbott and Snidal (2000), GRI et al. (2013), Herzig 
and Schaltegger (2011), Buhr (2010) and Lydenberg et al. (2010) among others, that 
sustainability reporting exists on a spectrum of governance systems, not as a simple 
binary of mandatory with strict enforcement and purely voluntary systems. Because 
policy mapping is an iterative process, each national sustainability reporting approach is 
broken down into its key attributes and characteristics, allowing for an inductive 
interpretation of policies.  
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4.2	  Findings:	  Policy	  Analysis	  
	  
4.2.1	  South	  Africa	  	  
Note: This is a non-OECD country.  
 
South Africa’s unique political, social, and economic history differentiates itself 
from the other OECD countries (King et al., 2010). Due to the significant progress in 
integrated reporting, and its consistent mention throughout the interviews, South Africa is 
an example of strong sustainability reporting (Scholtz et al., 2014; Eccles and Krzus, 
2014). In addition, it adds the perspective of integrated reporting (Eccles and Krzus, 
2014; IIRC, 2014). Despite South Africa leading the sustainability reporting landscape, 
there are implementation and enforcement challenges with legislation in the country 
(King et al., 2010; N.Morris, pers.comm., Dec.9, 2014). 
4.2.1.1	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  Governance	  
South Africa presents a unique example of strong sustainability reporting through 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) adoption of integrated reporting through the 
King III Code on Corporate Governance. The King III Code6 recommends that 
companies develop an integrated report, “a holistic and integrated representation of the 
company’s performance in terms of both its finance and sustainability” (IoDSA, 2009b). 
As Scholtz et al. (2014) explains, “Even though the King Report is non-legislative, it gets 
enforced through the JSE listing requirement and establishes the mandatory character for 
JSE-listed companies” (p.3). Moreover, under inspiration from the previous King I and II 
guidelines, the Companies Act of 2008 mandated that directors be held personally liable 
for poor performance and poor disclosure of information (IoDSA, 2009b; IRI et al., 
2014).  
South Africa was one of the first countries in the world to adopt an integrated 
reporting framework on a national scale (GRI et al., 2013). One of the main drivers was 
through the amended rules required for listing on the JSE on March 1, 2010. The King III 
defines sustainability as “having regard to the impact that the business operations have on 
the economic life of the community in which it operates. Sustainability includes 
environmental, social and governance issues” (IoDSA, 2009b, p.128). This definition 
stresses the economic aspect of sustainability. The Integrated Reporting Framework, 
issued by the IIRC in December 2013, has a similar economic agenda (IoDSA, 2014).  
The unique history of South Africa should be noted. In the post-apartheid era after 
1990, South African leaders wanted to promote international investment in the country, 
and strong corporate governance standards was one way to promote the South African 
market and develop a competitive advantage in the emerging economies market (Eccles 
                                                
6 Aside from the King III Code document, there is a second, separate document called the King III Report 
on Corporate Governance (King III Report). This document outlines the best practices recommendations 
for South African companies and organizations (IoDSA, 2009b). These two documents overlap in content, 
but are complementary to each other. However, these two documents are often referred to collectively, in 
the academic and practitioner literature, as the King III Code, or King III. They will be collectively referred 
to as King III in this research. 
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and Krzus, 2014). This history may have an influence on the high rates of social 
disclosures around black economic empowerment and employment equity (Scholtz et al., 
2014).  
4.2.1.2	  Policy	  Approach	  
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 created changes in the corporate governance 
structures of South African companies, and mandated more roles for the audit and social 
and ethics committees within public and state companies (IoDSA 2009a, 2009b; KPMG, 
2011). These changes towards enhanced accountability and transparency on social and 
economic development, corporate citizenship, environment, public safety, consumer 
relations, and employment made King III central to meet new statutory requirements 
(KPMG, 2011).  
King III classifies itself as a code of principles and practices, as opposed to a 
statutory requirement, but is mandated as a listing requirement for public companies on 
the JSE (IoDSA, 2009a). King III argues that “the ‘apply or explain’ regime shows an 
appreciation for the fact that it is often not a case of whether to comply or not, but rather 
to consider how the principles and recommendations can be applied” (IoDSA, 2009a, 
p.6). This avoids focusing on compliance over performance, common to the ‘comply or 
explain’ approach, and a hard law ‘comply or else’ approach (IoDSA, 2009a). Many 
companies in South Africa are still in the process of implementing the principles of King 
III (Solomon & Maroun, 2012; N.Morris, pers.comm., Dec.9, 2014).  
The King III Guidelines attempt to include a shareholder and stakeholder 
approach. Despite King III mentioning an “enlightened shareholder” approach to 
integrated reporting, King III explains a “stakeholder-inclusive” rationale for using the 
apply or explain approach:  
 
 In following the ‘apply or explain’ approach, the board of directors, in its 
collective decision-making, could conclude that to follow a recommendation 
would not, in the particular circumstances, be in the best interests of the 
company… Explaining how the principles and recommendations were applied, or 
if not applied, the reasons, results in compliance. In reality, the ultimate 
compliance officer is not the company’s compliance officer or a bureaucrat 
ensuring compliance with statutory provisions, but the stakeholders [emphasis 
added] (IoDSA, 2009a, p.6).  
 
The responsibility of the board of directors is to act in the best interests of the company, 
or “the best interests of the body of shareholders” (IoDSA, 2009b, s2.14.14). Yet, the 
stakeholders hold the company and board accountable by accepting or rejecting their 
rationale for exemption (IoDSA, 2009a). This stakeholder-driven accountability model 
relies on a targeted transparency approach to sustainability reporting, whereby the 
information provided by the company empowers stakeholders to act on their knowledge, 
and either accept or reject the disclosures (Fung et al., 2007). 
The King III Code is not a hard law approach to corporate governance. According 
to Neil Morris, Director of Climate Change and Sustainability at KPMG South Africa, 
South Africa is “not in a governmental regulated sustainability reporting environment. 
Some people probably would think that South Africa has listing requirements that force 
sustainability reporting. It’s only partially true…it’s not a mandatory requirement, you 
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can explain your way out of it” (Pers.comm., 2014). The “apply or explain” approach 
allows flexibility in application, while ideally achieving the same objective among 
different types of businesses. Public companies that do not apply King III need to report 
to the JSE on why they did not do this, which is then reviewed by the stock exchange (N. 
Morris, pers. comm., Dec. 9, 2014).  
4.2.1.3	  Key	  Features:	  
Name: King III (King III Report/Code on Corporate Governance)  
Format: Integrated report (in transition). Annual or integrated report with 
separate sustainability report is still common practice. 
Applies to: Publically traded and state owned companies on the JSE.  
Does not apply to:  Companies not listed on the JSE. However, the King III can 
be applied to all types of companies and organizations (IoDSA, 2009a). 
What is being reported: Corporate governance information, including key 
components of the sustainability report (outlined in Principle 9.2) 
Policy Approach: Stock exchange requirement with the apply or explain 
approach; more flexible than the ‘comply or explain’ approach  
Audit/Verification:  Accountant audit, JSE review of the integrated report. 
Auditors will review financial statements of the integrated report, and sometimes 
will review selected KPIs or, more rarely, the entire integrated report (JSE, 2013; 
N.Morris, pers.comm., 2014; EY, 2014). Internal and external audits are 
recommended in King III (IoDSA, 2009b). Recommendation to review forward-
looking statements despite difficulty (IoDSA, 2009b; N.Morris, pers.comm. 
Dec.9, 2014).  
Other:  
- Integrated reporting still in the early stages, compliance mechanisms weak 
(N.Morris, pers.comm., 2014; M.Krzus, pers.comm., 2015). 
- High quality reports in South Africa, likely due to early mover advantage 
- Social and political underpinnings (i.e. Black Economic Empowerment Act). 
- Stakeholders as agents of the companies 
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4.2.2	  France	  
French corporate responsibility reporting occurred quite early in comparison to 
other countries. The French government recommended annual social balance sheets - 
bilan social - as early as 1977 for companies with over 250 employees (Gray et al., 
1988). In 2001, the NRE Act asked French companies to disclose their social and 
environmental impacts (Doucin & Besse, 2013). The flexibility of this policy contributed 
to the more stringent requirements in 2010. France was one of the first countries to 
mandate sustainability disclosures in corporate reports through the Grenelle Laws of 
2010, which modified the French Commercial Code. Now, France boasts a 99% 
sustainability reporting rate among its largest companies, and has been cited as having 
some of the highest quality reports in the world (KPMG, 2013). 
4.2.2.1	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  Governance	  
Despite the high adoption rates of the NRE Act requirements in 2001, compliance 
remained weak, due to the minimal penalties and a lack of clarity on the Act (Dhooge, 
2004). A majority of the social and environmental indicators were not reported on, and 
few reports were verified (Hess, 2007; IRI et al., 2014). However, France showed 
evidence of a quick learning curve after the adoption of NRE, which are positive signs for 
the adoption of Grenelle II (KPMG, 2013; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2012). 
Currently, Article 225 of the Grenelle II Act is the governing article for 
sustainability reporting in France. As such, “the [Grenelle] Acts make it mandatory for all 
large companies with activities in France to prepare annual CSR reports” (GRI et al., 
2013, p.31). The relevant text of the legislation states: 
 
Article 225 of Grenelle II requires listed companies on the French stock 
exchanges, including subsidiaries of foreign companies listed in France, and 
unlisted companies, including subsidiaries of foreign corporations located in 
France, to incorporate into their annual reports information on “the social and 
environmental consequences” of their activities, as well as their “societal 
commitments for sustainable development” (as translated in EY, 2012, p.1). 
 
The Grenelle II Act, amended from the Grenelle I Act of 2008, now includes 42 general 
dimensions to report on, and attempts a stakeholder approach to corporate reporting 
(Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Malecki, 2011). These indicators were inspired by current 
international reporting standards, specifically ISO 26000, UN Global Compact, and the 
OECD (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2012). Grenelle II calls for any pollution 
activity in a company of over 500 employees and total assets or net annual sales of €100 
million to be disclosed in the annual report, as well as the environmental impact, 
commitment to environmental protection, restoration, and limitation of adverse 
consequences, and on environmental and social performance (Barbu et al., 2014; GRI et 
al., 2013; IRSE, 2012). The environmental and social disclosures of Grenelle II must be 
included in the annual management report, approved by the board of directors, and given 
third party verification (IRSE, 2012). The auditors must have the same independence as 
auditors used for financial reporting, and present a certificate of compliance and/or 
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explain any omissions (IRSE, 2012). All companies should be meeting these 
requirements by 2014.  A summary of Grenelle II indicators is below in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: ESG Indicators of Grenelle II, 2012 (Morris and Badache, 2012). 
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4.2.2.2	  Policy	  Approach	  
The NRE Act of 2001 is an example of the initial French policy approach of 
shareholder accountability and self-regulation (Doucin and Besse, 2013). Les Ministère 
des Affaires Etrangères (2012) note that the NRE Act had no provisions for sanctions, 
characteristic of French “orientation laws”. These types of laws “are regularly adopted in 
France with the aim of setting important objectives for the nation…The idea was to give 
shareholders…the power to order company management to comply with its reporting 
obligations if it had failed to do so" (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2012, p.1). No  
audit is required under the Act (IRI, 2014). The Act has been criticized for its low 
compliance rates, limited penalties issued, and basic provisions of environmental and 
social disclosure (Hess, 2007). However, the number of companies reporting after 2002 
increased significantly. Yet, the quantity of reports did not equate to quality, motivating 
the Grenelle Laws. 
Grenelle II, specifically Article 225, has been called “the strongest stance yet 
taken by any country to require transparency from businesses on the environmental, 
social and governance front” (EY, 2012, p.1; IRSE, 2012). It replaces the former Article 
116 of the NRE Act, and adopts a “comply or explain approach”, aligning with the 
orientation law framework. This orientation law framework is common also to the GRI 
and other voluntary standards, exemplifying a soft law approach to governance, aiming 
towards self-regulation (Abbott and Snidal, 2000; Malecki, 2011). Article 225 does not 
outline any sanctions for companies who do not comply; the enforcement mechanism is 
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the shareholder who can take legal action against the company if they wish (EY, 2012). 
This reverts to a model of agency theory (Gray et al., 1988; Toms, 2002). An auditor 
gives an opinion on the omitted information, but does not inflict any fines or 
consequences. Les Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (2012) argues, however, that “even 
though there is still no legal sanction to non-compliance, the verification mechanisms put 
in place by the Act ensure that companies who do not disclose the required information 
do so at their own risk, knowing that they will surely have more to lose if they don’t 
comply than if they do” (p.6).  
4.2.2.3	  Key	  Features:	  
- Name: Bill Loi no. 2010-788, portant engagement national pour 
l’environnement (adopted July 13, 2010), particularly Article 225 
- Text: “on how they take into account the social and environmental consequences 
of [their] activity and [their] social commitments in favour of sustainable 
development” (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2012).  
-  248 articles, not all of which are related to reporting (GRI/UNEP, 2013; Doucin 
and Besse, 2013). 
- Format: Annual report disclosure 
- Applies to: All companies with over 500 employees including public 
companies, partnerships limited by shares, cooperative societies, agricultural 
cooperatives, mutual insurance companies, credit institutions, investment 
companies, financial companies (Doucin and Besse, 2013). Subsidiaries are also 
included. 
- Does not apply to: limited liability companies, private limited companies, 
general partnerships, property investment companies, joint-interest organizations 
(IRSE, 2012) 
- What is being reported: Social, environmental and governance information. 
Over 40 topics to report on, depending on the type of company. Companies free to 
choose exact indicators to report (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2012).  
- Policy Approach: Government policy with ‘comply or explain’ with auditor 
review of statement 
- Audit/Verification: Third party organization audit, Accredited by 
French/European audit standard (Cofrac), appointed by executive director/chief 
executive, report with reasoned opinion given (IRSE, 2012; Ministère des 
Affaires Etrangères, 2012). 
- Other: Criticized due to lack of specific requirements and penalties (Dhooge, 
2004; Sulkowski and Waddock, 2014). 
- No mention of fines or litigation 
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4.2.3	  Denmark	  
 
Denmark has a long history with regulation of environmental and social 
disclosures (Gray and Bebbington, 2002; GRI et al., 2013). 99% of Denmark’s largest 
companies issue a sustainability report in some form (KPMG, 2013). The Danish 
approach to sustainability reporting focuses heavily on incorporating social and 
environmental criteria into supply chain management, due to the large export market, and 
the relatively low social and economic impacts felt within the country itself (Ioannou and 
Serafeim, 2014). Denmark serves as an example of a country with mandatory reporting, 
as environmental disclosures were initially legislated in the Green Accounts Act of 1995 
and more recently in the Amendment to the Danish Financial Statements Act, but with 
flexibility in how companies implement the policy.  
4.2.3.1	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  Governance	  
In 2008, the Danish government released an Act amending the Danish Financial 
Statements Act, “the Report on social responsibility for large businesses”. The main 
modifications of this Act in Section 99a call for companies to disclose their social 
responsibility policies. The Danish government amended the Act again in 2012, adding 
human rights and climate change policies as mandatory inclusions for 2014 (DBA, 2014). 
This amendment includes large companies in reporting Class C and Class D. Large 
companies in reporting Class C are companies that exceed 2 of the 3 criteria: i) balance 
sheet total of DKK 143 million, ii) net revenues of DKK 486 million, and iii) an average 
number of at least 250 employees (Proposal for Act, 2008). Class D companies are 
publically traded. 
The sustainability report is a part of the management review submitted to the 
Danish Commerce and Companies Agency annually. The Danish government allows 
companies to comply with the Amendment in 3 formats: through the submission of their 
management review, a stand-alone sustainability report, or the submission of a 
Communication on Progress report under the UN Global Compact (DBA, 2014). 
However, if businesses do not have a CSR policy in place by the instatement of the Act in 
2008, they may choose the ‘comply or explain’ approach, and explain why they do not 
have a policy, to exempt themselves from submitting a report (DBA, 2014). The Act 
itself is quite focused on social responsibility, with minimal reference given to 
environmental disclosures (GRI et al., 2013; Proposal for Act, 2008).  
4.2.3.2	  Policy	  Approach	  
The ‘report or explain’ approach, common to new governance systems, is central 
to the Danish Financial Statement Act Amendment. The Amendment of 2008 has been 
referred to as a soft law, and is an example of “business-driven social responsibility” as 
“individual businesses are responsible for choosing the areas and efforts relevant to their 
core business activities” to be disclosed (DanWatch, 2011; Proposal for Act, 2008, p.9). 
Christian Honoré, a KPMG partner, explains the policy approach in Denmark: 
 
From 2014, this ‘report or explain’ approach will be extended with requirements 
for companies to report on human rights, climate change, and employee diversity. 
While the reporting rate in Denmark is very high, many companies struggle with 
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reporting on CR as they remain focused on disconnected environmental, health, 
human resources or philanthropic initiatives. The legislation has encouraged 
companies to develop a more structured approach to CR as it is increasingly 
difficult to report without an underlying CR strategy and clear management 
approach (KPMG, 2013, p.24). 
 
The hope is that Danish companies will combine social responsibility into core business 
activities. It is not mandated that companies adopt or implement environmental or social 
policies, but if they do not, they would have to explain this (Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2014). Companies can report on this information in any chosen format, which can make 
comparability difficult (Larrinaga et al., 2002). According to the Proposal for the 
Amendment (2008), “the proposed disclosure requirement will not change the obligation 
of individual business and investors to choose if and how work on social responsibility is 
to be done…businesses will continue to be responsible for deciding how to meet these 
challenges” (p.5). There are no fines or litigation if a company does not disclose their 
policy or release a statement explaining its absence. Despite the flexible option of 
abstaining from CSR disclosures, the Danish Business Authority (2012) reports that 97% 
of Danish companies covered by the Amendment of 2008 are compliant. 
4.2.3.3	  Key	  Features:	  
- Name: Act amending the Danish Financial Statements Act, also known as 
Report on social responsibility for large businesses, Section 99a. 
- Format: Annual report disclosure, specifically in the management review 
section, an appended report on social responsibility or Communication of 
Progress (Proposal for Act, 2008). 
- Applies to:  Class C and D companies (see 4.2.3.1 for further description)  
Class C companies are medium and large size limited companies and private 
limited companies. Class D companies are companies with securities traded on a 
regulated market, and state-owned public limited companies (Proposal for Act, 
2008). 
- Does not apply to: Class A and Class B companies. Class A companies are sole 
trading businesses (do not release annual reports). Class B companies are small 
limited and private limited companies.  
- What is being reported: Environmental and social policies, with emphasis on 
supply chain operations abroad. More specifically: 
(1) Policies on social responsibility including any standards followed, 
(2) How policies are implemented into action (i.e. systems and procedures), and 
(3) An assessment of annual business achievements in social responsibility 
including future expectations (Proposal for Act, 2008).  
- Policy Approach: Government regulation with ‘comply or explain’ with 
Auditor review. Auditor’s role is not expanded beyond traditional duties 
(Proposal for Act, 2008).  
- Audit/Verification: Optional audit on sustainability information (Larrinaga et 
al., 2002). Must submit report to Danish Commerce and Companies Agency. 
- Other:   
- Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) note that the levels of disclosure in Denmark 
before and after the Amendment have remained the same; increased membership 
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in UNGC, more focus on supply chain management.  
- Proposal mentions positive structural financial implications and competitive 
advantages for businesses; some evidence of seeing the connectivity between non-
financial and financial performance 
- No mention of fines/litigation 
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4.2.4	  The	  United	  Kingdom	  (UK)	  
 
 The United Kingdom presents a unique social and political landscape for 
sustainability reporting. Strong trade union and labour movements in the 1980’s drove 
companies to focus on social disclosures (Gray et al., 1988). The country also has an 
interesting history with individual investors given opportunities to invest directly in 
ethical and environmental companies (Gray and Bebbington, 2002; R.Gray, pers.comm., 
Jan.14, 2015). The UK had one of the first sustainability reporting awards, held by the 
national accounting association (ACCA), contributing to a reporting culture focused on 
meeting targets (Gray and Bebbington, 2002). According to KPMG (2013), the UK 
currently has some of the highest quality sustainability reports in the world. Despite slight 
reductions in reporting rates, 91% of the largest companies in the UK issue a 
sustainability report (KPMG, 2013). This suggests that even with minimal regulatory 
requirements, British companies issue stand-alone reports. 
4.2.4.1	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  Governance	  
The main regulatory contribution to sustainability reporting in the UK comes 
from the Companies Act (2006). This Act calls for listed companies and large non-listed 
companies to disclose key environmental performance indicators in the Strategic Report, 
a separate report from the financial statements (Grayson, 2010; IRI et al., 2014). 
Companies must report on sustainability matters “to the extent that they are important to 
understanding the company’s business” (IRI et al., 2014). Similar to Denmark, UK 
companies should disclose environmental, social, community and human rights policies 
in the Strategic Report. This policy disclosure is a step in the transition to high quality 
sustainability disclosures (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Similar to the materiality 
principle used in the United States and Canada, managers in these companies judge what 
information is disclosed (GRI et al., 2013; Barbu et al., 2014). The Strategic Report is 
audited for consistency to the financial accounts. According to the Companies Act 
(2006):  
 
The review must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of the 
development, performance or position of the company’s business, include— 
(a) analysis using financial key performance indicators, and 
(b) where appropriate, analysis using other key performance indicators, including 
information relating to environmental matters and employee matters (414c4). 
 
4.2.4.2	  Policy	  Approach	  
The policy approach of the UK is an “enabling environment”, with little 
legislation on corporate sustainability reporting specifically, but a strong foundation of 
labour, health and safety, and environmental legislation (Grayson, 2010; Fifka and 
Drabble, 2012). Prior mandatory reporting in the UK did not prove to have high reporting 
rates or compliance in the 1990’s (Adams et al., 1995; Larrinaga et al., 2002). UK 
regulation on disclosures in annual reports is now primarily driven towards 
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environmental information, insofar as it related to the development, performance, or 
position of the company (Barbu et al., 2014). The primary audiences of these 
environmental disclosures are shareholders, investors, and lenders to public and large 
private companies (Barbu et al., 2014). This possibly compromises how other 
stakeholders can engage with the company. The scope of information provided in UK 
annual reports is specific to environmental topics, is driven by materiality, and is quite 
limited in scope and depth. 
 
4.2.4.3	  Key	  Features:	  
Name: Companies Act, 2006 
Format: Annual report disclosures in the Strategic Report/Business Review 
Section 
Applies to: Large public and private companies  
Does not apply to:  Medium and small private companies, and other 
organizations 
What is being reported: Environmental, social and governance information, if 
deemed material by the reporting company  
Policy Approach: “Comply or explain”; Materiality driven, investor focused, 
strong existing legal framework in place  
Audit/Verification: Audit of annual report, sustainability report audits are not 
mandatory 
Other: Wider scope, since it is inclusive of large private companies as well 
- Apparently reliance on the materiality test (within financial reporting) 
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4.2.5	  Germany	  
 
The German social market economy, established after World War II, presents a 
highly regulated economic landscape with strong attention to social issues, particularly 
those around labour (Tolhurst and Embaye, 2010). Germany saw the beginning of 
sustainability reporting in the 1970’s, with the voluntary development of sozialbilanz – a 
social balance sheet on firm performance and impacts on the societal environment (Gray 
et al., 1988). Although Germany does not have the same reporting rates as other 
European countries (currently 67%) and has experienced historically static growth in 
reporting, the quality of their reports is relatively high on the international stage (Gray 
and Milne, 2007; KPMG, 2013). 
4.2.5.1	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  Governance	  
The sustainability reporting governance of Germany is quite similar to the UK. 
German companies primarily issue separate, stand alone sustainability reports, often 
following voluntary international standards such as the GRI, the UN Global Compact 
principles, ISO standards, or OECD guidelines (Tolhurst and Embaye, 2010). The 
voluntary German Sustainability Code, created by the German Council for Sustainable 
Development, issued criteria and KPIs in 2011, inspired by the GRI and the European 
Federation of Financial Analyst Societies (IRI, 2014). More generally, environmental, 
social and governance information is regulated, to some extent, through the German 
Accounting Standards and the German Governance Code, which follows a ‘comply or 
explain’ approach.  
Companies must file annual reports according to the German Accounting 
Standards, under the German Commercial law, Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB). The Group 
Management Report, governed under the Germany Accounting Standard GAS 20, and 
the HGB, may include material sustainability disclosures  (GRI et al., 2013). The Group 
Management Report is to be submitted with the financial accounts for all listed 
companies and large limited liability companies (Buchheim & Beiersdorf, 2005; DRSC, 
2012). In the Group Management Report, "the disclosures must include the most 
significant financial key performance indicators and, to the extent that they are material 
for an understanding of the course of business and position of the group, non-financial 
key performance indicators" (DRSC, 2012). Topics of the Group Management report 
typically include explanations on the business model, internal risk management systems 
and risk reporting, the financial position of the company, and future expected 
developments (DRSC, 2015). If non-financial indicators are used, they must be 
quantitative (GRI et al., 2013). Auditors do review the Group Management Report, but 
there is no obligation to audit the stand alone sustainability reports.  
4.2.5.2	  Policy	  Approach	  
 The policy approach in Germany is largely voluntary, despite the use of non-
financial disclosures in recent accounting legislation. However, almost all of the N100 
German companies use non-financial KPIs in their Group Management Report (GRI et 
al., 2013). Much like other EU countries, existing laws and regulations provide a strong 
foundation for labour, health and safety, and environmental issues, suggestive of an 
“implicit CSR” model (Matten and Moon, 2008). The use of the ‘comply or explain’ 
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approach in the German Governance Code “contributes to more flexibility and more self-
regulation” (DCGK, 2014). Tolhurst and Embaye (2010) state that, "CSR is generally 
understood as a voluntary commitment in Germany" that goes beyond regulatory 
requirements (p.162). Disclosure of sustainability information is still largely the 
responsibility of the board, with shareholders having the option to sue if material 
sustainability information is not included; this relationship is based upon agency theory. 
The rise of stand-alone reports in Germany suggests that the voluntary governance of 
reporting may have positive results (KPMG, 2013). 
 
4.2.5.3	  Key	  Features:	  
Name: Combination of Reform Act on Accounting Regulations in 2004 (BilReg), 
German Commercial Law (HGB), and German Corporate Governance Code 
Format: Financial reporting requirements with non-financial KPIs deemed 
material (at management’s discretion) (GRI et al., 2013) 
Applies to: Public companies, and large limited liability companies 
Does not apply to:  Small to medium sized companies 
What is being reported: Economic position of the company, future events (post-
balance sheet), internal control system and risk management system as relevant to 
financial reporting, take-over related disclosures, corporate governance 
declaration, responsibility statement (DRSC, 2015)  
Policy Approach: Materiality-driven; risk and governance disclosures in the 
annual report, ‘comply or explain’ on presence of corporate governance in Group 
Management Report (DCGK, 2014) 
Audit/Verification: Audit of non-financial KPIs within the Group Management 
report, no audit of stand-alone sustainability report or the content of Corporate 
Governance statements 
Other: Public companies follow IFRS, other companies can follow previous 
German accounting standards 
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4.2.6	  United	  States	  of	  America	  (US)	  
 
Sustainability reporting in the US is largely voluntary, and is predicted to stay this 
way (Eccles and Krzus, 2014). However, the US has 1,376 large listed companies, the 
highest in the world, leaving great potential for sustainability reporting (Morrow & Yow, 
2014). Corporate reporting, and in particular, annual reporting, is regulated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC), whose aim is to protect investors 
through relevant reporting (Coburn and Cook, 2014). The SEC requires public companies 
to submit regulated documents called the 10-K (annually). Under the SEC, the provision 
to include certain environmental information in the annual report has been around since 
1971 (Sulkowski & Waddock, 2014). However, disclosing sustainability matters in 
regulatory filings is largely an issue of materiality.  
Sustainability disclosures in current US annual reports is quite low, despite stand 
alone reporting rates of 86% among the largest companies (KPMG, 2013; Coburn and 
Cook, 2014). Initial American non-financial reporting focused on consumer and public 
interests, and issues around race and gender (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996). More 
recently, the US had a constant level of reporting, perhaps signaling a delayed reaction to 
ESG demands in the global market (Gray and Bebbington, 2002; Kolk, 2003). The 
United States is a strong example of voluntary sustainability reporting.  
4.2.6.1	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  Governance	  	  
Sustainability disclosures within the US, much like Germany, the UK, and 
Canada, are driven by the materiality principle. Material information, according to the 
Supreme Court, is information presenting:  
 
“a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” 
of information made available” (TSC Indus. V. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 
(1976)). 
 
Although this definition continues to hold true, the information deemed material can 
change. A recent development towards climate change related disclosures became 
effective on February 8, 2010 when “Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure 
Related to Climate Change”, was released by the SEC as an interpretive release. This 
document was not adding anything new to American securities regulation, but was 
clarifying existing requirements (SEC, 2010). It stated that SEC disclosures are “intended 
to remind companies of their obligations under existing federal securities laws and 
regulations to consider climate change and its consequences as they prepare disclosure 
documents to be filed with us and provided to investors” (SEC, 2010, p.27). The extent to 
which regulation on climate change will come from the SEC is debated (M.Krzus, 
pers.comm., Jan.16, 2015; D.Park, pers.comm., Jan.20, 2015.) There have been recent 
legislative requirements in the US around conflict mineral disclosures (s.1502), and 
funding to oil and gas lobbyists (s. 1504) since the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act in 
2010 (Sulkowski & Waddock, 2014). However, this legislation did not originate in the 
SEC, as the SEC is independent of the legislative and judicial systems.  
  
66 
4.2.6.2	  Policy	  Approach	  
The policy approach for sustainability reporting in the US is largely voluntary, 
with some regulation over material ESG disclosures in the annual report. However, the 
extent to which sustainability disclosures are included in mandatory financial filings is 
driven by material issues, which vary from industry to industry, and from company to 
company (D.Park, pers. comm., Jan. 20, 2015). Often, material sustainability risks and 
opportunities are not discussed in the 10-K (Serafeim, 2014). The creation of SASB, the 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board, and their sustainability accounting standards 
for various industries and sectors is a positive sign for increasing disclosures in 10-K 
filings. However, it also suggests a current gap in direct regulatory guidance for 
sustainability within corporate reporting, as SASB is a voluntary standard. If the SEC 
does not begin to comment on the application of SASB standards, the strength of 
mandated annual report disclosures in the US for sustainability reporting will continue to 
be questioned (Coburn and Cook, 2014; Sulkowski & Waddock, 2014).  
Currently, American companies seem to prefer voluntary sustainability reporting, 
due to fears of over-disclosing, which can increase their risk of liability (Sulkowski 
&Waddock, 2014). Some argue the SEC has the institutional power to enforce 
environmental and social disclosures; however, this rests strongly on whether investors 
consider these disclosures material (Williams, 1999; D.Park, pers.comm., Jan.20, 2015).  
A recent report by Coburn and Cook (2014) argues that the SEC guidance has not been 
particularly successful. There is a higher increase in companies disclosing climate 
change-related issues in voluntary filings with the CDP, as opposed to in their 10-K 
reports governed by the SEC (See Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: Companies of Annual Report Disclosures in 10-K vs. CDP voluntary disclosures (Coburn and Cook, 
2014). 
 
The American case of mandated sustainability reporting appears to be an example of 
boilerplate disclosures, cited as a drawback of mandatory disclosures (CGA, 2011; 
Coburn and Cook, 2014). The global impact of the American market, and the high rates 
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of voluntary sustainability reporting make the US path of sustainability reporting relevant 
for future trends and practices. 
4.2.6.3	  Key	  Features	  
Name: Material disclosures in the 10-K 
Format: Typically found as a comment in the notes or MD&A of a company’s 
annual report; voluntary practice of stand alone reports (i.e. CDP, GRI reports) 
Applies to: Publically traded companies  
Does not apply to:  Companies that do not issue securities 
What is being reported: Financial and non-financial information that is deemed 
material to the reasonable investor 
Policy Approach: Market-driven, investor focused, risk oriented 
Audit/Verification: Auditor of the annual report  
Other:  
- High reporting rates among largest companies (approximately 85%) but with 
weak to moderate quality of reports (KPMG, 2013) 
- Aligns to prediction of the US aiming for environmental disclosures as 
“sustainability”. Not an integrated concept of sustainability; shadowed by 
economic/investor lens of materiality. 
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4.2.7	  Canada	  
Canada shares similar corporate responsibility practices to the US, and vice versa 
(Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996; TMX and CPA, 2014). Early sustainability reporting in 
Canada focused on employee status and working environments in the late 1980’s (CGA, 
2005). In the 1990’s, North American companies, including Canadian ones, began to 
issue environmental reports. The prominent natural resource sector in Canada issued 
some of the first environmental reports in the country; however, there was less legal 
regulation on sustainability issues in Canada at this time (Gray, Owen & Adams, 1996). 
One of the first guidelines on environmental reporting in Canada was the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce Guideline on Corporate Environmental Reporting in 1992 (Gray, 
Owen & Adams, 1996). Canadian sustainability reporting is substantially driven by 
voluntary initiatives, with some regulation in place for primarily environmental 
disclosures related to assets, liabilities, costs, and litigation risk. 
4.2.7.1	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  Governance	  	  
 Canada currently does not have mandatory sustainability reporting standards. Like 
their American neighbours, Canadian companies with listings on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) or international exchange must disclose material environmental and 
social concerns in their annual report and/or an additional document, the Annual 
Information Form (CGA, 2005). Sustainability reporting remains quite high in the 
country, with 83% of Canada’s largest companies reporting (KPMG, 2013). The rate of 
reporting, like the US and Germany, has not increased substantially in recent years.  
 Banks and financial institutions in Canada must also report on their contributions 
to the Canadian economy and society through Public Accountability statements 
(SOR/2002-133). These statements disclose information on community development 
goals, volunteered employee initiatives, and initiatives to finance small business and 
improve access to financial services, which are accessible to the public and customers on 
the bank website. This information is centered on community investment, and applies to 
the largest Canadian banks. 
The disclosure of material environmental, social and governance factors are 
required under the National Instrument 51-102 Continuous Disclosure Obligations (NI 
51-102) (CGA, 2011). Corporate governance disclosures are required under National 
Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practice (NI 58-101). However, 
the corporate governance disclosures are on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, and offer 
guiding principles for listed companies on the TSX that may or may not be applied (TSX, 
2006; OECD, 2014). Materiality for Canadian companies follows the IFRS accounting 
standard, whereby information is material “ if omitting it or misstating it could influence 
decisions that users make on the basis of financial information about a specific reporting 
entity” (IFRS, 2014). Companies are to report on material environmental and social 
policies, as well as issues and liabilities that impact operations and performance. Because 
the judgment of material policies, issues and liabilities is at the discretion of the reporting 
company, this is an example of a weak sustainability reporting requirement.  
Currently, there is no national securities regulator in Canada, only 
provincial/territorial ones. However, consultation with investors at the provincial level 
suggested that securities filings were missing environmental information that investors 
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were looking for (CSA 51-133). In 2008, the Ontario Securities Commission issued Staff 
Notice 51-716 – Environmental Reporting, which noted existing shortcomings in 
environmental disclosures. More recently, securities guidance was issued through the 
Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), a council of provincial and territorial 
securities regulators. The CSA, in 2011, provided clarification on existing disclosure 
requirements for environmental matters under securities legislation: 
 
Disclosure may be required concerning: risks, environmental trends and 
uncertainties, environmental liabilities, asset retirement obligations, and financial 
and operational effects of environmental protection requirements and risk 
oversight and management. The Staff Notice [CSA 51-333] also highlighted 
disclosure requirements related to forward-looking information. Reporting issuers 
need to follow these requirements to be eligible for a legal defense from civil 
liability for misrepresentation in forward-looking information (TMX and CPA, 
2014, p.12). 
 
The extent to which this document has been read and understood is debated (Participant 
A, pers.comm., Dec.12, 2014). It appears these documents are primary guidance 
documents, and are not often referred to. 
 
4.2.7.2	  Policy	  Approach	  
 The policy approach is dependent on the materiality test of the reasonable 
investor, similar to the US. Banks have a regulated requirement; however, this is heavily 
focused on disclosing initiatives, which is a weak disclosure requirement (Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2006). Because the Public Accountability Statement is only applied to the 
financial services sector, it is a weak reporting requirement. For other companies, 
disclosure may be required concerning risk, environmental trends and uncertainties, 
environmental liabilities, asset retirement obligations, financial/operational impacts of 
environmental protection, and risk management (TMX and CPA, 2014). Despite this, 
“there is evidence that existing regulatory disclosures of sustainability development do 
not necessarily meet information needs of various stakeholders and a lack of consensus 
over direct standards and purpose of sustainability reporting persist” (CGA, 2011). 
Despite the prominence of voluntary reporting in Canada, about 80% of all companies on 
the TSX reported some type of sustainability practice in their annual reports or stand 
alone sustainability reports (CGA, 2011). The strength of voluntary reporting in Canada 
thus appears strong. 
4.2.7.3	  Key	  Features	  
 
Name: Materiality test of Canadian Securities Administrator Staff Notice 51-333, 
and IFRS accounting standard 
Format: Material sustainability disclosures in the notes or MD&A of annual 
report; voluntary practice of stand alone reports (i.e. CDP, GRI reports) 
Applies to: Publically traded companies that issue securities 
Does not apply to:  Private companies and other organizations 
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What is being reported: Financial and non-financial information that is deemed 
material to the reasonable investor 
Policy Approach: Market-driven, investor focused, risk oriented 
Audit/Verification: Auditor of the annual report. No mandated audit required for 
sustainability reports.  
Other: Canadian requirements for the NPRI (National Pollutant Release 
Inventory) and GHG emissions are heavily focused on the environmental pillar of 
sustainability. 
- Public Accountability Statements required for large financial institutions 
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4.3	  Findings:	  Mapping	  Exercise	  
	  	  
 
Figure 10: Sustainability Reporting Policy Analysis 
As stated in 4.2, France, Denmark and South Africa have regulated sustainability 
reporting to some degree, beyond the traditional argument that sustainability should be 
included if material. These three countries hold the highest sustainability reporting rates 
in the world (KPMG, 2013). However, through analysis, France and South Africa have 
stronger sustainability reporting policies in comparison to Denmark. The French and 
South African requirements are more prescriptive than the Danish requirements, the latter 
of which focus primarily on policy disclosure, as opposed to actual performance and 
strategy disclosures related to environmental, social, and economic topics. The French 
and South African requirements are more precise than the Danish requirements, as both 
France and South Africa provide recommended indicators, and principles, respectively, 
for companies to report on. These countries appear to move beyond using a financial 
reporting materiality requirement, found in the other evaluated countries. The precision 
of France and South Africa’s reporting requirements makes this more mandatory than 
Denmark, as precision is one requirement of hard law (Abbott and Snidal, 2000). This is 
a more comprehensive and precise form of regulation than asking companies to report on 
the existence of a policy and its contents (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). In addition, both 
France and South Africa require some degree of assurance on the sustainability 
disclosures provided through their board of directors and assurance providers, while no 
other country mandates assurance on non-financial information (unless it is material). 
This delegation of responsibility to the company to verify the data through an auditor 
echoes another characteristic of hard law, supporting that France and South Africa have 
stronger mandatory requirements. 
France has previously faced low compliance with the NRE Act, and has expressed 
a need to improve upon that leniency with Grenelle II. The French laws are more 
prescriptive, as they denote an obligation of companies to disclose environmental, social, 
and governance information with assurance. This range of information provides a more 
holistic conception of sustainability, while Denmark has a central focus on social 
responsibility only. The ‘comply or explain’ approach is applied, and the shareholders 
can hold companies legally accountable for omissions.  
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Denmark, despite their early practice of environmental disclosures through the 
green accounts of 1996, has a more limited scope of disclosure. Corporate social 
responsibility policies are to be disclosed under the 2008 Financial Act amendment, with 
the ‘comply or explain’ approach. The Danish regulation is focused on policy disclosure 
(particularly social), which is typically not denoted as a high quality sustainability 
disclosure (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Discussion of initiatives, performance 
improvements, audits, and targets are required for high quality disclosures (Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2008).   
South Africa is often cited as a leader in reporting, not only due to their stock 
exchange requirement, but also the high quality of South African integrated reports in 
comparison to other countries (GRI et al., 2013; Eccles and Krzus, 2014). Despite the 
compliance weakness of the ‘apply or explain’ approach, implementing non-financial 
information within the typical financial report is a significant step forward. This is 
evident when compared to the materiality test found in countries like Canada and the 
United States, and is arguably a stronger sustainability initiative than disclosing only a 
policy, as Denmark requests.   
4.3.2	  Limitations	  
 
One difficulty of performing a policy analysis on this topic is the complicated 
landscape of sustainability reporting policies, which can make it challenging to compare 
different countries’ practices. Focusing on countries that were repeatedly mentioned as 
mandatory or voluntary in the literature was used for the initial policy mapping of 7 
countries. The mapping exercise will be limited on the way a policy’s mandatory and 
voluntary strength is judged. However, mapping on a spectrum will avoid grouping 
policies in merely two groups (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). The necessity of boundaries 
means that aspects of policy assessment will be excluded in the judgment of the 
mandatory or voluntary strength of these boundaries, and present the opportunity for 
others to create their own reporting maps based on additional criteria. 
The shortcoming of the spectrum approach is that the placement of countries will 
be largely determined through the inductive reasoning of the researcher. In addition, 
determining the mandatory strength of a policy can be challenging, given that often the 
policy on paper is not what may be implemented in practice, and there are a variety of 
disclosure formats for sustainability information (Daub, 2007). However, because the 
spectrum is being used to identify countries collected around the mandatory and 
voluntary ends, general location of each country is more important than its specific 
placement. Reviewing key attributes of each country’s reporting policies and using the 
support of the literature can inform the plotting of the case countries.  
A final sample size of 4 countries is also a limitation of this study. Reviewing a 
larger sample of countries would enhance the credibility of the results, and allow a more 
convincing correlation to be made. However, due to time restraints and the multi-method 
approach used, reviewing 7 countries and choosing 2 at each end of the spectrum, for a 
total of 4, was deemed as appropriate.  
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4.4	  Summary	  of	  Key	  Findings	  
 
 The findings of this policy analysis agree with the literature; the information 
discovered in 4.3 is central to determining the case countries for Sub study 3, the report 
review. This policy analysis reveals that there is a divergence of mandatory and voluntary 
sustainability policies at the international level, it represents the perceived tension 
between the shareholder and stakeholder approach, and it suggests a soft law policy 
approach towards mandatory reporting.  
 The seven case countries evaluated are very different with respect to reported 
content, enforcement mechanisms, and report format. Despite these differences, a divide 
between mandatory and voluntary is apparent, as some countries have either 
governmental or markets prescribing disclosure, while others are recommending 
disclosure under particular conditions. Since this study will be evaluating the mandatory 
and voluntary nature of these policies, understanding how this divide impacts report 
quality will be investigated in Sub study 3. 
There are different ways to determine report content, from France’s suggested 
indicators, to corporate governance disclosures in Germany, to the materiality test used in 
the UK, Canada and the US. The way in which report content is determined aligns a 
policy with the shareholder or stakeholder approach. The materiality test is heavily 
grounded in the shareholder approach, while prescribed indicators or principles, such as 
those in France and South Africa, attempt to be more inclusive to non-financial 
stakeholders.  
The escape clauses discovered in this analysis support a soft law policy approach. 
The ‘comply or explain’ approach/orientation law approach in France empowers 
corporate management to interpret Grenelle II, supporting a less restrictive role of the 
state discussed in new governance. Denmark, similarly, uses the same policy approach 
but for policy disclosure, as opposed to performance disclosure. The ‘apply or explain’ 
approach in South Africa adds further flexibility for interpretation. The involvement of 
corporate management, the board of directors, and investors in applying and enforcing 
reporting policies supports an economic view of sustainability, and hints that 
international sustainability reporting, even when regulated, follows the shareholder 
approach. 
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Chapter	  5:	  Sub	  study	  3	  -­‐	  Report	  Review	  
 
5.1	  Methods	  
 
 Sub study 3 brings this study together by applying the developed scorecard in sub 
study 1 to the mandatory and voluntary case countries in sub study 2, in order to answer 
the research question. Sub study 3 reviews publically listed companies sustainability 
disclosures in one of the three reports discussed – a stand alone report, annual report 
disclosures, or an integrated report. Some companies have more than one of these reports. 
Because of the nature of the research question, registration documents in France, 
integrated reports in South Africa, and stand alone reports in Canada and the US will be 
the primary sample reports. Through content analysis and an application of the criteria 
generated through Sub study 1, the effectiveness of mandatory standards in comparison 
to voluntary standards was assessed. The countries with higher scores have the stronger 
reports, as the measure of effective reporting is the sustainability scorecard. 
 Qualitative content analysis, used in sub study 3, is the most common approach 
used in corporate social disclosure research (Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Adams et al., 
1995; Duff, 2014; Llena et al., 2014). This method measures comparative positions and 
reporting trends, including differences in reporting in different countries. Guthrie et al. 
(2004) articulate content analysis as: 
 
…a technique for gathering data, it involves codifying qualitative and quantitative 
information into pre-defined categories in order to derive patterns in the 
presentation and reporting of information. Content analysis seeks to analyse 
published information systematically, objectively and reliably…(p.287). 
 
Categories of classification, objectivity, quantification of data, and a reliable coder are 
necessary. There are limitations to using content analysis, specifically subjectivity in 
coding and focus on quantity of disclosure as opposed to quality (Guthrie et al., 2004). 
5.1.1	  Finding	  Companies	  
Reports were collected from companies on the Global 2000 Listing by Forbes, 
which ranks companies by their sales, profits, assets and market value as of April 1, 
2014. The rankings in each of the four equally weighted categories are added, in order to 
develop a hierarchal list that considers sales, profits, assets and market value in USD.  
Not all of the sample companies had designated, downloadable sustainability 
reports, most notable Berkshire Hathaway (US), General Electric (US) Manulife 
Financial (Canada), and Brookfield Asset Management (Canada). The 11th company on 
the Global 2000 list for US – AT&T – was included. The 11th and 12th companies on the 
Global 2000 for Canada – Bell Canada Enterprises and Husky Energy – were included. 
Despite being in the top 10 companies on the French Global 2000 listing, EADS 
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(formerly known as Airbus Group) is now a Dutch owned company and was excluded. 
L’Oreal Group, the 11th company on the Global 2000 from France, was then reviewed.  
5.1.2	  Finding	  Reports	  
Sample reports were from a company with headquarters within the country 
studied (Langer, 2006). Reports were downloaded from the global company websites. . 
This process was not straight forward, due to difficulties navigating websites, the variety 
of reports uploaded, and the existence of subsidiary companies. Initial insights from the 
report search were: 
o Reports were usually available in PDF format, with online or interactive reports  
o A variety of titles were given to sustainability reports 
o Separate reports (not included in the primary report) related to compliance with 
standards were read (i.e. Public Accountability Statements for Canadian banks, 
King III Principle Reports in South Africa, Grenelle II indicator reports in France) 
o Not all South African companies released sustainability reports. 5/10 reviewed 
companies had sustainability reports, suggesting that integrated reporting has not 
substituted the sustainability report (N.Morris, pers.comm, Dec.9, 2014). 
o Extra voluntary reports were commonly posted (i.e. Equator Principle reports, 
CDP reports, and UN Global Compact documents). These reports would be 
reviewed if easily accessible, and would be relevant to Quality 8 on the scorecard. 
5.1.3	  Report	  Boundary	  
The mandatory case countries – South Africa and France – include sustainability 
disclosures in their regulated reports -- the integrated report and the registration 
document, respectively. King III and Grenelle II requirements were also sometimes 
published in separate reports. Because these documents would be directly incorporating 
sustainability indicators, and because they are connected to relevant legislation that is 
being assessed through the research question, they were reviewed. Only these primary 
reports were considered as sustainability reports. The exceptions to this rule will include 
reports that are clearly incorporating other relevant sustainability disclosures (i.e. an 
additional sustainability report that was directly referenced and discussed in a company’s 
primary report). With the case of the voluntary case countries, the researcher noted extra 
voluntary reports in Quality 8bb. These reports would be additional to the primary stand 
alone report. These separate voluntary reports would not be considered as part of the 
sample of sustainability reports.  
5.1.4	  Reviewed	  Companies	  and	  Reports
Legend of Report Titles 
AIR = Annual Integrated Report 
AR = Annual Report 
CCR = Corporate Citizenship 
Report 
CDPR = Carbon Disclosure 
Project Report  
CMR = Community Report 
CRR = Corporate Responsibility 
Report 
CSRR = Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report 
DR = Diversity Report 
ER = Environmental 
Responsibility Report 
GCR = Global Citizenship Report 
GRI = GRI Index/Supplemental 
Report 
GRR = Global Responsibility 
Report  
IAR = Integrated Annual Report 
IR = Integrated Report 
KIII = King III Principle 
Supplement 
PAS = Public Accountability 
Statement 
RD = Registration Document,  (s) 
= section 
SDI = Sustainable Development 
Indicator Supplement 
SR = Sustainability Report 
STR = Stewardship Report 
SU = Sustainability Update
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France South Africa Canada USA 
 
• BNP 
Paribas 
• 2013 RD (s) 
 
•  Total 
• 2013 RD (s) 
 
• AXA 
Group 
• 2014 
RD/AR (s) 
 
• EDF 
• 2013 
RD/AR 
• 2013 SDI 
 
• Sanofi 
• 2013 RD (s) 
 
• Crédit 
Agricole 
• 2014 RD (s) 
 
• Société 
Generale 
• 2014 RD (s) 
 
• Orange 
S.A. 
• 2014 RD (s) 
 
• VINCI 
• 2014 
RD/AR (s) 
 
• L’Oreal 
Group 
• 2014 RD (s) 
 
• Standard 
Bank Group 
• 2013 AIR 
• Sasol 
• 2014 IR 
• 2013 KIII 
 
• MTN Group 
• 2014 IR 
• 2014 KIII 
 
•  FirstRand 
• 2014 AIR 
 
• Steinhoff 
International 
Holdings 
• 2014 IR 
• 2014 KIII 
 
• Sanlam 
• 2014 AR 
• 2014 KIII 
 
• Naspers 
• 2013 IAR 
 
• Bidvest 
Group 
• 2014 IR 
 
• Shoprite 
Holdings 
• 2014 IR 
• KIII (website) 
 
• Remgro 
• 2014 AIR 
• Royal Bank of 
Canada 
• 2013 CR (review) 
• 2013 CR 
Backgrounders 
• 2013 PAS 
 
• TD Bank Group 
• 2013 CRR 
• Linked documents 
• 2014 PAS 
 
• Scotiabank 
• 2014 CSRR 
 
• Bank of Montreal 
• 2013 CRR 
• 2014 PAS 
 
• Suncor Energy 
• 2014 Summary SR 
• 2014 Assurance 
Letter 
• 2014 Performance 
Data 
 
• Canadian Imperial 
Bank of Canada 
• 2014 CRR/PAS 
 
• Sun Life Financial 
• 2013 SR 
• 2013 PAS 
 
• Canadian Natural 
Resources 
• 2013 STR 
 
• Bell Canada 
Enterprises 
• 2013 SR 
• 2013 Assurance 
Letter 
 
• Husky Canada 
• JPMorgan 
Chase 
• 2013 CRR 
• 2013 GRI  
 
• Exxon Mobil 
• 2013 CRR 
• 2013 CDPR 
 
• Wells Fargo 
• 2013 CSRR 
• 2014 CSRR 
(interim) 
 
• Bank of 
America 
• 2013 CSRR 
 
• Apple 
• 2014 ERR 
 
• Citigroup 
• 2013 GCR 
• 2013 DR 
 
• Chevron 
• 2013 CRR 
• CRR 
Performance 
Data 
 
• Wal-Mart 
Stores 
• 2015 GRR 
 
• AT&T 
• 2013 SU 
• Linked 
documents 
 
• Verizon 
Communicati
on 
•  
  
77 
Energy 
• 2013 CMR  
5.1.5	  Scoring	  Reports	  
Reports were read and scored according to the Sustainability Reporting Qualities 
Scorecard of Sub study 1 (see Appendix 3). Some qualities were not evaluated for each 
company. Quality 5b, on discussing negative and positive performance, was evaluated on 
a 0-1 scale, where 0 is no discussion, and 1 is discussion. This quality was revised to be a 
data point not included in the total score for each company, as evaluating positive and 
negative disclosures on a 0-3 scale appeared difficult. However, this quality was still 
captured as it has potential value for results and discussion.  
Quality 8 was sub-divided into Quality 8a and 8aa, and Quality 8b and 8bb. 
Quality 8a and 8aa applied to France and South Africa, and not to the US or Canada. 
Quality 8a aimed to evaluate awareness of compliance to the regulated sustainability 
reporting standard. Quality 8aa aimed to evaluate the presence of any additional 
voluntary standards, and was evaluated on a 0-1 scale (No-Yes). Because there is still 
debate on whether mandatory or voluntary standards are better for sustainability reporting 
results, quality 8aa was kept as a data point and not included in the total score. Quality 8b 
and 8bb applied to the US and Canada, and not France and South Africa. Quality 8b 
aimed to evaluate compliance with a voluntary standard. Quality 8bb aimed to evaluate 
the presence of any additional voluntary standards, and was evaluated on a 0-1 scale (No-
Yes). For similar reasons, quality 8bb was kept as a data point and not included in the 
total score.  
Quality 10 aimed to evaluate the decision usefulness of climate change 
information in sustainability reports. This quality was evaluated on a 0-2 scale, with 0 
representing no mention of climate change, 1 representing some mention of climate 
change, and 2 representing a discussion of climate change, and/or identification of 
climate change as material or as a risk. All other qualities were scored on a 0-3 scale. The 
criteria required for each score are explained below each quality on the scorecard 
5.1.6	  Additional	  Observations	  	  
5.1.6.1	  Deliberating	  Scores	  for	  Qualities	  
 One predicted challenge of scoring reports with an invented scorecard was 
determining scores between the 1/3 to 3/3 ranges, in particular deliberating a score of 2/3 
or 3/3. The idea of the scorecard, however, was that a 3/3/ be a gold standard for 
sustainability disclosures. In predicting these judgment challenges, the scorecard tried to 
accommodate through the use of two features: a “Details” row under each quality, and a 
“Notes” column for researcher notes. Each possible numerical score for each quality 
would have a “Details” section, which acted as a guide for what attributes would be 
required to attain that particular score. Most of the attributes described in the “Details” 
section would need to be present in order to attain that score. For additional clarity in the 
scoring process, the far right column of the scorecard was used as a “Notes” section. 
Here, the researcher could document a) evidence-based comments that would support the 
numerical score allocated to that quality, b) general observations (i.e. novel findings), and 
c) page references or important quotations. Appendix 4 includes a more detailed 
commentary on the methodology for scoring qualities. 
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5.1.6.2	  Weighting	  of	  Scores	  
 Although quantitative scores would be used for the purposes of sub study 3, a 
qualitative analysis of the scores and the major themes for each country are the main 
sources of analysis. In order to capture the results for each country, the calculation of 
averages was primarily used when tallying the scorecard results. Qualities 5b and 8aa/bb 
were not included in this tally, and were calculated only for observation. By calculating 
averages at both the country level and at the international level, a cross-country 
comparison could be performed on not only total scores, but also on scores per quality. A 
short quantitative analysis was performed, in order to test the significance of the scores at 
the end.  
 No qualities were weighted as more or less important, as the 0-3 scale was used 
for almost all qualities. The only quality that did not get an equal weighting in the total 
tally was Quality 10, Climate change explained as decision useful information. This 
quality was one of the most difficult qualities to include, due to challenges measuring 
how companies consider climate change in their reports. A 0-2 scale was deemed the 
most applicable, as complexities around defining material issues in voluntary and 
regulated reports made it difficult to extend into a 0-3 scale. Moreover, certain industries 
did not have significant GHG emissions or environmental impacts, making extensive 
climate change disclosures not entirely relevant to them. For these reasons, a 0-2 scale 
was appropriate. 
5.1.6.3	  Cross	  Coding	  
A fellow Sustainability Management colleague [the cross coder] with experience 
in corporate reporting reviewed 5 companies’ reports from the case country sample at 
random, and scored them. This cross coding was performed to test the applicability and 
user-friendliness of the scorecard. Initial guidance was provided on how to use the 
scorecard. The purpose of this exercise was to test the credibility and consistency of the 
scorecard, and illuminate any shortcomings of the scorecard to the researcher. Because 
the proceeding section on scoring each quality was developed through the process of 
reviewing reports, the cross coder was not aware of these intricacies. The results of this 
double coding process revealed that approximately 3/5 scores were close to the initial 
scores of the researcher (within 5 points). The remaining 2 scores had some degree of 
difference, but were reviewed in detail by the researcher and confirmed as being not 
significant. Please see Appendix 4 for additional notes on scoring each quality.  
 
5.1.7	  Quantitative	  Analysis	  
Upon completion of the tallying of total scores for each country, a quantitative 
analysis was performed, to detect if there are significant results from the total average 
scores of the mandatory and voluntary countries. T-tests were primarily performed. This 
detected if there is enough evidence against the null hypothesis, and evaluated if 
mandatory or voluntary makes a difference in the score of the report. The final results of 
this quantitative analysis are included in Chapter 6. 
5.1.8	  Limitations	  
Because the mandatory case countries chosen have relatively recent reporting 
requirements, it was not clear in the literature how the reports would be formatted. The 
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use of thematic qualities in the scorecard mitigated this concern to some degree, as they 
could be applied to a variety of report formats. 
Almost half of the cross-coding scores were quite different from the researcher’s 
scores. It appeared that these divergent scores occurred when certain individual qualities 
were scored differently. Divergent scores – those where the score had 2 points difference 
– occurred twice with Assurance (Quality 7). Understanding where to find assurance 
information and how to interpret the language of assurance was a key difference between 
the researcher’s scores and the cross coder’s scores. 
Practitioner documents often use the G250 and N100 companies as their sample 
(Langer, 2006; Coburn et al., 2011; KPMG, 2013). In replicating this scope, private 
companies and SMEs will be excluded. This is reasonable given the trend that large, 
publically traded companies are more likely to report.7 Another limitation involves the 
assessment of reports from different sectors. Some sectors may be more attuned to 
prescriptive reporting, or using quantitative as opposed to qualitative indicators. The 
results still hold in a wide variety of settings, however, as there are many sectors in the 
top 10 companies of each case country. 
A final limitation is establishing the connection of the policy to the physical 
report. Many factors influence the form and content of the report, other than the policies 
reviewed here. This limitation is articulated in the following warning: 
 
… Scholars of corporate social disclosure are also confronted with complex social, 
political and economic contexts that differ from Nation-State to Nation-State. 
Failure to acknowledge these differing contexts can mask the complexity of drivers 
for both disclosure and corporate silence (Adams and Whelan, 2009, p.119).  
 
Quality 8 helps to address this concern, by searching for awareness of compliance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 This rationale aligns with the resource-based perspective of the firm, whereby larger companies have 
more resources to use on these non-financial, stakeholder-related initiatives than SMEs (Hart, 1995).  
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Chapter	  6:	  Results	  -­‐	  Findings	  of	  Sub	  study	  3	  
 
6.1	  Introduction	  	  
The results of sub study 3 answer the research question, as well as the subsequent 
objectives outlined in Chapter 1. In order to address how effective mandatory 
sustainability reporting standards are to voluntary sustainability reporting standards, the 
scores of France and South Africa will be compared and contrasted to those of Canada 
and the US.  
 
6.1.1	  Research	  Question	  and	  Hypothesis	  Summary	  
 
To recall, the research question of this study is:   
 
How effective are mandatory sustainability reporting standards in comparison to 
voluntary sustainability reporting standards?  
 
The hypothesis of the researcher, as stated in Chapter 1, was that the mandated reporting 
countries would have more effective reports than those reports in voluntary reporting 
countries. The trend seen in European countries towards more enhanced non-financial 
disclosures has been solidified in French legislation quite early. The drive for a 
competitive advantage in the emerging economies market has lead South Africa to 
become a leader in corporate reporting. These two case countries are predicted to have 
higher quality sustainability reports over the reports from Canada and the United States 
where no such regulation exists. There may be a null hypothesis present, which would be 
that there is no ideal or optimal policy for sustainability reporting, specifically between 
mandatory and voluntary policies.  
The independent variable of this study is “Adherence of Sustainability Report to 
Criteria”, which is also referred to as “effectiveness”, and the dependent variable is “the 
Sustainability Reporting Implementation Method”, which would be if the report was 
governed by a mandatory standard, or the absence thereof, which would be a voluntary 
report. 
6.1.2	  Results	  Summary	  	  
In order to respond to the research question, the scores from the sustainability 
reporting scorecard were used to assess the difference in mandatory and voluntary 
countries to determine if one region had higher scores than the other. Total and average 
scores at the quality and country level are compared. Because qualitative notes were also 
taken, emerging themes and patterns are discussed in the following Discussion Chapter.  
The companies’ total scores, and the score for each quality on the sustainability 
reporting scorecard were then organized by country (Figures 11-14). This allowed for a 
quality-by-quality comparison for each country, as well as a calculation of the average for 
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each quality. The total scores for each country were tallied and ranked in Table 1. The 
average scores for each quality per country were then compiled into an international 
results chart (Figure 15). Scores were also compared between mandatory case countries, 
France and South Africa and between voluntary case countries, Canada and United States 
(Figure 16 and 17). Lastly, a quantitative analysis on the scores in Figures 11-14 was 
performed to test if the difference in scores was statistically significant. 
 
6.2	  Country	  Results	  
6.2.1	  Canada	  
 
Figure 11: Canadian Company Results 
 
Canadian reports generally scored quite high, with some range between the highest 
scoring Canadian report at 25 points (TD Bank) and the lowest scoring report at 12 points 
(Canadian Natural Resources), with an overall range of 13 points between the highest and 
lowest scoring company. Over all case countries, Canada had the highest scores in its 
definition of sustainable development (Quality 1), disclosures on stakeholder 
relationships (Quality 11), and its readability (Quality 12).  Canadian companies had 
lower scores in their provision of assurance (Quality 7) and their materiality discussion 
(Quality 9). The average score for Canada was 18.7/35. 
 
	  
	  
	  
Quality
SD Mgmt Corp Gov Strategy Balance Neg/Pos Sust Perf Assurance Vol Stand Vol Stand Materiality Cl. Change Stakehldr. Readability
Company Name 1 2 3 4 5a 5b 6 7 8b 8bb 9 10 11 12
Royal Bank of Canada 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 2 15
TD Bank Group 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 3 25
Scotiabank 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 0 2 1 1 2 2 3 21
Bank of Montreal 1 1 2 1 2 0 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 2 21
Suncor 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 2 22
CIBC 0 1 2 1 1 0 2 0 2 1 1 1 3 2 16
Sun Life Financial 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 2 1 1 0 2 2 17
Canadian Natural Res. 0 1 0 1 2 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 12
Bell 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 24
Husky Canada 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 14
Average 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.6 0.7 1.9 1.1 2.2 1 1.1 1.2 1.8 2.2 18.7
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6.2.2	  South	  Africa	  
 
 
Figure 12: South African Company Results 
South African companies did not score as high as initially anticipated, largely due to the 
financially-driven disclosures of integrated reports. The highest scoring report in South 
Africa scored a 25 (Sasol), while the lowest scoring report scored a 13 (Shoprite 
Holdings). This range of scores was closer in comparison to the other case countries, with 
8 points between the highest score and the lowest. This close gap suggests that mandatory 
requirements may result in greater consistency of reports, which was predicted in the 
hypothesis of the study. However, this gap is still quite significant. South African 
companies scored the highest average scores among all case countries in corporate 
governance disclosures (Quality 3), the presence of negative and positive information 
(Quality 5b), materiality discussion (Quality 9), and stakeholder relationships (Quality 
11). The presence of a sustainability strategy (Quality 4) and the provision of user-
friendly climate change information (Quality 10) were weaker categories for South 
African companies. The average score for South Africa was 18.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality
SD Mgmt Corp Gov Strategy Balance Neg/Pos Sust Perf Assurance Reg Stand Vol Stand Materiality Cl. Change Stakehldr. Readability
Company Name 1 2 3 4 5a 5b 6 7 8a 8aa 9 10 11 12
Standard Bank Group 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 21
Sasol 0 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 1 2 19
MTN Group 1 2 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 3 0 2 2 22
FirstRand 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 18
Steinhoff Int'l 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 17
Sanlam 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 20
Naspers 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 0 2 1 18
Bidvest Group 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 0 2 1 17
Shoprite Holdings 0 1 2 0 1 1 2 1 3 1 0 1 1 1 13
Remgro 2 2 3 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 0 1 2 1 19
Average 1.1 1.6 2.1 1 1.4 1 1.8 1.4 2.9 1 1.4 0.8 1.8 1.3 18.4
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6.2.3	  United	  States	  
 
 
Figure 13: American Company Results 
 
American companies scored quite close to Canadian and South African companies 
overall. The highest scoring company in the United States had 24 points (Bank of 
America), while the weakest score was 13 (JP Morgan). The difference between the 
highest and lowest scoring company was 11, similar to Canada. American companies 
scored highest overall in their management involvement in the report (Quality 2). Weaker 
scores tended to occur in transparency around sustainable development definitions 
(Quality 1), their materiality discussion (Quality 9), and the provision of user-friendly 
information on climate change (Quality 10). Including definitions of sustainability and 
sustainable development was a much lower score than any of the other case countries. 
The average score for American sustainability reports was 17.6. 
 
Quality
SD Mgmt Corp Gov Strategy Balance Neg/Pos Sust Perf Assurance Vol Stand Vol Stand Materiality Cl. Change Stakehldr. Readability
Company Name 1 2 3 4 5a 5b 6 7 8b 8bb 9 10 11 12
JP Morgan 0 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 2 13
Exxon Mobil 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 2 22
Wells Fargo 0 3 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 1 1 0 2 1 16
Bank of America 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 2 24
Apple 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 0 0 2 0 2 13
Citigroup 0 3 3 1 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 23
Chevron 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 1 0 1 1 2 14
Wal-Mart 0 1 1 2 2 1 2 0 2 1 0 0 2 2 14
AT&T 0 2 0 1 2 0 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 19
Verizon 0 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 3 18
Average 0.4 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.9 1.6 2 0.8 0.9 1 1.6 2.1 17.6
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6.2.4	  France	  
 
 
Figure 14: French Company Results 
 
French companies were the strongest with respect to total scores and quality scores for 
sustainability disclosures. The highest score for France was 27 (BNP Paribas) and the 
lowest score was 17 (Total). The difference between the highest and lowest score was 10. 
French companies scored highest overall in their corporate governance disclosures 
(Quality 3), their strategic outlook on sustainability (Quality 4), their inclusion of 
negative and positive information (Quality 5b), their measured performance (Quality 6), 
their provision of assurance (Quality 7), their awareness of compliance (Quality 8), and 
their provision of user-friendly information on climate change (Quality 10). Clear 
management involvement in their sustainability disclosures (Quality 3), and a discussion 
around materiality (Quality 9), and transparency on stakeholder involvement (Quality 11) 
were weaker qualities for French reports. The average score for a French report was 20.9. 
 
	  
 
	  
 
 
Quality
SD Mgmt Corp Gov Strategy Balance Neg/Pos Sust Perf Assurance Reg Stand Vol Stand Materiality Cl. Change Stakehldr. Readability
Company Name 1 2 3 4 5a 5b 6 7 8a 8aa 9 10 11 12
BNP Paribas 2 2 3 2 3 0 2 3 3 1 1 2 1 2 27
Total 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 0 2 2 1 17
AXA Group 1 1 2 0 3 1 2 3 3 1 1 2 0 1 19
EDF 1 1 2 2 3 1 3 3 3 1 0 2 1 1 22
Sanofi 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 1 1 2 1 1 20
Credit Agricole 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 19
Societe Generale 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 0 1 2 1 21
Orange S.A. 0 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 19
VINCI 2 1 2 1 2 1 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 1 23
L'Oreal Group 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 3 1 1 2 0 2 22
Average 1.1 1.2 2.1 1.5 2.4 0.9 2.2 3 3 1 0.7 1.7 1.1 1.2 20.9
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6.3	  Overall	  Results	  
 
Table 1: Overall Country Scores for Sustainability Reporting Quality 
Country Total Average Score Rank 
France 20.9 1 
Canada 18.7 2 
South Africa 18.4 3 
USA 17.6 4 
 
France had the highest report scores, with respect to overall average score at 20.9/35. The 
second highest report scores were with Canada, at 18.7/35, followed by South Africa at 
18.4/35, and the US with 17.6/35. Because France also had the highest average scores in 
7 of the 14 possible qualities, the French reports appeared to be the strongest 
sustainability disclosures, in defining effective reports as those that most align to the 
sustainability reporting scorecard.  
 
6.3.1	  Compiled	  Country	  Scores	  
 
 
Figure 15: Scores for All Case Countries 
 
Country scores were then consolidated into one spreadsheet, in order to compare how 
each country’s average score for each quality compared to others, as depicted in Figure 
15. France lead with the highest score in the most qualities (7), followed by South Africa 
(4), Canada (3) and the United States (1).  
Quality
SD Mgmt Corp Gov Strategy Balance Neg/Pos Sust Perf Assurance Vol Stand Vol Stand Materiality Cl. Change Stakehldr. Readability
Country 1 2 3 4 5a 5b 6 7 8b 8bb 9 10 11 12
USA 0.4 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.9 1.6 2 0.8 0.9 1 1.6 2.1
France 1.1 1.2 2.1 1.5 2.4 0.9 2.2 3 3 1 0.7 1.7 1.1 1.2
South Africa 1.1 1.6 2.1 1 1.4 1 1.8 1.4 2.9 1 1.4 0.8 1.8 1.3
Canada 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.6 0.7 1.9 1.1 2.2 1 1.1 1.2 1.8 2.2
Average 0.95 1.55 1.8 1.23 1.73 0.83 1.95 1.78 2.53 0.95 1.03 1.18 1.58 1.7
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There is a low understanding of sustainable development and of sustainability 
more generally in the reports of all four case countries. Despite the prevalent use of the 
word “sustainability” in reports, companies seem to avoid explicitly defining 
sustainability in terms of their business. Despite annual reports often presenting and 
promoting corporate strategies, having a sustainability-driven strategy is still a relatively 
new practice for the case countries. Companies seemed to struggle linking environmental 
and social performance to their current corporate strategy, and often lacked a specific 
sustainability strategy with quantitative targets. Qualitative discussion seemed to be more 
prominent in all reports over quantitative data, as most case countries (with the exception 
of France) struggle to balance hard data with narrative and discussion on the indicators 
and values they provide. Sustainability performance appeared to be measured, however, 
across economic, social and environmental fields by all case countries. These scores were 
all relatively close to 2/3. The use of integrated indicators is thus still largely absent.  
With respect to credibility, assurance standards are still quite divergent among 
different countries. The mandatory countries seemed to have not only more frequent 
adoption of assurance, but also more extensive assurance that covered some, if not the 
majority, of sustainability indicators. Assurance seems to be heavily tied to national 
requirements, as seen through the strong corporate governance scores of South Africa, 
where the King III Code for Corporate Governance targets this particular area. Most 
companies, regardless of country, adopt some type of voluntary standard, whether ISO 
14000, the CDP, the GRI, or an industry specific standard. Thus, having some external 
party involvement with sustainability disclosures is apparent across the board. 
Materiality assessments for sustainability issues were rare in the reviewed reports. 
South Africa had a higher score in this category, perhaps due to the integrated nature of 
their report, which could include materiality alongside sustainability discussions quite 
easily. Climate change was an issue that many companies would mention, but would not 
classify as a risk or material issue. For this reason, Quality 10 was modified to a 0-2 
scale. Upon review of all case country scores, climate change is beginning to be 
mentioned in reports. However, it is often not discussed in detail, nor is it identified as a 
risk or material issue. Future research could consider how climate change is mentioned or 
discussed in regulatory filings in all countries (i.e. in the 10-K in the United States, and in 
Canadian annual reports). This dimension of sustainability reporting could be evaluated 
in and of itself in future studies. 
The stakeholder inclusivity of reports was assessed through Qualities 11 and 12, 
and seems to suggest a trend of increasing stakeholder consideration, but without much 
transparency and without integration into strategic planning. It was often unclear how 
stakeholders were engaged, how frequently they were engaged, and how their concerns 
were included in company decision making around future goals. Despite this lack of 
complete transparency, reports are beginning to become more user-friendly, particularly 
the voluntary reports. Readability was quite high in the voluntary reports, due to their 
added use of colour, diagrams, and internet engagement mechanisms like hyperlinks. 
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6.4	  Mandatory	  and	  Voluntary	  Combined	  Scores	  
 
 
Figure 16: Total Average Scores for Mandatory and Voluntary Sustainability Reporting 
 
Figure 16 includes the scores for France and South Africa, the two case countries 
representing mandatory sustainability reporting on the left, with the scores for Canada 
and the United States, the two case countries representing voluntary sustainability 
reporting, on the right. The total average scores for mandatory sustainability reporting 
countries was 19.65, while the same score for voluntary sustainability reporting countries 
was 18.15.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory SR Average Score Voluntary SR Average Score 
South Africa 21 Canada 15
19 25
22 21
18 21
17 22
20 16
18 17
17 12
13 24
19 14
France 27 USA 13
17 22
19 16
22 24
20 13
19 23
21 14
19 14
23 19
22 18
Average 19.65 Average 18.15
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Figure 17: Mandatory and Voluntary Countries Score by Quality 
Figure 17 outlines that mandatory countries had higher scores in 11/14 qualities. 
However, two of these qualities are those not included in the total value on the 
sustainability reporting scorecard (Quality 5b and 8aa). Without these two qualities, 
mandatory countries would have the highest values in 9 of the 12 qualities. The qualities 
with the greatest advantage in score were Quality 1 (definition of sustainable 
development), Quality 3 (Corporate Sustainability Governance), Quality 4 (Strategic 
Outlook), Quality 5a (Balance of qualitative and quantitative), Quality 6 (Sustainability 
Performance), Quality 7 (Assurance), Quality 8a (Awareness of Compliance), Quality 9 
(Materiality), and Quality 10 (Climate Change) in comparison to voluntary countries. It 
should be noted that Qualities 4, 6, 9, and 10 were very close to the scores of the 
voluntary countries (≤ 0.15 difference in scores). 
Voluntary countries had the highest score in 3/14 qualities. When considering that 
the scorecard did not include Quality 5b and 8bb, voluntary countries have the highest 
scores in 3/12 qualities actually included in the scorecard total. Voluntary countries had 
higher scores in Quality 2 (Management Involvement), Quality 11 (Stakeholder 
Involvement) and Quality 12 (Readability) in comparison to mandatory countries. 
Qualities 3 and 11 were somewhat close in score to the mandatory scores (0.25-0.3 
difference in scores).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mandatory Sustainability Reporting
Quality
SD Mgmt Corp Gov Strategy Balance Neg/Pos Sust Perf Assurance Man Stand Vol Stand Materiality Cl. Change Stakehldr. Readability Total
Country 1 2 3 4 5a 5b 6 7 8a 8aa 9 10 11 12
France 1.1 1.2 2.1 1.5 2.4 0.9 2.2 3 3 1 0.7 1.7 1.1 1.2
South Africa 1.1 1.6 2.1 1 1.4 1 1.8 1.4 2.9 1 1.4 0.8 1.8 1.3
Average 1.1 1.4 2.1 1.25 1.9 0.95 2 2.2 2.95 1 1.05 1.25 1.45 1.25 21.85
Voluntary Sustainability Reporting
Quality
SD Mgmt Corp Gov Strategy Balance Neg/Pos Sust Perf Assurance Vol Stand Vol Stand Materiality Cl. Change Stakehldr. Readability Total
Country 1 2 3 4 5a 5b 6 7 8b 8bb 9 10 11 12
Canada 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.6 0.7 1.9 1.1 2.2 1 1.1 1.2 1.8 2.2
USA 0.4 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.9 1.6 2 0.8 0.9 1 1.6 2.1
Average 0.8 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.55 0.7 1.9 1.35 2.1 0.9 1 1.1 1.7 2.15 19.65
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6.5	  Quantitative	  Analysis:	  The	  T-­‐Test	  and	  Monte	  Carlo	  Method	  
 
Two T-Tests were performed on the data above. The first T-Test was performed 
on the total average score of each of the four individual countries. Four scores were thus 
included. These individual countries were then grouped based on if they had reporting 
regulation or not. This T-Test tested the mean difference in score between mandatory 
countries (France, South Africa) and voluntary countries (USA, Canada) to see if the 
difference that occurs is significant. The resultant p-value was 0.3866, which means there 
was not sufficient evidence against the null hypothesis. This t-test was thus inconclusive, 
and could neither support the hypothesis or the null hypothesis.  
 The second T-Test included all of the total scores of each company (40 scores). 
These scores were divided into the mandatory sustainability reporting and voluntary 
sustainability reporting groups. Here, every company score was included, resulting in 20 
scores for mandatory, and 20 scores for voluntary. The average was thus taken for the 
entire group of 20 scores for mandatory companies, and another average was taken for 
the entire group of 20 scores for voluntary companies. The resultant p-value was 0.1823. 
This p-value, like the p-value of the first T-Test, means there was not sufficient evidence 
against the null hypothesis, and the t-test was thus inconclusive.  
 The third test performed was the Monte Carlo method. This statistical analysis 
includes the same sample of 40 scores, and divides them up into a mandatory and 
voluntary group. Then, each numerical score is detached from its true 
mandatory/voluntary grouping, and shuffled around approximately 10,000 times to test if 
the difference in the total average of mandatory and voluntary scores changed 
significantly. The observed difference in average score between mandatory countries and 
voluntary countries was 1.64. As seen in Figure 18, the distribution of the difference in 
the total averages of mandatory and voluntary scores most frequently occurred close to 
the 0 difference mark. This suggests that no matter if the score was denoted as belonging 
to the mandatory or voluntary group, the difference in average score did not change 
significantly. The observed difference in average score of 1.64 was plotted in Figure 18 
on the graph, and lies in an area of high frequency, meaning that this mean difference in 
score is not a significant finding, as it lies within the middle of the curve. The observed 
difference of 1.64 occurred about 8000 times, even while detaching scores from their true 
mandatory and voluntary groups. Significant results would require this number to be 
located on the outskirts of the curve, which it is not. The resultant p-value of this test was 
0.1581. The test does not show that there is any evidence of policy impacting the score of 
sustainability reporting. The results of the Monte Carlo method were, therefore, 
inconclusive.  
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Figure 18: Randomizations of Score for Mandatory and Voluntary Scores Using the Monte Carlo Method 
 
Please see the code and calculated data for the following quantitative analysis in 
Appendix 4.  
 
6.5.1	  Limitations	  	  
 These statistical results neither prove nor disprove the hypothesis of this study. 
The use of the T-Test can only disprove the null hypothesis. The results are thus 
inconclusive for this reason. Some of the reasons why the results were inconclusive could 
be due to the small sample size. Because only 4 countries were used, and then divided 
into 2 groups of 2 countries each, there was minimal data to work with, which increases 
the likelihood of inconclusive results. A larger study could include more countries in the 
mandatory and voluntary grouping. There could also be additional confounding variables 
that contribute to the scores of each country, that do not include if the reporting was 
regulated or not. These potential confounding variables include socio-economic issues 
within countries and their governments, and differences in regulatory language, which 
may make some standards weaker than others. These can impact the scores companies 
receive on the scorecard, as well as the mandatory or voluntary nature of sustainability 
disclosures. These confounding variables are other factors that may impact the scores that 
companies receive, but cannot be quantified, and thus cannot be detected through a 
statistical analysis. 
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Chapter	  7:	  Discussion	  
7.1	  Preliminary	  Discussion	  
7.1.1	  Analysis	  of	  Scores	  
The results of this study suggest that currently, the presence of policy on 
sustainability disclosures does not have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the 
resultant sustainability disclosures. This study did not have enough evidence to refute the 
null hypothesis, which was: there is no ideal or optimal policy for sustainability 
reporting, specifically between mandatory and voluntary policies. However, the results 
can also not conclusively state that there is no relationship with policy and reporting 
effectiveness. The use of both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the results allows 
for discussion of the close scores between the case countries, as well as various national 
and international trends on sustainability reporting. 
 
7.1.1.1	  FRANCE	  
France had the highest average score of 20.9 (refer to Table 1 in Results). The 
scores for French companies had a range of 17/35 to 26/35. French disclosures were 
found in the registration documents. Perhaps due to the intended audience of this report – 
“financial analysts, institutional investors and individual shareholders” – the language 
used is highly technical and there appears to be a minimal understanding of sustainable 
development present (AMF, 2013). Axa Group, EDF, Sanofi and Orange S.A. explicitly 
stated that their disclosures were written for an investor audience. 
All French companies reported strong awareness of compliance to Grenelle II (see 
Figure 14), with all companies scoring a 3/3. Because Quality 8a measures awareness of 
compliance, it cannot be used to confirm if French companies are, in fact, fully compliant 
with the specific requirements of Grenelle II. Frequently cited Law 2010-799 of July 10, 
2010 (implicated April 24, 2012) was mentioned as the law companies were abiding to, 
and/or they would mention Article 225 and particular subsections in which they were 
compliant. Commonly referred to subsections were s.102 and s.105. All French 
companies had full assurance on the scorecard, and scored a 3/3. This follows from the 
practitioner literature, which states that there must be verification of the disclosures in 
Article 225 (IRSE, 2012). 
There were other common themes prominent in the French reports. For one, most 
sustainability disclosures typically were located in one section of the report. Eight 
companies included the Grenelle II information within a chapter in the body of the 
registration document. Two companies included their Grenelle II information in an 
appendix. It was not uncommon to have both a chapter on ESG/CSR/sustainability 
disclosures, and an appended Table of Concordance to Article 225, which was present for 
5 companies. 
Disclosures were typically organized in environmental, societal and social 
categories, as requested under the legislation (EY, 2012). This, however, did lead to 
significant compartmentalization of indicators under these three categories. Moreover, 
there appeared to be a weak understanding of sustainable development within the 
registration documents, despite Article 225 calling for “societal commitments undertaken 
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in favour of sustainable development” within the registration document (Malecki, 2011). 
This weak understanding of sustainable development, as assessed in Quality 1, likely 
contributes to the lack of explanation about sustainability strategies within the case 
companies, as assessed in Quality 4. Axa Group, Sanofi and Vinci all mentioned 
sustainability strategies without any context or description of what this means. This lack 
of transparency around a corporate understanding of sustainability and sustainable 
development may also impact the persistent scoring of 2/3 in Quality 3, corporate 
sustainability governance. French companies were good at mentioning a CSR and/or 
Sustainable Development department, but struggled to explain how responsibility and 
accountability was distributed through such departments. This is an area for further 
consideration by French public companies. 
Environmental information was often not outlined as material to a company in 
France, but would nonetheless be disclosed because of Grenelle II. The difficulty in 
completing a materiality analysis for sustainability issues is potentially not as problematic 
with regulation like Grenelle II, as regulation, being prescriptive, can include 
environmental disclosures regardless of materiality. The provision of indicator guidance 
within the legislation could also contribute to the higher scores of French companies. 
Implementing a new sustainability reporting system can be potentially eased through a 
clear methodology of implementation, like a key performance indicator table. 
Despite the strength of Grenelle in including environmental disclosures, the law is 
fairly weak in its request for economic information. Perhaps because companies were 
including these disclosures within their registration documents, economic information 
was easily overlooked due to the heavy presence of financial data in other areas of the 
report. However, Lozano and Huisingh (2011) note that economic disclosures are not 
financial disclosures in entirety. Rather, economic disclosures should include data on 
customers, value creation, market presence, raw materials, supply chain, liabilities, anti-
corruption measures, earnings, acquisitions and mergers, market presence, local 
economic development initiatives, and wages, salaries and benefits for employees. 
Materiality was not discussed in most registration documents. When listing relevant 
indicators in appended tables, 5 companies used the phrase “information deemed the 
most important” as opposed to the term “material”. This is somewhat surprising, given 
that materiality is common to financial reporting, and the registration document is largely 
a financial report. 
 
7.1.1.2	  CANADA	  
 Canada had the second highest score and had the strongest sustainability reporting 
effectiveness of the two voluntary countries, with a total average score of 18.7. Canadian 
companies’ scores were distributed with quite a range, from 12/35 to 25/35 (see Figure 
11 in Results). This may be a trend for voluntary countries, as France and South Africa 
did not have the same difference in scores. Canadian public companies voluntarily report 
on their sustainability performance through voluntary reports, most often in the stand-
alone report format. Many of the largest listed companies in Canada were banks, which 
means they would also include a Public Accountability Statement either appended to or 
separate from their sustainability report. Some Canadian companies had many separate 
documents to look at, such as RBC, who divided their sustainability report by theme. 
BMO and Suncor similarly had parts of their reports in separate documents. Although the 
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intention was to create report sections that speak to particular stakeholder groups, too 
much compartmentalization of sustainability disclosures can become confusing for the 
reader, and can isolate issues within a company that may in fact be integrated across 
operational lines. This dimension – readability – was assessed in Quality 12. The use of 
hyperlinked documents (as used in the TD, Canadian Natural Resources, and Bell) is 
much easier to navigate, and gives the reader the option to investigate further, as opposed 
to being forced to with a divided sustainability report. 
 Like France, Canadian companies struggled with scoring high in their materiality 
disclosures (Quality 9) and with their weaker use of economic indicators. Canadian 
companies were more inclined to report on social issues. They also tended to define 
sustainability from an environmental perspective, explicitly stated by 4 companies. For 
companies that did use the term materiality, the assessment was either separate from the 
report (Suncor) or it was defined from a stakeholder perspective, similar to how the 
IoDSA defines materiality in South Africa (Bell, CIBC). 
 Unlike France, Canadian companies included a heavy discussion of initiatives 
within their sustainability reports, emphasizing positive narratives and stories about 
employees and nearby communities. Canadian companies tended to either have no 
assurance (0/3) or some degree of assurance (2/3). This varied practice is possibly 
characteristic to voluntary reporting countries, where no verification mechanism is 
emphasized in regulation. Four Canadian companies mentioned a voluntary 
standard/standards, such as the GRI, but it was unclear to the reader how it was applied. 
Mandatory countries countered this concern with the use of compliance tables, or tables 
of concordance which demonstrated awareness of compliance (and generally improved 
scores for Quality 8). This study, however, was assessing awareness of compliance, as 
opposed to the extent of compliance. 
 Despite the push for companies to report on real-time data, Canadian companies 
used old data (> 1 year old) in some instances, most notably TD and Canadian Natural 
Resources. This may contribute to the lack of long-term target setting observed by most 
Canadian companies. 
 
7.1.1.3	  SOUTH	  AFRICA	  
 South African companies scored an average of 18.4/35 with respect to their 
sustainability reporting effectiveness. This score trails just slightly behind Canada. The 
range in scores for South Africa were similar to that of France with a difference of 9; 
however, South Africa struggled to have one very high scoring report, with their highest 
score at only 22 (see Figure 12 in Results). South African sustainability disclosures were 
found in the integrated report, as these are the disclosures that are regulated under the 
King III Code. Half of the South African companies also released a stand alone 
sustainability report; these sustainability reports were not always reported annually, often 
only included some divisions of a business, or were quite short excerpts from the 
integrated report. However, in the words of South African energy company Sasol, “the 
annual integrated report is our primary report to stakeholders” (p.3). About half of the 
case companies did cross referencing between their integrated report and their 
sustainability report, to different degrees. 
 South African companies, as predicted, revealed confusion around understanding 
the audience of the integrated report due to their current experimentation period 
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(N.Morris, pers.comm., Dec.9, 2015). However, this is anticipated within the King III 
Code, as adopted by the JSE. Principle 9.1 of the Code states that integrated reporting 
should focus on “substance over form”, recognizing the various ways this new type of 
reporting may be interpreted. South African companies, like MTN Group, Sanlam, First 
Rand, and Bidvest Group, explicitly stated that their report was for providers of financial 
capital/shareholders. Some companies, like Remgro and Naspers, identified both 
shareholders and stakeholders as central audiences. Despite integrated reports being 
supposedly written for providers of financial capital, there appears to be confusion among 
South African companies on the intended audience (Eccles and Krzus, 2010; 2014; 
M.Krzus, pers.comm., Jan. 16, 2015). The King III Code states that: “…the board should 
take account of the legitimate interests and expectations of the company’s stakeholders in 
making decisions in the best interests of the company” (IoDSA, 2009a, p.9). Principle 9.2 
in the King III Code, which requests sustainability reporting to be included within the 
integrated report, may be one influence that is leading the integrated report towards a 
more stakeholder-inclusive approach.  
 Defining materiality in integrated reports appeared to be towards material issues 
to stakeholders/society. First Rand, Steinhoff International, Standard Bank, and MTN 
Group explicitly stated their materiality measurement included stakeholders (i.e. beyond 
investors). Sasol referred readers to the sustainability report for their materiality matrix 
on sustainability issues. South Africa is a prime example of the difficulty between the 
legal definition of materiality, and proprietary definitions from external standard setters. 
The use of different materiality definitions by the IIRC (investor centric) and IoDSA 
(stakeholder-centric) creates conflicting understandings of materiality.   
 Like France, South Africa had a high awareness of their reporting obligation 
under King III, with most companies scoring 3/3. Most companies displayed this 
awareness through tables that stated their compliance to the Code. For example, 3 
companies did this through an embedded table in the report, while 3 companies included 
compliance tables in referenced documents. However, assurance scores for South Africa 
were varied, with companies scoring between a 1 and a 2. This may be due to the 
“combined assurance model” suggested in the King III Code. This assurance model is 
defined as “integrating and aligning assurance processes in a company to maximize risk 
and governance oversight and control efficiencies, and optimise over all assurance to the 
audit and risk committee…” (IoDSA, 2009a, p.50). This focus on internal assurance may 
contribute to the lack of full assurance with an external assurance body, as assessed in 
Quality 7.  
Another similar comparison to France is through the limited transparency around 
understanding sustainable development. Sustainability was largely defined with financial 
parameters in integrated reports. Commonly used terms included “commercial 
sustainability”, “sustainable profitability”, “sustainable shareholder value”, “sustainable 
economic value”, “sustainable growth”, and “sustain[able] organic growth of the 
business”. One reason for this could be the economic focus of sustainability in the King 
III Code, where sustainability is defined as, “having regard to the impact that the business 
operations have on the economic life of the community in which it operates” (IoDSA, 
2009a, p.59). 
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7.1.1.4	  UNITED	  STATES	  
 American companies scored the lowest of the case countries, with a sustainability 
effectiveness score of 17.6. The difference in report scores was 11, with the lowest 
American score at 13/35, and the highest score at 24/35. American sustainability reports 
were all stand alone reports, with 4 companies including their sustainability disclosures in 
more than one report. Most reports were issued on an annual basis; however, American 
companies had some slower reporting cycles with Wells Fargo and AT&T issuing full 
sustainability reports on a biennial basis. This is potentially troubling given the current 
investor demand for real-time data (Participant B, pers. comm., Apr. 8., 2015).  
 Similar to Canadian companies, American companies had a range of scores in 
assurance (Quality 7). Most companies either scored 0/3 or 2/3, with 5 companies scoring 
0/3. The demand for assurance thus does not seem as significant in voluntary reporting 
countries, likely due to the fact that there is no pressure to assure reports from 
governmental bodies. Despite low assurance rates, 9 American companies, with the 
exception of Verizon, followed an external reporting standard for either some or all of 
their sustainability KPIs.  
American companies also had high readability scores, like Canada, with an 
average of 2.1/3. These similarities in voluntary country qualities can also be detected 
through Figure 17 in Results. Because the stand alone report is separate from financial 
disclosures, these documents were more stakeholder-oriented in their presentation, in 
comparison to registration documents and integrated reports aimed at shareholders. 
Because there is no regulatory body overseeing the report, and the report is not primarily 
written for providers of financial capital, reports from American and Canadian companies 
were typically easier to understand, included images and graphics, and were written with 
non-technical language. Despite high readability scores among case countries, American 
companies had low scoring disclosures on user-friendly information related to climate 
change. This was predicted, given the commentary of two sustainability professionals in 
sub study 1 (M.Krzus, pers.comm and D.Park pers.comm, 2015). American companies 
did not like to classify climate change as a risk, and often would not mention other 
legislative or negative performance topics in their sustainability report. American 
companies can be held liable for materiality claims in voluntary reports, which may 
motivate this lack of disclosure (SASB, 2015).  
American companies seemed to score a range of scores on Quality 9, 
Transparency on Materiality. This may be because of the mixed understanding of 
materiality within American financial and sustainability reporting (D.Park, pers.comm., 
Jan.20, 2015; SASB, 2015). Material issues in financial reporting can be different than 
those in sustainability reporting; however, having a degree of transparency around these 
issues is important for understanding the sustainability risks and challenges a company 
faces. Half of American companies did not discuss materiality to any extent, while the 
other five companies showed some attempt to (scoring close to a 2/3). Including 
identified material information in a sustainability report holds a company liable to that 
information, and can be used as a material misstatement/omission, increasing the risk of 
liability (Sulkowski and Waddock, 2014; SASB, 2015). 
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7.1.2	  Addressing	  the	  Hypothesis	  
 The hypothesis of this study, as outlined in Chapter 1, predicted that countries 
with regulated sustainability disclosures, France and South Africa, would have higher 
overall scores than the voluntary countries. No predictions were made on the scores 
within each quality as sub study 1 occurred after the initial hypothesis. However, as 
discussed in the literature review and in the policy analysis of sub study 2, mandatory 
countries typically have more extensive assurance practices, and typically discuss a wide 
variety of topics, albeit not in elaborate detail. Voluntary reports typically engage with a 
broader audience of stakeholders, and are criticized for being public relations pieces 
(Gray, Owens & Adams, 1996; Fonseca et al., 2013). Recognizing that this study defined 
sustainability reporting effectiveness in relation to the created scorecard, mandatory 
sustainability disclosures in previous studies had stronger correlation to sustainability 
reporting excellence and quality than voluntary disclosures (Kolk and Perego, 2010; 
Morrow et al., 2013). 
 The null hypothesis of this study, that there is no ideal or optimal policy for 
sustainability reporting between mandatory and voluntary policies, cannot be proven 
given the inconclusive results of the statistical analysis performed at the end of sub study 
3. Yet, there was also insufficient evidence to support that mandatory or voluntary makes 
a difference, likely due to the close scores (20.9, 18.7, 18.4 and 17.6) and the small 
country sample size. Despite a perceived trend by Kolk (2008) that assurance for 
sustainability elements within an annual report is a new trend, this information is often 
reviewed in alignment with the registration documents and integrated reports included in 
this study, making them more likely to be reviewed. 
There is evidence that the quality of sustainability information in France and 
South Africa was more credible due to the collective assurance scores, corporate 
governance scores, and the consistent use of an external voluntary standard (see Figure 
15 in Results). The management involvement in France and South Africa, however, was 
lower than the scores of Canada and the US. This suggests that management is more 
hesitant to disclose their direct relationship to sustainability disclosures when they are 
included in regulated documents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2	  Analytical	  Discussion	  
7.2.1	  Commentary	  on	  Case	  Countries	  and	  their	  Governance	  Structure	  
 
 As discussed in the new governance literature, traditional top-down government 
systems were not prevalent for the mandatory countries of this study (Tollefson et al., 
2012). Rather, stock exchange regulation and government requirements were the sources 
of regulation, central in determining the content of disclosures, and the extent of 
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regulation (GRI et al., 2013). The AMF in France (the government’s financial regulator) 
and the JSE in South Africa (the national stock exchange), are market-based parties 
central to mandating ESG disclosures for listed companies. This use of quasi-
governmental rule through market regulators supports the new governance literature, and 
the spectrum approach to reporting. 
 Despite the use of two groups of countries in this study – the most mandatory 
reporting countries and the most voluntary – the historical and current governance 
structures in these countries are different. As noted by Barbu et al. (2014), the legal, 
social, financial, cultural and political contexts of a country impact the resultant 
environmental disclosures. France may be the most effective reporter in this study, due to 
the relatively long legislative history sustainability disclosures have, in comparison to 
South Africa. France exists within a supranational and national governance system, both 
of which have a legislative history of non-financial disclosures. This includes following 
EU guidance as early as 2001, as well as their own national NRE Act of 2001 (EC, 2001). 
Meanwhile, South Africa has a unique social, political, and economic history, 
especially when considering its previous apartheid regime (King et al., 2010). As an 
emerging economy, they also have experienced growing economic competition from 
Brazil and China (M.Krzus., pers.comm., Jan.16, 2015). Yet, their integrated reports are 
ranked the strongest in the world, and give South Africa a competitive advantage over 
other developing nations (Eccles and Krzus, 2014). The “learning curve” for South Africa 
is thus just starting, whereas the French practice started almost 15 years ago.  
The governance structures in the voluntary case countries are also going through 
unique periods. The SEC is in the process of reclaiming institutional independence. In 
2010, the SEC clarified existing disclosures on climate change (Boecher, 2010). Yet, 
there remains debate within the US about regulating sustainability disclosures. The 
current American SEC chair, Mary Jo White, has recently emphasized the SEC’s 
independence from the legislative and judicial systems of government. She suggests that 
legislated requirements over securities dealings is not warranted, as: “…other mandates, 
which invoke the Commission’s mandatory disclosure powers, seem more directed at 
exerting societal pressure on companies to change behaviour, rather than to disclose 
financial information that primarily informs investment decisions” (White, 2013). This 
calls into question the future of US securities regulation as a source of sustainability 
disclosures. Coburn and Cook (2014) support this anti-regulatory stance by suggesting 
that voluntary disclosures are becoming more popular over 10-K disclosures. American 
companies will likely follow a voluntary, market-driven trajectory whereby competitor 
pressure will drive companies to report as opposed to regulation (M.Krzus, pers.comm., 
Jan. 16, 2015).  
In Canada, the lack of a national securities regulator challenges a market-driven,  
collective sustainability disclosure requirement. Similar to the US, there has been no 
substantial response to the 2010 CSA Staff Notice 51-333, similar to the interpretive 
release in the US in the same year. However, there is awareness that climate change 
presents physical, regulatory, reputational, and litigation risk to all Canadian companies. 
Institutional investors are increasingly looking for climate change disclosures in 
corporate reports (Desjardins and Willis, 2009). The use of the Public Accountability 
Statement by banks, coupled with the intensive resource sector in Canada may contribute 
to the relatively high quality voluntary reporting observed in this study. Although sectors 
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were not considered in the sample of this study, Canada appears to align with the 
predicted high quality reporting observed in environmentally sensitive sectors (Cho and 
Patten, 2007; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008).  
Despite similar governance systems (see section 4.3), there are distinct features 
prevalent in each of the mandatory and voluntary countries. One such feature, the 
reporting format, largely aligned with the three discussed formats in the literature (Gray 
and Herremans, 2011; Eccles and Krzus, 2010; KPMG, 2013). As assessed in sub study 
2, stand alone sustainability reports are not regulated in any jurisdiction at this time. The 
complex reporting formats of regulated disclosures, and the stand alone format common 
to voluntary reporting, may impact the effectiveness of sustainability disclosures, 
particularly from a stakeholder approach.  
7.2.2	  Complicated	  Report	  Formats	  
Sustainability information is displayed in a variety of complicated report formats; 
this was not anticipated due to the numerous studies that clearly delineate mandatory and 
voluntary sustainability disclosures (GRI et al., 2013; IRI, 2014; Barbu et al., 2014; 
Scholtz et al., 2014). Because the implementation method of reporting (mandatory or 
voluntary) was the dependent variable, only those disclosures relating to the respective 
regulation were reviewed. Yet, most French companies and half of the South African 
companies issued both regulated and voluntary sustainability reports. Canadian and 
American companies may have also disclosed information in their regulated filings; 
however, this was beyond the scope of the study. There is an era of experimentation 
within sustainability reporting  which is both problematic for future sustainability 
reporting, and promising for those who wish to see sustainability integrated into financial 
reporting.  
Reviewing French and South African reports took a substantially longer time than 
Canadian and American reports. One reason for this imbalance is the cross referencing, 
and the need to search for sustainability information within financial disclosures 
(Brockett and Rezaee, 2012). Cross referencing can be done in a user-friendly way, 
evident in Crédit Agricole’s voluntary sustainability report, where a correlation table 
matched pages of the report to both voluntary and mandatory requirements. Cross-
referencing raises the question. Please see a sample of the table below in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Sample Correlation Table, Credit Agricole CSRR 2014-2014, p.40. 
 
These correlations to different reporting standards can also be depicted with visual cues 
(i.e. Standard Bank’s integrated report). In most instances, finding information relating to 
King III and Grenelle II required more searching due to the long length of regulated 
documents, and the heavy use of both qualitative and quantitative information. These 
results suggest that legislative requirements may not present the most stakeholder-
friendly approach to disclosure, and run on the assumption that investors are the primary 
audience for these reports (Brown and Fraser, 2006; O’Donovan, 2002). 
Through the findings of sub study 3, it appears that the reports in the case 
countries aim at different audiences. This result was not anticipated, given the heavy 
emphasis on stakeholder inclusivity in the literature (Azapagic, 2004; Moneva et al., 
2007; Lydenberg et al., 2010; GRI 2013a; 2013b). Moreover, the recent movement 
towards targeted transparency requires the public to be able to interpret and understand 
information, in order to change their behaviour (Fung et al., 2007). Regulated disclosures 
may not be the most conducive to this, as information is not structured in such a way that 
stakeholders can understand; this agrees with previous criticism of mandatory 
environmental and social disclosures (Larrinaga et al., 2002, Case, 2005; Hess, 2007). 
Despite this perceived trend, the current likelihood of finding sustainability disclosures in 
regulatory filings is quite low (Coburn and Cook, 2014). The stand alone report has 
  
100 
become the primary location for environmental, social, governance, and economic 
disclosures in most jurisdictions (Gray and Herremans, 2011). A potential or current 
investor may struggle to find whether sustainability information would be in the annual 
report or the sustainability report. It appears that regulated sustainability disclosures serve 
the business case approach, as these regulated reports are primarily intended for providers 
of capital in the first place (Brown and Fraser, 2006; Lozano, 2013). Voluntary 
disclosures are more likely to be useful for a broader group of stakeholders, or for 
investors who wish to find additional information beyond materiality requirements. Thus, 
embedded sustainability reporting (i.e. in annual and integrated reports) and stand alone 
reporting becomes challenging to navigate when sustainability disclosures are being 
written in either one or both of these different reports, and for two different audiences.  
7.2.2.1	  An	  Issue	  with	  Integrated	  Reporting	  
 At the beginning of this study, it seemed that integrated reporting would be one 
format that could mitigate the concerns of a dual report system. However, there is a 
remaining problem with integrated reporting, in that it struggles to address and balance of 
different stakeholder needs, which aligns with initial concerns (Eccles and Krzus, 2010). 
This struggle also exists with other reporting formats; however, integrated reporting was 
predicted to alleviate some of these concerns. The struggle to coordinate a balance 
between financial and non-financial information is not clear in the literature, and will be 
evaluated. 
The purpose of the integrated report is to have all material financial and non-
financial information in one place (Eccles and Krzus, 2010; 2014). Within South Africa, 
some companies now release only an integrated report, while others continue to also 
release separate sustainability reports. These reports are, according to the IIRC, written 
for different stakeholder groups. The integrated report is for investors, as it is a JSE 
listing requirement, and outlines the material issues of a company, and state broader 
sustainability challenges facing the organization (IIRC, 2013). Yet, the Institute of 
Directors of Southern Africa, the authors of King III, suggest that it is written for 
stakeholders. There appears to be a contradiction of the intended audience of the 
integrated report within the country that started it. The detected absence of some 
sustainability reports in South African companies may neglect to address those interested 
in sustainability disclosures. The reviewed South African companies struggled to define 
materiality in one concise way, using both investor and stakeholder-centered definitions. 
This places these companies at risk of litigation (SASB, 2015). Moreover, approximately 
half of South African companies had difficulty connecting their strategy to sustainability, 
perceiving strategy as primarily financially driven, despite the six capitals model (IIRC, 
2013). Even with regulatory guidance, issues of implementation prevent one uniform 
report format. The integrated reporting movement must be aware that is does not become 
part of the “trend of increasing sophistication amongst people who understand these 
issues [and aim] to prevent these debates” (R.Gray, pers.comm., Jan.14, 2015).  
7.2.3	  The	  Shareholder	  and	  the	  Stakeholder:	  Addressing	  Different	  
Audiences	  
This study supports the tension between the shareholder and stakeholder approach 
common to the corporate reporting, agency theory, and legitimacy theory literature. The 
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shareholder and stakeholder debate is prominent in this study. An important question 
remains after this study: who are sustainability disclosures for? Stakeholder theory 
suggests that reports should be aimed at the most important stakeholders to the company. 
Agency theory suggests that reports should be aimed at investors, given their contractual 
relationship to the company. Legitimacy theory suggests management should use reports 
as a way to support the company’s agenda, and thus reports should be used as positive 
branding to the public. This study, contrary to the literature, seems to discover a binary 
relationship emerging whereby regulated disclosures aim more at the investor, while 
voluntary reports address general stakeholder concerns.  
Aiming regulated disclosures to investors makes economic sense to a public 
company, as they are the primary way a public company will grow and continue to exist. 
Because annual reports and registration documents are primarily intended for investors, 
including sustainability information in these documents naturally directs this information 
to these audiences. The IFRS states that information in financial reporting is material “ if 
omitting it or misstating it could influence decisions that users make on the basis of 
financial information about a specific reporting entity” [emphasis added] (IFRS, 2014). 
These users are explicitly defined, referencing sections of the conceptual framework of 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS, 2014): 
 
The objective of financial reporting…refers to existing and potential investors, 
lenders and other creditors… 'regulators and members of the public other than 
investors, lenders and other creditors' may find information in general purpose 
financial reports useful but clearly states that those are not the parties to whom 
general purpose financial reports are primarily directed.  
 
Therefore, once sustainability information is included in an annual report, the primary 
audiences of this information are the users listed above – investors and creditors – in 
other words, those that have a financial interest in the respective company. 
Placing the future of sustainability outcomes on investors is both promising and risky. It 
is promising due to the perceived change in investors, and the recent push for more 
information on sustainability performance (Participant B., pers.comm., April 2015; 
Brockett and Rezaee, 2012b). The socially responsible investment community, and their 
demand for sustainability information as a measure of risk, has increased the demand for 
sustainability disclosures (Morrow et al., 2013; Morrow and Yow, 2014). Investors carry 
with them great potential, as “once investors can understand the sustainability 
performance of companies and the sustainability impacts, they can make decisions that 
drive capital to the most sustainable outcomes” (D.Park, pers.comm., Jan. 20, 2015). 
Investors also have a legal relationship to companies (through the principal-agent 
contract), which gives them significant leverage in the demands for disclosure (Adam and 
Whelan, 2009).  
Investors are a risky audience for sustainability disclosures in that “the primary 
challenge is having companies view environmental and social issues as being material to 
them…these issues are not material because they don’t have any real financial impact…” 
(Doug Park, pers.comm., Jan. 20, 2015). Because investors determine materiality 
primarily based on financial impact, sustainability disclosures must be connected to this. 
The soft law approach of mandatory sustainability reporting leaves the investor as a 
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primary accountability and enforcement mechanism. Grenelle II’s primary enforcement 
mechanism is the shareholder, who can bring legal action against the company for 
omitted disclosures (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 2012). Apart from socially 
responsible investors, many investors’ interests revolve around generating financial gain 
from their respective financial interests. This also makes investors a risky audience for 
sustainability disclosures as sustainability is often not associated with financial gain. In 
other words, profit drivers generally come before sustainability on the hierarchy of 
importance to investors that lack a socially responsible motive. Therefore, if investors 
have personal financial gain as a main driver of their decisions, this could result in poor 
quality sustainability disclosures if investors are the target audience.  
Will investors know what the “sustainable outcomes” are? Will they consider 
environmental and social risks material? Will they hold companies accountable to 
environmental and social impacts? If mandatory sustainability reporting continues to 
place environmental, social, governance and economic information within documents 
intended for investors, the future of positive sustainability impacts by companies is left 
with one select group of stakeholders, to which financial return is the highest priority. 
There is no way for those without a financial share in the company to hold the company 
accountable, especially if shareholders are the only enforcement mechanism, and 
companies can use escape clauses to avoid compliance. According to targeted 
transparency, the public needs to have enough relevant information to force a company to 
change its behaviour (Fung et al., 2007; Mitchell, 2011). If sustainability disclosures in 
regulated documents cannot provide user-friendly information to members of the public 
(who are not investors), these stakeholders may not be able to place pressure on 
companies, and may lack information that would change behavioural decisions. In a 
society where there are many other affected parties from corporate decisions, 
transactions, and developments, this is a risky path for future sustainability reporting to 
take, and should be re-evaluated in greater detail (R.Gray, pers.comm., Jan 20, 2015).  
7.2.4	  Operating	  within	  the	  Accountant’s	  Paradigm	  	  
 
“Experiences shows that, organizations will not want an account that threatens the 
credibility of their whole raison d’être.” – Gray, 2010, p.52 
 
Critics of current sustainability reporting (see the critical theorist perspective in 
2.2.6.3) argue that institutional changes are required to advance sustainability reporting. 
For one, there is some degree of distrust with accountants assessing sustainability 
performance due to previous errors with the financial accounting industry. Gray and 
Herremans (2011) argue: “If the financial markets were unable to assess the financial 
performance of a corporation from its financial statements, this would be entirely 
unacceptable. Why might it be acceptable with sustainability reports?” (p.420). From a 
more ontological perspective, the worldview of accountants is much smaller than the 
worldview of sustainability. Crowther (2012) posits that: 
 
…The various uses of accounting as a basis for the measurement of past 
performance bind the whole organization throughout time into a unified 
whole…this binding of the organization into a unified whole is however only 
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possible at the expense of simultaneously separating the organization from its 
external environment. Thus accounting, when used traditionally, considers solely 
the organisation itself and the effects of that organisation’s actions only upon 
itself, rather than recognising any interaction between the organization and its 
environment (p.35). 
 
Accountants currently operate under the assumptions of agency theory, which fails to 
consider other interactions that occur between a company and the biosphere (Gray and 
Bebbington, 2002). Critical theorists argue that, “sustainability reporting requires a 
detailed and complex analysis of the organisation’s interactions with ecological systems, 
resources, habitats, and societies, and interpret this in the light of all organisation’s past 
and present impacts on those same systems” (Gray and Milne, 2007, p.195).  
Accordingly, company performance and impacts cannot be reduced to financial 
and cash flow decisions; rather, companies need to be seen as part of a larger system on 
which they are dependent on (Gray, Owen and Adams, 1996). Larrinaga et al. (2002) 
note in their research that accounting standards do not include a long-term view, external 
costs and benefits, or impacts on ecological entities. The lack of expertise of accountants 
on environmental and social disclosures, and on forward-looking information, offers an 
additional argument against sustainability information being included in annual reports. 
South African accounting firms, for example, must now audit sustainability disclosures in 
the integrated reports of public companies. Neil Morris, a chartered accountant at KPMG 
in South Africa expressed his concern around his profession’s responsibility with this 
practice. “The auditors”, he stated, “get really, really nervous around forward-looking 
statements and whether they can provide assurance on it” (Pers.comm., Dec. 9, 2014). 
Yet, corporate reporting is becoming more and more centered on a forward and outward 
looking perspective (Crowther, 2012). As the results of this study suggest, the inclusion 
of sustainable strategies with measurable targets and goal setting within sustainability 
disclosures are still in the very early stages.  
7.2.5	  The	  Mandatory	  and	  Voluntary	  Debate:	  Is	  New	  Governance	  the	  way	  
to	  go?	  
 
New governance, a central theory in the mandatory and voluntary debate…is 
based primarily on voluntary performance standards. Law does play a role, but more as a 
procedural framework than as a ‘policy instrument’ (Eberlein & Kerwer, 2004, p.131). 
The results of this study, specifically sub study 3, suggest that voluntary reports are not as 
poorly written as the literature suggests. Yet, when considering the scorecard tallies, both 
mandatory and voluntary countries scored quite low, with averages between 50% (US) 
and 60% (France) of the total possible points. Even with the existing soft law mandatory 
standards, sustainability disclosures are still relatively weak. This could be due to the 
emphasis on sub-topics of sustainability (i.e. corporate governance, environment) as 
opposed to including environmental, social, economic, and governance disclosures 
altogether. France tended to focus on environmental and social topics, while South Africa 
had significant focus of corporate governance and social topics, but lacked discussion on 
environmental issues. Weak total disclosure could also be due to relaxed standards and/or 
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poor implementation of existing standards. Evaluating the value of existing standards is 
beyond the scope of the study, but is an area of future research.  
The use of escape clauses in mandatory reporting is potentially a barrier to future 
reporting quality improving. Because companies can escape particular requirements 
through explanation, there is little push to improve not only reporting quality, but also the 
enforcement of reporting standards. Case companies would write that certain indicators 
were “not applicable”, sometimes without explanation. Since standards are loosely 
enforced, there is no regulatory “teeth” to push companies to be more transparent. This is 
potentially why France and South Africa, despite having enforcement bodies, have 
similar reporting scores to Canada and the US. Although stronger on most qualities, 
mandatory countries do not show a significant improvement. Even if the standards 
included were considering sustainability more holistically, if the standard is not held to 
account and enforced, the reporting quality will not improve. Escape clauses can also 
eliminate the competition to have the strongest mandatory disclosures, countering the 
prediction of Lydenberg et al. (2010). Elimination of competition through weak standards 
prevents policy innovation and best practices development, which are notably two strong 
suits of voluntary reporting. The only way societal actors will become knowledgeable 
and effective in a soft law system that depends on transparency, is if companies are more 
transparent and forthcoming on holistic sustainability performance. 
Mandatory reports supported previous criticism of enforcement bodies failing to 
stringently implement policies (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2011; CDSB, 2012; Sulkowski 
and Waddock, 2014). However, as Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) note, laws and 
regulations around sustainability reporting take a number of years to materialize.  This 
study did not entirely support the criticism that mandatory policies aim at minimal 
compliance, as Quality 8 had high scores for awareness of compliance (see Figure 17). 
Voluntary reporting largely aligned with criticisms identified in the literature. American 
and Canadian reports defined sustainability in various ways, evident in the variety of 
titles given to these reports (Langer, 2006). Different indicators were discussed, 
supporting the claim that comparability is difficult in voluntary reporting (WBCSD, 
2013; Fonseca et al., 2013). The avoidance of materiality and climate change risk agrees 
with Jeucken’s (2001) and Case’s (2005) assessment that voluntary reporters do not wish 
to disclose risky or confidential information that could put the company in a litigious 
situation, or at a competitive disadvantage.  
Like the spectrum approach of sub study 2, so, too, is sustainability reporting 
governance on a spectrum between soft and hard law. Existing sustainability reporting 
regulation lies far on the end of the soft law approach. This allows for a flexible policy 
approach, as companies, market regulators, and governments can innovate through 
collaboration. Yet, there is also a risk of new governance-inspired policy, due to the 
absence of a government’s regulatory power. In this era of “governing without 
government”, the implementation of new governance may require modification to 
improve the quality of sustainability reporting in mandatory countries. Despite being a 
multi-actor model of governance, there was not extensive stakeholder involvement in the 
requirements of France and South Africa. Focus was instead centered on the board of 
directors’ approval. Moreover, as revealed through sub study 1 interviews and sub study 
2, it is difficult to find how Grenelle II and King III are enforced (largely because they 
are still being interpreted). Soft law systems need to improve their stakeholder 
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involvement throughout the application of a standard, but they also need to be more 
binding on compliance obligations. This approach may initially be repelled by market 
regulators and securities exchanges; however, the power differentials that remain in soft 
law, and the lack of accountability mechanisms in new governance policy are 
problematic areas that are present in sustainability reporting legislation (Leman, 2002; 
Rhodes, 1996). Thus, although new governance may empower additional actors, the lack 
of an inclusive stakeholder approach and absent enforcement mechanisms suggests that 
an improved version of new governance is required for substantive results in 
sustainability reporting. 
 
7.2.6	  Addressing	  Some	  Broader	  Concerns	  In	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  
 
“We’re in the world of the ‘should’ right now… like what companies should be doing. 
It’s not necessarily what they are doing.” – Participant B 
 
The worries of the critical theorists are supported by the observed trends in this 
study, of repeated economic conceptions of sustainability, and the lack of integrated 
indicators in sustainability disclosures. Critics posit that determining the purpose of 
sustainability reporting, and its contents, is an ontological question that precedes the 
mandatory and voluntary debate (R.Gray, pers.comm., Jan.20, 2015). In moving beyond 
the mandatory and voluntary debate, more radical perspectives should be considered that 
question the current corporate understanding of sustainability, and call for institutional 
changes. As seen in Quality 1, the definition of sustainability is often manipulated to 
serve a financial purpose, such as “sustainable shareholder value”, or “sustainable 
returns”. Sustainability reporting, whether mandatory or voluntary, is criticized for its 
misunderstanding of sustainability, its discounting of other value systems, and for the 
institutional inertia it supports. 
 Sustainability reporting is accused of focusing on short-term temporal scales, and 
on primarily economic interests over social and environmental ones; this can negatively 
impact sustainability reporting quality. Voluntary sustainability reports have been 
accused of perpetuating existing problems by avoiding true sustainability, as they are 
written to legitimate practices that continually exploit people and the environment, 
through features such as self-selected indicators and weak assurance requirements (Gray 
and Milne, 2007). The technical economic and financial language prevalent in mandatory 
reports supports criticism that companies distort definitions of sustainability to serve their 
own interests, echoing legitimacy theory once again. If companies convince the public 
they are portraying sustainability through reports, and a particular threshold is set as 
being the “best practices” for reporting, this threshold of sustainability is seen as 
legitimate, and becomes accepted. In this way, transparency through reporting can be 
used to manipulate the public, convince them of some managerial conception of 
sustainability, and in fact reduce concerns on quality performance improvements 
(Deegan, 2007; Duff, 2014). Reports could serve as barriers preventing change 
(Bebbington, 2007; Moneva et al., 2006; Gray, 2010). From a more optimistic 
perspective, reports could serve as a mechanism to begin transitions to new value 
systems. Sustainability reports can “serve to change management strategies and 
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information systems and in turn lead to changes in management philosophies and 
practices” (Buhr, 2010, p.67). 
New value systems for measuring environmental, social and economic 
performance could be included in sustainability reporting, and create more substantial 
change than existing standards. A more integrative sustainability paradigm would not 
only recognize the exchanges that currently occur, which are material exchanges, but 
would also consider ecological exchanges with the biosphere, and nonmarket exchanges 
with the sociosphere (Gladwin et al., 1995). Although these other systems of exchange 
seem foreign, they suggest that there are other ways to measuring value that exist beyond 
the current industrial paradigm that created environmental, social and economic 
problems. This is similar to the tension between prioritizing shareholders (a financial 
argument) and stakeholders with the environment (a moral argument). As Rob Gray 
points out, there are different value systems that companies currently do not consider in 
their operations. “The pursuit of shareholder value,” he argues, “is a political and 
religious belief. It isn’t a fact…it’s a political belief based on neoliberalism” 
(Pers.comm., Jan.14, 2015).  
Institutional inertia is a factor that may also contribute to the current and future 
quality of sustainability reporting. According to Moneva et al. (2006): “the understanding 
of the meaning of sustainable development, the three dimensions/pillars of sustainability 
(TBL) and their interactions has been changing as the concepts have been analysed, 
reinvented and operationalized for institutional purposes” (p.134). The idea of 
institutional change, especially those that deal with the market of industrial society, is a 
painful and discomforting thought to companies, organizations, governments, and 
individuals. However, this may be required in order to accommodate new value systems 
that aim to eliminate negative impacts to the climate, reduced material consumption, and 
more extensive social equity. Should new economic systems outside of capitalism be 
seriously considered, existing reporting mechanisms – both mandatory and voluntary – 
would be deemed insufficient, especially given the very low scores on the existing 
scorecard in sub study 3. Currently, mandatory reporting, “will not necessarily diminish 
the corporate concern to maximize shareholder wealth so long as the institutional 
pressures and remunerative mechanisms…remain intact” (Adams and Whelan, 2009, 
p.130). 
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Chapter	  8:	  Conclusion	  
8.1	  Contributions	  of	  this	  Study	  
 
In a discussion about improving sustainability reporting, Rob Gray raised an 
important point about the practice that comes “pre-legislation”. He said: 
 
“…it’s the idea that we actually want to know the extent to which companies are 
unsustainable and the extent to which we have to change our way of life” 
            - personal communication, Jan. 14, 2015. 
 
This study, through the creation of a scorecard, the policy analysis, and an evaluation of 
both mandatory and voluntary reports, contributes in some small way to this larger debate 
of improving sustainability measurements, and ultimately performance. The usability of 
the scorecard, coupled with the insights of sub study 2 and 3, offer an understanding of 
the intricacies of sustainability reporting policy, and suggest there is opportunity for both 
mandatory and voluntary reports to improve in the future.  
This study provided methodological, academic, and practical contributions.  
The scorecard of this study developed in sub study 1 (see Appendix 3) is the main 
methodological contribution, as it offers qualities to measure the effectiveness of a 
sustainability report, a concept that is not discussed in the literature in great detail. It 
takes the key themes from expert interviews, and combines them with previously used 
scoring methods to assess the strength of a sustainability report. The fact that this 
scorecard can be used in both mandatory and voluntary jurisdictions with Quality 8 is 
also a new and useful contribution of this study, especially given the increasing trend of 
mandatory disclosures. This scorecard has been used on stand alone reports, registration 
documents, and integrated reports, which makes it dynamic and useful in different 
corporate environments and countries.  
The academic contribution of this study primarily impacts the governance 
literature on the mandatory/voluntary debate, and also contributes to the sustainability 
reporting literature more broadly. This study contributes to the mandatory/voluntary 
debate by evaluating the degree of regulation, and making an assessment on their 
effectiveness, which has not been done before (Scholtz et al., 2014).  It also contributes 
by suggesting there is no significant difference between mandatory and voluntary 
standards at this time, through statistical verification. However, the breakdown of the 
scores for each quality reveal that there is the potential for mandatory disclosures to 
create more high quality reports if they can be more user-friendly. This study also reveals 
that mandatory disclosures, despite their perceived strength in credibility, are investor-
centric and often relax compliance through policy mechanisms like the ‘apply or explain’ 
principle. This observation supports the new governance literature, which suggests that 
less government involvement is an increasing trend in regulation. This study also 
contributes to emerging research on integrated reporting, through its discovery that this 
practice follows a business case approach, and must resolve the tension on its intended 
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audience. This study adds support to existing research that suggests the format of the 
report is linked to the purpose and audience of report, and thus changes its content.  
This study also has practical contributions for non-academic readers, such as 
current companies and policy makers. The extensive policy analysis in sub study 2 
provides a collective summary of sustainability reporting policies in 7 countries for 
interested parties. The scorecard is also a positive contribution to any company or 
organization wishing to measure their sustainability reporting quality, or used as an 
outline to help first-time reporters. At a national level, this study provides an initial 
assessment of sustainability reporting for each of the four case countries, and could help 
these countries improve their current reporting practices through review of the data. For 
international policy makers, this study provides an in-depth look at the advantages and 
disadvantages of regulation. It explores two different approaches to regulation -- the 
indicator intensive policy of Grenelle II, which can create text-intensive, technical 
reports, compared to the principle based guidelines of King III, which can create a 
diversity of reports, and neglect environmental issues. This study’s analysis of the 
reporting policies, and the resultant assessment of their effectiveness, can provide some 
initial understanding to the policy community, given that recent reporting practices are 
relatively new and experimental. 
 
8.2	  Summary	  of	  Findings	  
A summary of the study results can be found in the Preliminary Discussion 
section of the Discussion chapter. Three major findings come from this study, with 2 
secondary findings. Each finding is associated with a sub study of the Methods.  
• There are 12 areas of sustainability disclosures that are perceived as being 
the most important to effective sustainability reporting. The sustainability 
reporting scorecard demonstrates these themes (Appendix 3). 
• In the study’s sample, France and South Africa currently have the 
strongest sustainability reporting requirements, due to their government 
and stock exchange mandates. Canada and the United States have the 
weakest reporting requirements, as neither the stock exchange nor the 
government has offered regulation over sustainability disclosures at this 
time. These countries are international examples of voluntary reporting.  
• There is, at this time, no significant difference between the scores of 
companies from mandatory reporting countries and companies from 
voluntary reporting countries. France has the most effective sustainability 
disclosures currently, followed by Canada, South Africa and the United 
States. 
o The existing format of reports is varied depending on the country 
evaluated. This is confusing for investors searching for disclosures, 
and for stakeholders who wish to inform themselves on corporate 
activity.  
o Sustainability reporting, especially when regulated, is centered on 
meeting the needs of investors and providers of capital. This is 
problematic, given the increasing attention given to broader 
stakeholder groups and the environment, and the existing 
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environmental and social problems perpetuated by the capitalist 
economy. 
 
8.3	  Further	  Areas	  of	  Research	  
 There are two main areas of research that stem from this study. The selected 
qualities evaluated on the scorecard, and the use of a scorecard for measuring report 
effectiveness, are possible areas of future study. Further research on the benefits of using 
one scorecard, as chosen in this study, and multiple scorecards (i.e. Morhardt et al., 
2002), does not appear to be evaluated in the literature, and is a future research gap that 
could be analyzed.  
Secondly, further research could be done to enhance the credibility of this study, 
by scaling up the study to include more countries, and by interviewing more international 
experts. Because only 4 countries were reviewed, it is difficult to state international 
patterns around sustainability reporting, and to provide statistically significant results due 
to the small sample size. Six professionals were interviewed, in order to create the 
scorecard in sub study 1. Interviewing additional experts from current case countries and 
others would further support existing qualities, and/or address other sustainability topics 
that should be included measures of reporting effectiveness.  
Further research could also be done on the format of corporate reporting, and how 
effective various forms of reporting are in communicating sustainability information. 
Specifically, it would be insightful to research the possibility of writing integrated reports 
not for providers of capital, but for all stakeholders, as the Institute of Directors of 
Southern Africa initially suggested. Lessons learned from emerging economies may serve 
to be useful for developed economies as well, as this study suggests that they consider 
and integrate corporate governance and social considerations more extensively than their 
European and North American counterparts. Investigating if it is even possible for this 
type of integrated report to exist, on an ideological level, would be useful for academics 
and policy makers interested in the future of corporate reporting. The current landscape 
of reporting is messy – determining the most conducive report structure that embodies a 
stakeholder-accountability approach and the environment, as outlined by Brown and 
Fraser (2006) and Kolk (2008), would potentially simplify the currently complex 
reporting space.  
 
8.4	  Concluding	  Remarks	  
This study suggests that the mandatory/voluntary nature of sustainability 
reporting does not have a significant impact on the effectiveness of the report. However, 
it also suggests that the recent trend of mandatory sustainability reporting aims primarily 
at investor needs. Governments need to start requiring companies to report on 
environmental, social, economic, and governance performance and impacts. It can give 
investors and other stakeholders credible, comparable, and quantitative information, 
which they can rely upon for financial and non-financial decision-making. This 
information, if in regulated documents, should be written in a less technical manner. It is 
suggested that governments attempt to regulate sustainability disclosures in another 
format, such as through stand-alone sustainability reports (as opposed to disclosures 
within annual reports), to see if this improves the reporting effectiveness to both 
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interested investors and stakeholders. Additional research should also be undertaken in 
other countries for a broader, international perspective. This can improve the size of the 
data sample and alleviate the inconclusive conclusion of the results. 
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Figure 20: UNEP/SustainAbility Criteria from Milne, Tegida and Walkton (2003) 
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Figure 21: KPMG Criteria for Corporate Responsibility Reporting Quality (KPMG, 2013) 
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Appendix	  1:	  Semi-­‐Structured	  Interview	  Questions	  
 
Sub study 1: Sample Questions for Interview 
 
In defining a sustainability report as a stand-alone report, annual report disclosures, and 
integrated reporting: 
 
1. What do you believe should be the overall goal of the sustainability report?  
a) How would you define an “effective sustainability report”, according to the investment 
community? (i.e. what should the report be able to do?) 
 
2. What do investors want to find in a sustainability report? In an annual report? 
a) Do you believe this changes in different countries?  
 
3. Are there examples of sustainability reports from OECD countries that you believe 
exemplify strong sustainability reports? 
 
4. Are there key features in government regulated sustainability reporting, and key 
features in voluntary, company-led sustainability reporting that you have detected?  
a) Do you believe one type of reporting (mandatory or voluntary) discloses more 
environmental, social, and economic information for investors? 
b) Do you believe one type of reporting (mandatory or voluntary) includes more credible 
information for investors? 
 
5. Do you detect any current evolutions or major shifts occurring within sustainability 
reporting, or in the future? 
 
6. Based on your experience, which indicators or dimensions of a sustainability report are 
investors most attentive to? 
 
7. Do you believe sustainability reporting can be improved to serve as an important tool 
towards sustainable development? 
 
8. In considering currently sustainability challenges facing companies and society, do you 
see voluntary standards, mandatory standards, or varying degrees of both, as important to 
the future of effective sustainability reporting?  
a) Are there additional attributes of reporting that you believe investors are looking for, 
but are not yet highly prevalent in sustainability reporting? 
 
9. How would you describe the current state of regulated annual reporting from the 
perspective of sustainability?  
a) Do investors typically assess the annual report before the stand alone sustainability 
report, or are both weighted equally?  
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Appendix	  2:	  Interview	  Data	  Coding	  
Data	  Coding	  Chart	  	  
Stage Coding Procedure Topics and Categories 
1st Read: 
Steps 1-2 
of Tesch 
(1990) 
Initial read of each 
transcript, find 
underlying meaning and 
main themes  
• Sustainable strategy central to a strong report and its content  
• Need for business relevance  
• Forward looking aspect of sustainability and definition of 
sustainability is confusing 
• Reporting changes for different types of industries, sectors, countries 
• Each type of corporate report has a different function and goal 
• The integrated reporting movement in South Africa is not as all 
encompassing as portrayed 
• Comparability lacking in sustainability reporting beyond the 
governance debate 
• Sustainable development is not the current intention of sustainability 
reporting  
• Brand management 
• Message from leadership 
• Targeted reporting with tracking of indicators 
• Materiality impacts the content of a sustainability report  
• Role for international standard setters in helping comparability 
• Economic viewpoint does not align with environmental viewpoint or 
social viewpoints  
• Shareholder value is a political idea 
• Transferability of financial accounting principles but limited  
• North American perspective versus EU perspective; US voluntary vs. 
EU mandatory  
• Ontology of sustainability reporting comes pre-legislation 
• Current sustainability reporting does not understand sustainability 
nor include it 
• Sophistication of issues by parties who understand sustainability has 
prevented the debate towards  
• Poor success of GRI 
• Environmental and social values are different 
• Un-sustainability of public companies 
• Deep ecology  
• Integrated reporting focus on financial risk, not environmental or 
social risk 
• Need for environmental and social accounting principles 
• Integrated reporting has an implicit focus on sustainability 
• Non-financial and financial reporting do not need to be physical – 
role of technology and portal format 
• Mixed mediums of reporting can improve report quality 
• SEC reluctance at disclosure regulation 
• Balancing long term viability of company with short term profit 
demands 
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• Information systems and quality controls are lagging in sustainability 
reporting 
• Integrated reporting and sustainability reporting are for different 
groups and different purposes but there are commonalities 
• South Africa has higher quality integrated reports than others  
• Mandatory reporting as competitive advantage for emerging 
economies 
• Culture and country impact mandatory/voluntary debate 
• Sustainable strategy, not initiatives, need to be in an integrated report 
• Stakeholder engagement 
• Readability  
• Material issues are measured with a KPI 
• Materiality is incorrectly used in sustainability reporting (i.e. the 
GRI) 
• Quality of information beyond the mandatory voluntary debate 
• Climate change disclosure is becoming increasingly relevant to many 
industries 
• Positive change towards sustainable development will be dependent 
on allocation of capital, which is influenced by reports 
• Companies are still getting to the stage of thinking about disclosing 
versus actually disclosing 
• Investor recognition of sustainability topics as material is 
determining factor  
• Form and content change by country/political region, stock 
regulation 
• Mandatory filings more credible than voluntary 
• Mandatory can be boilerplate, generic 
• Voluntary disclosures need higher quality information 
• Sustainability reporting and annual report disclosures have different 
audiences and purposes  
• Regulated annual reporting and sustainability is still in the early 
stages 
• Not many good mandatory reporting examples 
• Multiple goals of the sustainability report 
• Public relations/community relations 
• Financial benefit of sustainability 
• Meeting regulatory requirements 
• Investment decision criteria 
• Weak enforcement of the SEC 
• The need for employee buy in and involvement 
• Understanding extent of unsustainability and lifestyle changes 
• Ecological footprint, ecobalances, equity issues 
 
Cluster: 
Step 3 
Topic Groups: 
 
Bold: Mandatory Voluntary Debate 
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Teal: Purpose of Sustainability Reporting 
Green: Audiences and Stakeholders 
Gray: Investor Centrism 
Light Blue: Geographical Trends 
Magenta: Materiality 
Light Green: Challenges and Critiques 
Red: Report Attributes 
Yellow: Strategy 
 
Creswell (2014) Coding Themes: 
 
Expected Themes: 
Investor and shareholder centric view of integrated reporting and somewhat to sustainability 
reporting · Sustainability strategies are more important than check box initiatives · Poor ESG 
information systems impact quality of reporting · Identification of material issues · Different reports 
(IR, SR, AR) have different goals and audiences · Difficulty understanding sustainability · 
Integrated reports are for providers of financial capital · Mandatory and voluntary standards will 
collectively improve reporting performance · Mandatory reporting difficult for small companies · 
Progressive goals of reporting · American versus European views · Private governance · Assurance 
for credibility 
 
Surprising Themes: 
Low adoption rates of GRI in MNCs · Materiality definition is legal and misconstrued in voluntary 
reporting · Brand management/public relations/community relations still central aim of reports · 
Weak enforcement in the SEC · US is predicted to stay market-driven and voluntary in sustainability 
disclosures · Overlap between the IIRC Framework and Regulation S-K · Lawsuit potential to 
materiality claims in AR · Definition of sustainability · Sustainability as empirical category not 
socially constructed one · True sustainability reporting is not in company interests · Mandatory 
successful for particular socio-political conditions · South Africa not strongly regulated 
 
Unusual Themes:  
No true sustainability reporting exists yet · Forgotten methods of environmental and social 
accounting · Difficulty understanding sustainability · Competitive advantage of integrated reporting 
for emerging economies · Government recognition of voluntary standards required for successful 
implementation (SASB) · Poor quality sustainability reporting across the world · Prevention of the 
debate by those who understand it (WBCSD) · Substantial sustainability reporting would profoundly 
change the world · Shareholder value is political belief · Auditors nervous with forward looking 
information · 
Assigned 
Codes: 
Step 4 
Integration of Interview Themes with Literature Themes: 
Concept of sustainability · Sustainability strategy · Integrated performance · Internal controls · 
Balance of negative and positive · Materiality discussion · Stakeholder engagement · Governance · 
Business relevance/Investor relevance · Supply chain · Compliance with standards (legislated and/or 
voluntary) 
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Appendix	  3:	  Sustainability	  Reporting	  Qualities	  Scorecard	  –	  
Mandatory	  Template	  
Note: The N/A beside Quality 8b and 8bb would not be present for the voluntary case 
countries. The N/A for Canada and the US would be beside Quality 8a and 8aa. 
 
 
 
 
 
Sustainability Reporting Qualities Scorecard
Company Name:               Reports: 
Notes
1
Understanding 
of Sustainable 
Development 
Definition of sustainability, 
with consideration of SD as 
defined by Brundtland 0 1 2 3
Details No mention of sustainable development
Sustainability important from a 
brand management perspective; 
no detailed definition or 
connection to SD
Provides clear definition of 
sustainability but not directly 
connected to time dimension of 
SD. Sustainability important for 
long-term financial returns
Sustainability defined in 
connection to company 
operations and SD recognized 
as important for long term 
value (i.e. carrying capacity, 
future generations 
mentioned/time dimension 
included, scale of development 
discussed)
2
Management 
Involvement & 
Engagement 
Message from leadership 
with evidence of 
management involvement 0 1 2 3
Details No evidence of management involvement in the report
Message from mgmt without 
supporting information from 
within the company on their 
involvement and responsibilities
Message from mgmt with some 
supporting information of their 
involvement (i.e. responsibilities 
explained). National Corporate 
Governance code may be 
mentioned, but compliance not 
clear.
Message from mgmt with 
evidence of CEO/CSO/VP 
involvement (board 
expectations, code of conduct, 
how they help in the strategic 
management). Compliance 
with national Corporate 
Governance Code mentioned.
3
Corporate 
Sustainability 
Governance 
Transparency
Overview of organization’s 
activities and governance 
structure 0 1 2 3
Details
No explanation of company 
operations/activities or 
governance structure
Explanation of company 
activities and governance 
structure without explaining 
where sustainability fits 
Explanation of company 
activities and governance 
structure, with some connection 
made between corporate 
governance and sustainability
Company activities, corporate 
governance structure 
explained with clear 
delineation of sustainability 
responsibilities and structures 
throughout the organization
4
Strategic 
Outlook
Company accountable to a 
corporate sustainability 
strategy  0 1 2 3
Details
No sustainability strategy 
present or discussed, may 
discuss initiatives
Sustainability vision in place, 
largely qualitatively described. 
Some degree of strategic focus 
(may have sustainability policy 
in place).
Sustainability vision with 
targeted quantitative goals, with 
timelines and assessment of 
performance
Sustainability vision with 
targeted quantitative goals, 
timelines, assessment of 
performance (indexing), and 
connection to stakeholders. 
Report sees time as 
intergenerational.
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Sustainability Reporting Qualities Scorecard
Company Name:               Reports: 
5a
Balance of 
qualitative and 
quantitative 
Qualitative and quantitative 
content on identified 
components of 
sustainability performance 
(i.e. those identified as 
material 0 1 2 3
Details
No use of KPIs (financial or 
non-financial), heavy reliance 
on story telling.
Heavy use of narrative in 
describing sustainability 
performance, minor use of KPIs 
and measurement (cannot see 
trends or goal setting)
Does not measure each 
component of sustainability 
performance, but use of both 
narrative and KPIs (may not be 
able to see trends over time yet)
Each component of 
sustainability performance has 
own KPI (non-financial or 
financial) supported with a 
narrative, measured 
quantitatively, consistently 
implemented
5b
Balance of 
negative and 
positive
Discussion of both negative 
and positive performance 0 1 Data Point.
Details
No discussion on 
performance being positive or 
negative 
Positive performance and 
negative performance discussed
6
Measured 
sustainability 
performance 
Economic, social, and 
environmental dimensions 
of performance are 
discussed and integrated 0 1 2 3
Details
No discussion of 
environmental, social, or 
economic performance
1-2 dimensions (environmental, 
social, economic) of 
performance discussed 
qualitatively
At least 2 dimensions 
(environmental, social, 
economic) of performance are 
discussed both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. 
All dimensions 
(environmental, social, 
economic) of performance are 
discussed both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, with the 
use of integrated indicators.
7
Assurance of 
Data
Assurance provided on 
sustainability disclosures 0 1 2 3
Details No form of assurance used
Self-Assurance: Some or all data 
or KPIs are assured through a 
self-regulatory/internal standard 
(i.e. board review). No 
independent, external party is 
involved.
Limited Assurance: Data or KPIs 
of some material sustainability 
issues are assured by an 
independent and external 
assurance provider.
Full Assurance: Data or KPIs 
of majority of material 
sustainability issues are 
assured by an independent and 
external assurance provider.
See Below: 8a, 8aa OR 8b, 8bb are to be filled out, depending on the country - not both.
8a
Awareness of 
Compliance
Awareness of compliance 
with existing standard (if 
law/policy in place) – 
Applies to France and 
South Africa 0 1 2 3
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Sustainability Reporting Qualities Scorecard
Company Name:               Reports: 
Details No mention of existing reporting regulation
Mention of regulation but no 
attempt to discuss or apply it
Some explanation of regulation, 
but unclear if company applies it 
Understanding of regulation 
and its impacts, with evidence 
of company awareness of 
requirements and applying 
them
8aa
Is a voluntary standard 
applied/mentioned? 0 1 Data Point.
Details No Yes
8b
Awareness of 
Compliance
Compliance with Standard 
(if voluntary Standard in 
place) – USA, Canada 0 1 2 3 N/A
Details No voluntary standard used for report
Internally derived standard or 
management system used, no 
external standard referred to
Use of external standard, but 
either with no assurance and/or 
not completely applied
Use of external standard with 
either complete application 
and/or assurance N/A
8bb
Is more than one voluntary 
standard 
applied/mentioned? 0 1 N/A
Details No Yes N/A
9
Transparency 
on Materiality
Transparency of materiality 
concept and assessment of 
material issues 0 1 2 3
Details No discussion of materiality
Material issues identified 
without disclosure of materiality 
assessment and key stakeholders
Material issues identified with 
materiality assessment and 
identification of key 
stakeholders
Material issues identified and 
assessed through direct 
engagement with stakeholders 
and are connected to the 
company’s sustainability 
strategy (i.e. through KPIs) 
10
Climate Change
Climate change explained 
as decision useful 
information 0 1
No mention Some mention
Discussion of climate 
change (i.e. identified as risk 
or material issue)
11
Stakeholder 
Involvement
Stakeholder identification 
and involvement in 
company strategy 0 1 2 3
Details No identification of stakeholders
Identification of key 
stakeholders 
Identification of key 
stakeholders and stakeholder 
engagement processes discussed 
with concerns listed
Identification of key 
stakeholders, stakeholder 
engagement process discussed, 
and evidence of key 
stakeholder concerns are 
integrated into strategic 
planning
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Sustainability Reporting Qualities Scorecard
Company Name:               Reports: 
12
Stakeholder 
Involvement
Accessibility and 
comprehensibility of 
content 0 1 2 3
Details
Report is difficult to access 
(i.e. may be 
compartmentalized), is 
audience specific, and lacks 
engagement (i.e. all textual). 
 Report is highly textual, 
generally appeals to one 
stakeholder group
Report uses a balance of text and 
visuals, user-friendly to more 
than one stakeholder group
Report is interactive for the 
user, and tries to connect to 
other mediums of corporate 
reporting the company offers. 
Report shows attempt to 
operate as a portal of 
sustainability information, as 
opposed to a PDF format.
TOTAL SCORE
MAXIMUM 35
Comment'
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Appendix	  4:	  Notes	  on	  Scoring	  Each	  Quality	  
In considering the guidance of the Details section of the scorecard and the reviewed 
researcher comments in the Notes column, additional observations were made with 
respect to the scoring methodology for each quality. Despite some of the clarifications 
and commentary below, one researcher evaluated each quality for the duration of the 
study, and the application of each quality was consistently implemented for each country. 
 
Quality	  1: Some companies would mention future generations, or the precautionary 
approach, but would not include a definition of sustainability that clearly depicted 
environmental, social and economic impacts. These companies would receive a 2/3, as 
they are beginning to understand the time dimension of sustainability and sustainable 
development, but have not fully made readers aware of the definition they are relating to. 
 
Quality	  2: CEO messages/letters were typically always present in some shape or form. In 
regulated disclosures, specifically the French registration documents, these messages 
would be more difficult to find. In order to attain a 2/3 or a 3/3, the message would have 
to move beyond discussing positive sustainability initiatives within the company, and 
mention how management is accountable for sustainability performance, with evidence 
of sustainability leadership (CSO, VP, Director) in the report. 
 
Quality	  3: Determining scores for this quality were fairly straightforward. This quality 
initially appears similar to Quality 2, but focuses more on the transparency around 
sustainability governance within the organization, as opposed to having management sign 
and approve the report (Quality 2). A 2/3 required some sustainability roles and 
responsibilities to be allocated within the company, while a 3/3 often included a visual 
map and clearly explained the responsible party for sustainability performance and 
impacts within a company.  
 
Quality	  4: Scoring strategic outlook was challenging at first, but the Details section was 
central in determining the exact scores. A company would need to have a majority of the 
features in the details section in order to get that score. The corporate strategy 
discussed/mentioned in the report needed to have some dimension of sustainability (i.e. 
not just the general corporate strategy on building value or establishing returns). A 
qualitative strategy with no way to measure progress was a 1/3. Some goal setting with a 
qualitative strategy was a 2/3.Targeted goals with quantitative values, and a medium-long 
term time frame was required for a 3/3 score. It became clear to the researcher that many 
companies did not include stakeholders as a pillar or dimension of their corporate 
sustainability strategy. Although this was recommended for a 3/3 in the strategy quality, 
it was not required for this score.  
 
Quality	  5: Quality 5a was not only attempting to measure the balance of qualitative and 
quantitative information, but could also offer insight into the potential utility of the report 
to many stakeholder groups. Most companies scored a 2/3 in this category, as a 3/3 
required that each identified dimension of sustainability (i.e. in each category/pillar of the 
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sustainability report/chapter) had a KPI and a narrative. Some companies would have 
selected KPIs, or one short section with indicators and no context or discussion on the 
relevance of this data. This would be a 1/3. Companies who measure some degree of both 
hard data (quantitative KPIs) and have a narrative would score 2/3 if they did not discuss 
trends or patterns emerging. 
Because of the differences between mandatory and voluntary sustainability 
disclosures, Quality 5b was a data point and not included in the total score. A 1/1 was 
allocated if something negative and/or challenging was identified clearly in the report 
(i.e. could be detected in the first reading). Most companies scored 1/1 on this. 
 
Quality	  6: This quality assessed if companies were measuring performance in each of the 
three pillars of sustainability, according to the triple bottom line. It is understood that 
each pillar may not have the same number or quality of disclosures, as each industry 
addresses different impacts and risks, depending on the nature of their business. 
Companies would often use different terminology to discuss these dimensions of 
sustainability, particularly around the social pillar. Common terms would include 
“society”, “people”, “community development” and “employees”. French companies 
would often have a “society” and a “social” category. Financial information would often 
not necessarily fit in the economic dimension of sustainability. Economic disclosures 
would include information on market presence, customer satisfaction, value creation and 
earnings, patents and intellectual property, supply chain information, anticorruption 
disclosures, and data on raw materials (Lozano and Huisingh, 2011). Financial 
disclosures around revenues, assets, profits, return on equity, and share price would not 
be sufficient as economic disclosures on their own, but would still be reviewed alongside 
other economic disclosures.  
Even if all three dimensions were discussed in some way (economic, social, 
environmental), a 3/3 required some integrated indicators that cross more than one 
dimension of sustainability. This includes indicators such as wealth created per 
employee, human capital investment as a percentage of profit, or the average CO2 
emissions emitted per employee (Azapagic, 2004; Lozano and Huisingh, 2011). These 
indicators would typically have to include economic, environmental, and social 
considerations.  
 
Quality	  7: Assurance was relatively straightforward in its assessment. Self-imposed 
assurance systems would often be explicitly referred to in a corporate governance section. 
These systems were often present in South Africa (part of their combined assurance 
model), and to some extent in Canada and the US, if there was some board of directors or 
senior leadership approval process and review of the sustainability disclosures. Because 
assurance on sustainability disclosures is relatively new and still developing, a 2/3 would 
apply to a company that assured some of their material sustainability impacts (less than 
50%). This assurance could be limited or reasonable in the degree to which is was 
assured. A 3/3 would include a majority of data was assured, either at the limited or 
reasonable level of assurance. Signed letters from external advisory firms were often a 
strong indication of a 2/3 or a 3/3.  
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Quality	  8: Quality 8 is testing the dependent variable, the sustainability reporting 
implementation method. This can be either through regulated disclosures (Quality 8a/aa) 
or through voluntary disclosures (Quality 8b/bb). Quality 8aa and 8bb are not included in 
the total score, as the presence of a voluntary reporting standard does not necessarily 
equate to higher quality reporting.  
 Scoring Quality 8a was very clear. Companies would often mention the regulation 
to either Grenelle II as stated in Article 225 of the French Commercial Code (France) or 
the King III Code of Corporate Governance (South Africa). Most companies would 
mention the regulation, and then state how they applied it. Sometimes they would refer to 
sections of the report. For example, French companies often referred to a Table of 
Concordance to Grenelle II, and South African companies sometimes included a King III 
compliance table, which would state how each principle was applied, and explain 
exceptions. French and South African companies, generally, had a strong understanding 
of existing regulation.  
 Scoring Quality 8b was also easy to judge. American and Canadian companies 
would make it quite clear what standards were considered in the creation of their 
sustainability report, as readers would interpret this as a positive contribution to the 
company’s credibility. A score of 2/3 would mean the company mentioned a standard, 
and maybe included some disclosures from the standard (i.e. select GRI indicators) but 
did not get any assurance on this. A score of 3/3 would include complete application of a 
standard and/or evidence of assurance. If a company explained that they fully applied a 
standard (i.e. they had a CDP report, a GRI table/appendix, a UN Global Compact 
section), they would score a 3/3.  
 
Quality	  9: The details section was heavily relied on for this quality. There seemed to be a 
general avoidance of the term “materiality” in all case country reports. The progression 
from a 0/3 to a 3/3 was driven by how transparent the materiality process was in the 
report, while considering that the term “materiality” may not be used. French companies, 
or example, often used the term “issues/information consider to be the most important”, 
which would be a 1/3, as this is just disclosure of the issues. A 2/3 would be allocated if a 
company identified the issues and the materiality assessment process, without identifying 
stakeholders. This is a slight change from the Details section of Quality 9. 
 
Quality	  10: As mentioned above, this quality was assessed on 0-2 scale and was straight-
forward to apply. In order to score a 2/2, climate change could not be merely mentioned 
once or twice in a report, but required a narrative and discussion on how it impacted the 
company. Identifying climate change as a risk or material issue was a 3/3, so long as 
there was some narrative about climate change as well. 
 
Quality	  11: Choosing between a 2/3 and a 3/3 was more challenging for this quality. A 
1/3 was easy to allocate, as a company would only identify stakeholders without further 
commentary. This usually occurred in a designated section of the report on stakeholders. 
Some reports required further in-text searches to find identified stakeholders for the 
company. It became apparent that many companies were not very clear on the 
stakeholder engagement mechanisms they used, and how frequently they interacted with 
various stakeholders, such as employees and local communities. For these purposes, a 
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company could score a 2/3 without a very transparent discussion on their engagement 
processes. A score of 3/3 generally required some integration of stakeholder concerns 
into strategy, which shows a company taking information from their stakeholders, and 
using it for positive changes within the organization.  
 
Quality	  12: Michael Krzus identified the portal report as the gold standard of corporate 
reporting (Pers.comm., Jan, 16, 2015). Quality 12 was aiming to abide by this discovery. 
However, it was discovered that some reports that tried to do this were very 
compartmentalized and difficult to comprehend, and thus would receive a 2/3. Too many 
links and external references within a report would make it confusing, and leave the 
information very dispersed, negatively impacting readability. RBC notably stands out as 
one such example. Reports that scored a 1/3 were usually written very technically and 
aimed towards one audience, usually investors. Integrated reports in South Africa often 
scored a 1/3 because of their investor-centric nature. A PDF report written for a broader 
audience than investors would typically score a 2/3. A score of 3/3 would try to connect 
to other reports, but without confusing the reader or losing focus. TD and AT&T were 
good examples of balanced reporting, with easy connection to other corporate documents 
or websites within the one report. 
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Appendix	  5:	  Quantitative	  Analysis	  Results	  
 
TEST #1: T-TEST 
 
> #Testing each country with a t-test 
>  
> yR <- c(20.9,18.4) 
> yN <- c(18.7,17.6) 
> t.test (yR,yN,var.equal=T) 
 
 Two Sample t-test 
 
data:  yR and yN 
t = 1.0984, df = 2, p-value = 0.3866 
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 
 -4.375918  7.375918 
sample estimates: 
mean of x mean of y  
    19.65     18.15  
 
 
yR = regulated countries 
yN = non regulated countries 
p-value is GREATER then 0.05, thus there is no evidence against the null hypothesis  
 
TEST #2: T-TEST  
 
> yR <- c(27,17,19,22,20,19,21,19,23,22,21.19,22,18,17,20,18,17,13,19) 
> yN <- c(13,22,16,24,13,23,14,14,19,18,15,25,21,21,22,16,17,12,24,12) 
> t.test (yR,yN,var.equal=T) 
 
 Two Sample t-test 
 
data:  yR and yN 
t = 1.3592, df = 37, p-value = 0.1823 
alternative hypothesis: true difference in means is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 
 -0.806931  4.095352 
sample estimates: 
mean of x mean of y  
 19.69421  18.05000  
 
yR = regulated countries 
yN = non regulated countries 
p-value is GREATER then 0.05, thus there is no evidence against the null hypothesis  
 
 
TEST #3: MONTE CARLO METHOD 
 
 
>  
> #Monte Carlo 
> #Read in file 
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> Companies <- read.csv("mel.csv") 
>  
> #Get each company as a variable 
> companiesx <- subset(Companies, select=Score, drop=T) 
>  
> observed <- abs(19.69421 - 18.05000) #store observed mean differences  
>  
> #set.seed(0) 
>  
> B <- 10^5-1  #set number of times to repeat this process 
> result <- numeric(B) # space to save the random differences 
> for(i in 1:B) 
+ { 
+   index <- sample(40, size=20, replace = FALSE) # sample of numbers 
from 1:40 
+   result[i] <- mean(companiesx[index]) - mean(companiesx[-index]) 
+ } 
>  
>  
>  
> ##Plot 
>  
> hist(result,xlab="Mean DIfference in Score", main="Randomizations of 
Score") 
>  
>  
> #Compute P-value 
> pleft <- (sum(result < observed)+1)/(B+1) 
> pright <- (sum(result >= observed)+1)/(B+1) 
> 2*min(pleft,pright) # two-sided P-value 
[1] 0.1581 
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Glossary 
 
Effectiveness: Effectiveness is defined in this thesis as a two-part term. Effectiveness 
primarily refers to meeting generally accepted sustainability reporting criteria developed 
in sub study 1. The criteria was based on the literature and interviews. Effectiveness also 
relates to meeting the requirements and/or guidelines issued for sustainability reporting; 
this is pertinent when reviewing mandatory sustainability reporting policies. The 
rationale for this definition is that it includes not only an assessment of awareness of the 
policies that govern sustainability reporting, but also evaluates the extent to which a 
report can abide by evidence-based sustainability criteria. Section 2.3.2 provides 
additional clarification around this term, with grounding in the literature. 
 
Mandatory: Mandatory sustainability reporting will be used to refer to those standards 
that attempt to follow a hard law approach, where legislation is written to govern the 
sustainability disclosures of a particular group of companies. It is understood, however, 
that many mandatory policies could be more often characterized as soft law, and they 
often lack sanctions and compliance mechanisms at present, which are characteristic of 
mandatory systems (IRSE, 2012). This may or may not include penalties or fines as 
consequences for non-compliance. A joint study by UNEP, GRI and KPMG surveying 
sustainability reporting policies around the world required one of four criteria to be met 
for a policy to be considered “mandatory”. These criteria were: 1) Governmental/market 
regulatory requirements of sustainability information, 2) CSR initiatives 
requiring/providing guidance for sustainability reporting or other forms of public 
disclosure, 3) Requirements or recommendations covering single topic or sector (i.e. 
GHG; mining), 4) Standards on sustainability assurance (GRI et al., 2013, p.8). 
 
Sustainability Report: a sustainability report will be a publically accessible corporate 
report that includes sustainability disclosures and matches one of the three forms of 
sustainability reporting – the stand alone report, annual report disclosures, or the 
integrated report. The formats are fairly inclusive, in order to account for national 
differences in reporting format. These formats are defined further in the literature review. 
 
Sustainability Reporting:  There are a variety of definitions of sustainability reporting.  
Since the GRI is seen as the leading organization on sustainability reporting guidelines, 
their conception of sustainability reporting will be used. GRI (2014) defines sustainability 
reporting as, “a report published by a company or organization about the economic, 
environmental and social impacts caused by its everyday activities. A sustainability 
report also presents the organization's values and governance model, and demonstrates 
the link between its strategy and its commitment to a sustainable global economy.” 
 
Sustainability Reporting Standards: Any guideline or policy that dictates particular 
principles and/or indicators to be included in a sustainability report. These standards do 
not need to be “standardized”, in the sense that they can be mandatory and governed by a 
particular law, or they may exist as a standard companies can choose to adopt. Standards 
typically have a physical boundary (i.e. one document) and a boundary in their 
application (i.e. publically traded companies).  
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Voluntary: Voluntary sustainability reporting will be used to refer to non-binding rules 
and/or standards that companies can choose to apply, and can choose the extent to which 
they comply with the standards. There may also be no guideline present – the report is 
still considered voluntary. The non-binding nature is a defining feature, in comparison to 
mandatory reporting. Individual companies, industries, and their associations often 
motivate voluntary sustainability reporting, as opposed to governments. The standards 
may be created by standard setting initiatives. 
                                                
 
